In remarkable developments within the Middle Eastern security sphere, the signing of the “Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement” between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in September 2025 elicited a positive response from the Islamic Republic of Iran. This stance is taken while Iran, over the past four decades, has consistently emphasized the exit of extra-regional powers from the Persian Gulf and the provision of security by regional countries. For Iran, this pact was welcomed at a time when Tehran had previously presented numerous regional initiatives, including the “Hormuz Peace Initiative” in 2019, aimed at creating collective security without external presence. Analyzing this development requires an in-depth examination of Iran’s strategic foundations and the post-October 2023 developments in the region.
Requirements of the New Security Order
The strategic defense pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, signed on September 17, 2025, is not merely a bilateral agreement but symbolizes a transition from a US-led security order towards a multipolar architecture in the Middle East. Based on “mutual deterrence” and “comprehensive support,” this pact followed Israel’s attack on Hamas officials in Qatar and reflects the profound and growing distrust of Arab countries towards Washington as a security guarantor.
In this context, Saudi Arabia, instead of relying on support from Western countries like the US, now relies on the military support of Pakistan, a regional Muslim country with a strong army and nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, this defense pact is a kind of hedging strategy in the multipolar order (it should be examined whether it is hedging or realignment).
Saudi Arabia’s strategic defense agreement with Pakistan is part of a wider formation of alignments within the broader Muslim world meant to counter Israel’s expanding power and ambitions in the region, as the threat perception has shifted from Iran to Israel.
From Riyadh’s perspective, this agreement is part of a broader diversification strategy: maintaining close relations with Washington, testing defense ties with China, expanding energy diplomacy with India, and now strengthening military cooperation with a long-standing partner, Pakistan, which has proven capabilities.
The Saudi-Pakistani defense pact emerged amid regional developments following the October 2023 attacks. This period witnessed the weakening of Iran’s proxy network through Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the fall of the Syrian government. In June 2025, direct conflicts escalated into a 12-day war between Iran and Israel, during which Israel attacked senior Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists, and the US also targeted Iranian nuclear facilities in Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow. In response, Iran missile-attacked the US base in Qatar.
This war, as a geopolitical turning point, transformed the balance of power in the Middle East and revealed Iran’s weakness in maintaining its proxy network. It also showed that Arab Gulf countries, despite efforts to stay away from the conflict, cannot escape its consequences.
Prior to this war, the regional security order was shaped by the US “offshore balancing” strategy and the Abraham Accords, which aimed to create security cooperation between Israel and Arab countries under US leadership.
Indeed, regional initiatives such as the Abraham Accords; the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a US-supported commercial and connectivity project linking India, the Middle East, and Europe; the Negev Forum, a regional security forum bringing Israel together with Arab and Western partners; and I2U2, which groups India, Israel, the UAE, and the US for technological and economic cooperation, were designed to build a new order rooted in Arab-Israeli cooperation under US supervision. The goal was to connect Arab countries to Israel, exclude Turkey, and contain Iran.
However, Israel’s attack on Qatar, while the latter was mediating for a ceasefire, caused a fundamental shift in the region’s security calculations.
This attack, carried out against a key US ally in the region, severely questioned the credibility of Washington’s security umbrella and showed Israel’s unpredictable and aggressive behavior. Following this event, Arab countries realized they could not trust US security guarantees.
This trend has been observable since the 2019 attack on Aramco and the weak US response, which revealed Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability. These developments caused Gulf countries to intensify the process of strategic independence and diversification of security partnerships that had begun since the 2011 Arab Spring. In this framework, the Saudi defense pact with Pakistan is considered a message to the US and Israel, indicating Riyadh’s desire to seek security options outside the US-led structure.
But the Arab Gulf states are now more concerned about Israel itself and its hegemonic ambitions in the form of the “Greater Israel” plan.
The idea of a new regional order in which Israel operates with impunity and with little opposition and firm support from the US and Europe, while dictating security norms to its neighbors, is highly undesirable for the Arab Gulf states.
Following the Israeli attack on Qatar, many countries in the region, in response to this Israeli aggression, are diversifyingtheir security partnerships, investing in their own autonomy, and distancing themselves from normalization with Israel. A multitude of projects aimed at bringing Israel closer to Arab countries – primarily with US help, but also with support from India and Europe – will likely be marginalized.
In this context, following the attack on Qatar, Riyadh signed a defense pact with Pakistan; the choice of timing for signing could indeed be a message to the US and Israel. This pact actually indicates Riyadh’s desire for alternative security partnerships and intent to engage with another Muslim power outside the US-led security structure.
This Saudi move should be assessed within the framework of regional governments’ investments in internal capabilities and in diversifying suppliers through a hedging strategy. In this regard, Saudi Arabia has expanded cooperation with China regarding missiles and drones and has sought greater indigenization of defense production.
