Israel’s attack on Qatar occurred while the Persian Gulf security order in recent years, and prior to Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, was known for indicators such as the expansion of the Abraham Accords and Israel’s security convergence with the Gulf Arabs under American leadership.
The Abraham Accords altered the regional security architecture of the Persian Gulf, establishing a new security order. This new order was aligned with the US strategy of ‘offshore balancing’ in the Gulf, aimed at reducing its military presence and focusing on containing China. Furthermore, this strategy is partly a revision of traditional American alliances, famously known as ‘Trojan alliances,’ where the main burden of security costs fell on the US, and other alliance members enjoyed the privilege of free-riding.
This new regional security order entered a more serious phase with the transfer of Israel from the US European Command (US EUCOM) to the US Central Command (CENTCOM). The Abraham Accords completed this loop, leading to enhanced security and intelligence cooperation between Israel and the Gulf Arabs, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The ultimate goal was the creation of a joint defense system consisting of Gulf Arab countries and Israel under US leadership.
In 2020, by signing the Abraham Accords with the UAE, Israel laid the groundwork for an agreement aimed at redefining the Middle East peace process, centered on the formation of a Palestinian state and the recognition of Israel as part of the region. This agreement paved the way for economic initiatives, including a comprehensive partnership with the UAE and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project. But the strategic outlook has changed. The ongoing Gaza war, with its staggering human casualties condemned worldwide, along with the expansion of settlements in the West Bank, has eroded the foundation of this partnership.
While the Persian Gulf security order was characterized by the normalization of Arab-Israeli relations and the creation of a strategic partnership among India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and U.S. (I2U2) and the IMEC, Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, followed by the Gaza war, attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon, direct attacks on Iran, along with the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, have decisively shifted the balance of power in favor of Israel.
The idea of a new regional order where Israel operates with impunity while dictating security norms to its neighbors is highly undesirable for the traditionally pro-Western Gulf Arab states. These concerns are fueled in part by the weak opposition and firm support from the US and Europe for Israel’s actions, which has deeply worried the Gulf Arabs. They are now more concerned about Israel itself and its hegemonic ambitions—particularly with Netanyahu’s “Greater Israel” plan and his sarcastic remark to Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi Crown Prince, about establishing a Palestinian state on Saudi territory.
Israel’s attack on Qatar intensified this concern and raised the possibility of another attack on this country or even on other Arab countries, for instance, on Oman for hosting Houthi leaders. After Trump told Doha it would not face similar attacks again, Netanyahu announced he would attack Hamas leaders wherever they are.
This attack redefined Gulf-Israel relations. The issue is no longer how to expand the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia or Syria, but how Gulf countries can protect themselves from Israeli actions carried out under the ‘open domain doctrine,’ which allows Israel to target any country at any time for any reason—even in defiance of international law and the UN Charter.
The largest US military base in the Middle East is located in Qatar. Trump visited Qatar on his first foreign trip during his second presidential term. Qataris hoped that by proposing extensive investments, they could change the Trump administration’s view of them. But during Trump’s first term, his approach towards Qatar led to an economic blockade by Arab countries.
For many years, the primary strategic assumption in the Persian Gulf has been that the United States is the ultimate guarantor of security in the region: Washington was seen as a critical and irreplaceable actor in securing the Gulf. The US military presence, especially after the 1990-91 Gulf War, has always been considered the ultimate deterrent against external aggression and a guarantee of regime survival. This was notably reflected in US security doctrines regarding the Gulf, particularly the Reagan Doctrine.
Hosting US bases, purchasing US military equipment, and aligning foreign policy with Washington’s interests were understood to ensure adequate protection. The attack on Aramco in 2019 and the lack of an appropriate US response to Riyadh’s request for a response, as well as involving Arabs in the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025, showed that the US not only fails to support the Arabs when necessary but also sacrifices them for its own interests and those of Israel. This indicates that US foreign policy and its ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy have diminished past US security guarantees for the Gulf Arabs.
Within this framework, Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia have achieved a degree of strategic independence in their regional policies while diversifying their strategic partnerships.
Of course, this trend of strategic independence, known as the ‘Gulf moment,’ has been pursued since the Arab Spring. The Gulf Arabs had seen with their own eyes that the US not only did not help Arab rulers but, in cases like Bahrain, advised the government to tolerate protesters and avoid impulsive decisions and actions. Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi concluded that they must have strategic independence and reduce their security dependence on the West. This trend is recognized through components such as: 1. Modernization of armed forces and creation of domestic defense industries; 2. Diversification of regional and extra-regional defense and military partnerships. Israel’s attack on Qatari soil has now reinforced the belief that past US security guarantees for the Gulf Arabs have diminished.
It is worth noting that during the Biden administration, Qatar was designated as a ‘major non-NATO ally’, following Kuwait and Bahrain. Thus, the United States failed to deter a hostile act against one of its closest Arab security partners in the Gulf. Qatar has been a close US partner for decades and has facilitated international negotiations. The last major negotiation between the US and the Taliban in 2020 took place in Doha, allowing Washington to withdraw from Afghanistan. The US relies on Qatar to communicate with opposing parties it cannot contact directly. Hamas’s political office in Qatar was established in 2012 at the request of the US government to maintain communication channels.
Washington’s silence and inaction have been interpreted not as neglect but as a form of complicity. On the other hand, the conservative international reaction to this blatant violation of international law sends a clear message to Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership: you are permitted to violate any law and harm anyone.