Reasons for Iran’s Support
Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iran has always adhered to two principles: rejection of the presence of extra-regional powers and the provision of security by regional countries. This view, repeatedly stated by Iranian officials, considers Washington a source of instability and Israel an existential threat. Accordingly, any foreign military presence in the Persian Gulf is considered contrary to Iran’s national interests. For decades, Iran – with little success – has encouraged Western-aligned Arab Gulf states to set aside their dependence on Washington for security and instead argues that regional actors themselves are the best option for maintaining regional stability.
In this regard, Iran in 2019 presented the “Hormuz Peace Endeavour“ proposed during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, a model of regional cooperation based on UNSC Resolution 598, which ended the Iran-Iraq War. The initiative called for members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Iran to jointly assume responsibility for regional security without foreign intervention.
Based on this, Iran’s support for a defense pact between a GCC member and an extra-regional country must be sought, contrary to Iran’s traditional doctrine towards the region, and as a result of the dynamics following the regional developments after the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel.
The strategic importance of supporting this pact for Iran was such that it was mentioned in the text of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s speech at the 80th UN General Assembly in New York, where it was welcomed as the beginning of a comprehensive regional security system with the cooperation of Muslim countries in West Asia in political, security, and defense fields.
Indeed, after the Israeli attack on Qatar, Iran seeks to capitalize on the concerns of Arab Gulf states regarding Israel’s advancement in the region and has accordingly emphasized confidence-building, mutual respect, regional convergence, and multilateralism based on international law.
Even before this, from Iran’s perspective, normalizing relations with Arab neighbors aimed to separate the positions of the US and the GCC regarding Iran. In this regard, most GCC members refused to allow the use of their territory or airspace for provocative military action against Tehran and avoided participation in US operations against the Houthis in the Red Sea and Yemen.
After the Israeli attack on Qatar, Iran also condemned this attack and strongly supported Qatar against Israeli threats, emphasizing the establishment of a joint defense mechanism by Islamic countries.
Although the Saudi-Pakistani defense agreement can also be considered a kind of response to the attack on Qatar, Arab countries currently prefer to focus on the greater threat, Israel.
It must be noted that despite Iran’s welcome of this agreement, the joint statement of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan announced that an attack on either country will be considered an aggression against the other.
Accordingly, the spearhead of this agreement could be directed against threats from Iran’s proxy forces, including the Houthis in Yemen. However, after the normalization of Iran-Saudi relations mediated by China, a ceasefire between the Houthis and Riyadh was implemented with Iran’s support. But despite this, Iran has raised the possibility of expanding the war to other countries in the region in case of conflict with the US – even after the attack on Qatar.
Thus, this pact could open the door for Pakistan’s involvement in Saudi Arabia’s regional rivalries, particularly with Iran.
This defense pact sends a powerful political message to the world, particularly to Iran and Israel, regarding the growing solidarity between the two Sunni nations. Given the severe potential international repercussions of Saudi Arabia pursuing its own nuclear weapon (the Saudi bomb), it is entirely logical for Riyadh to welcome the “strategic ambiguity” created by its pact with Pakistan. This deliberate ambiguity implants the possibility of “nuclear retaliation” into the strategic calculations of Iranian and Israeli officials, without requiring Saudi Arabia to bear the costs and risks of physically hosting nuclear warheads on its soil.
In the same vein, Mohammad Hosseini Baniasadi, an Iranian diplomat, sees Iran as one of the losers of this security pact, saying, “While Iran has good relations with Pakistan and has also restored relations with Saudi Arabia, the special conditions prevailing in the region and the signing of this pact ultimately means that Iran finds its hands tied from threatening or taking practical action against economic facilities in the sphere of US influence.”
Despite this, Iran sees the prevailing conditions governing the security relations of GCC member states with the US and Israel, and the weakening of the joint defense-security system with the United States – which does not definitively guarantee the security and stability of these countries – as an opportunity to cooperate with these countries to further weaken the American order and prevent further Israeli influence in the region (halting the process of normalization of Arab relations with Israel, especially Saudi Arabia).
The dissatisfaction of Gulf Arabs with US inaction at critical moments – such as the consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings, the 2019 Aramco attacks, and the Houthi attacks on Abu Dhabi in 2022 – increased doubts about Washington’s reliability. However, none of these instances involved the US allowing a hostile power to attack a GCC country.
In this context, Iran capitalizes on the Israeli attack on Qatar’s capital with the green light from US President Donald Trump, and the public admission by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of his biblical and historical belief in the necessity of forming “Greater Israel” including territories of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, even Mecca and Medina, as issues that concern the Arab Gulf states.