The traditional concern of the Gulf monarchies was the challenge posed by Iran’s proxy forces. But their weakening in the region, along with Israel’s military expansion in the area, has significantly shifted the balance of power in favor of Israel. This has caused concern among the Gulf Arabs. It was also believed by the Gulf Arab states that by being deeply engagedin Western, particularly American, structures, they could remain players and manage their security dependence.
Oil and gas markets were once the primary tools of this entanglement, but since the 2000s, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have increasingly positioned themselves as proxies for American power projection. From counterterrorism to regional diplomacy, the Gulf has transformed from a net consumer of US security to a net supplier of US power.
The Abraham Accords, which were the first formalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel, represented another layer of this entanglement. In Abu Dhabi and Manama, normalization with Israel was seen as a ticket to maintaining their standing in Washington. But the attack on Doha has exposed the limitations of this logic, as this entanglement has neither guaranteed security nor restrained Israel’s freedom of action from the US.
Over the past decade, Gulf Arab security thinking has been based on the assumption that although Israel has historically been a threat, its hostility could be contained by quietly and covertly winning its support. This is while Israel is seeking to realize a vision of regional dominance after Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack, which has deeply worried Arab powers. Its ultimate goal—a reconstructed ‘New Middle East’ accompanied by decisive military power—leaves little room for Gulf interests or independence.
Israel, once seen under US oversight as a potential partner, has now become an independent actor—empowered to project power in the Gulf without fear of consequences. If ‘mowing the grass’ was once Israel’s metaphor for containing Hamas, in the past two years, it has been plowing the neighbor’s garden. There are no rules, no red lines, no checks and balances.
Iran is still perceived as a threat, but at least a threat whose past actions were somewhat contained by the West. Yet Israel presents itself as a threat supported by the US and the West. However, due to the significant differences between Iran and the Gulf Arabs, a rapprochement between them following increasing Israeli threats cannot be expected unless Iran presents a security package to the Gulf Arabs and addresses their security concerns.
The key difference between the attack on Saudi Aramco by the Houthis of Yemen in 2019 and Israel’s attack on Qatar is precisely this: the attack on Aramco was carried out by an enemy. But the attack on Qatar was carried out by Israel while Doha was mediating negotiations between Israel and Hamas, and Hamas leaders in Doha were also reviewing the US plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza war. By targeting Qatar—a country that has acted as a vital bridge between Hamas and the US-Israel coalition since 2012 and the transfer of Hamas’s political office from Damascus to Doha—Israel attacked the heart of regional mediation efforts. Beyond an airstrike on a residential neighborhood in the Qatari capital, this was a direct offensive against the infrastructure of diplomacy. Based on this, Qatar’s ruling emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, stated at the emergency summit of Islamic and Arab countries: “If Israel wishes to assassinate the Hamas leaders, why then engage in negotiations?”
It is noteworthy that this attack was carried out with US support, and Western countries did not have serious and effective opposition to it. Also, this attack showed that Israel, with US support, wants to establish itself as the regional hegemon and will observe no red lines or limitations to achieve this goal. What has been highlighted most through Israel’s attack on Qatar is that in the absence of strategic, identity-based, and geopolitical links, economic or security dependencies have not been able to provide fulfilling security guarantees.
Israel’s attack on Qatar could have outcomes similar to Iran’s attack on Aramco by showing that the US security umbrella only works when America’s own interests are guaranteed. Thus, the Gulf Arab states will probably consider it worthless. However, the US, by announcing the need for a bilateral defense agreement with Qatar, is trying to keep Doha satisfied. From a security and economic perspective, it also seems unlikely that Qatar and other Gulf countries will reduce their relations with the US and Israel, although their concerns about Israel’s hegemonic ambitions are increasing.
In practice, today it is the Persian Gulf that finances American power, while Washington does not guarantee Gulf security. While it was previously argued that the Gulf Arab states were free-riding on the US in the form of Trojan alliances, Trump’s trip to the region and the signing of contracts worth totaling more than $2tn (£1.5tn) for the US and endangering the Gulf Arabs (Qatar) in the 12-day Iran-Israel war, and the lack of US government support for Qatar against Israel’s attack point to Washington’s ‘free-riding.’
Israel’s attack on Qatar has re-highlighted views regarding collective security mechanisms among Arab-Islamic countries. This view was also pursued during Trump’s first presidential term in the form of an ‘Arab NATO’ by countries like Saudi Arabia.
At the emergency meeting of Arab-Islamic countries in response to Israel’s attack on Qatar, the formation of a joint Arab-Islamic coalition was also proposed, particularly by the Egyptian government, with the proposal of a ‘NATO-style Arab military force’; an Egypt that desires to restore its leadership role in the Arab world.
Although unlikely given the Gulf states’ security and military dependence on the US, this nonetheless reflects a significant shift in their perspective toward exploring alternatives to the American security umbrella. Accordingly, strengthening intra-Gulf security cooperation and reviving the Gulf Cooperation Council is likely. Diversification of external partnerships with Europe, Pakistan, Turkey, and even India is also conceivable.
Strategic independence, once a topic of academic interest, is becoming a necessity among GCC members.
Accordingly, immediately after Israel’s attack on Qatar, Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense pact with Pakistan, whichpossesses nuclear weapons. What this partnership will bring to the regional dynamics remains to be seen.
Image source: © Vyacheslav Argenberg / http://www.vascoplanet.com/, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/64/Qatar%2C_Doha%2C_Qatar%2C_Persian_Gulf.jpg