Tehran has also tried, by relying on shared religious and cultural identities, to strengthen solidarity with GCC members and portray their close relations with Washington as a betrayal of regional independence and pan-Islamic unity. Although Iran’s efforts to present itself as a credible alternative to Western security guarantees have had little practical success, this narrative remains a central theme in Iran’s diplomacy with neighboring Arab countries.
On the other hand, Iran views this agreement as creating a kind of deterrence against Israel. This is while Iran considered the idea of an “Islamic NATO” initiated by Saudi Arabia during Trump’s first term as an action and a threat against itself.
The convergence of Arab Gulf states with Israel, which began with the Abraham Accords process, was a major concern for Iran. Although Iran could do little against the bilateral normalization of Arab countries with Israel, it was very worried about the military and security convergence, manifested in proposals for a joint air defense system led by the US with the participation of Israel and the Arab Gulf states.
To prevent this convergence trend, Iran had proposed forming a regional alliance with countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Iraq.
Iran is trying to exploit the declining trust of Arab Gulf states in the United States as a security guarantor and seeks to draw Doha and other regional capitals closer to itself while simultaneously organizing broader opposition within the Muslim world against the US-Israel alliance and is trying to use the Israeli attack on Qatar as a basis for proposing the formation of a joint Islamic defense coalition with Iran’s participation.
However, despite rhetorical positions and symbolic actions, Tehran’s ability to draw Gulf countries into its sphere of influence remains significantly limited. In reality, Iran’s participation in a regional alliance supported by Islamic countries, including Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, is improbable.
The deep-rooted mistrust between Iran and the Western-aligned Arab Gulf states, and the strong defense ties between GCC members and the United States, limit Iran’s ability to turn verbal achievements into tangible geopolitical changes.
Despite this, Iran, in its effort to establish a new regional security structure, pursues warmer relations with Saudi Arabia, and with the recent visit of Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, to Saudi Arabia – which is considered the highest-level visit by an Iranian delegation since the resumption of relations in 2016 – Riyadh-Tehran relations have entered a significant new stage and confirmed the commitment of both sides to reducing tensions.
However, this visit and the expansion of relations with Riyadh should not be assessed merely as a reactive move. The reduction of US security guarantees, the expansion of Israeli advancement in the region, Netanyahu’s biblical claims regarding the territorial integrity of regional countries, and the effort to avoid the costs of a conflict between Iran and Israel/the US are enduring reasons for the Saudi kingdom to improve relations with Iran. Indeed, with the emergence of Israel as a more immediate threat to the interests of the Arab Gulf states, an opportunity has arisen to transform the fragile Iran-Saudi relationship into a more stable partnership. Accordingly, the drivers that led to the revival of relations between the two countries in 2016 have not only not weakened but have been strengthened by recent regional developments.
In the same vein, Saudi-Iranian relations have remained stable during Israel’s war on Gaza and the Israel attack on Iran, and both countries have been able to prevent regional instability from spilling over. In a positive move, the 2001 security cooperation agreement has also been reactivated.
Despite the trend of improving Iran-Saudi relations and whispers of defense cooperation, the prospect of such a partnership is unlikely in the near future. Geopolitical differences, the two countries’ different views on security threats, Saudi Arabia’s security cooperation with the US, and ideological differences regarding political Islam and the leadership of the Islamic world remain as diverging factors.
Tehran sees this renewed interaction not only as a way to stabilize relations with Riyadh but also as a potential means to facilitate simultaneous de-escalation with Pakistan. After the escalation of tensions in Iran-Pakistan relations following Iran’s attack on Pakistani soil to confront militant groups, which was met with an immediate and severe reaction from Islamabad, the two countries began a process of de-escalation, the peak of which was observed in the condemnation of the Israeli attack on Iran by Pakistan’s National Assembly and Senate.
Given that Iran and Saudi Arabia have often competed for influence in Pakistan, accordingly, any rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia could pave the way for a more interactive regional dynamic involving Islamabad.
Accordingly, Iran’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, which is also reflected in its support for the Riyadh-Islamabad bilateral pact, is a strategic move by Tehran to create a more resilient regional framework as an initial step and to adapt itself to the post-crisis landscape and with broader regional alignments, including Pakistan and possibly China.
Consequently, given the regional conditions after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and the weakening of Iran’s position and its proxy forces in the region, improving relations with Saudi Arabia can relieve pressure on allies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. In this regard, Hezbollah’s recent effort to reduce international pressure on the Lebanese government regarding the group’s disarmament by turning to Saudi Arabia has been the result of behind-the-scenes diplomacy by Iran.
From the perspective of Iran and Hezbollah, the Israeli attack on Hamas leaders in Qatar – a Saudi ally – this month may have changed conditions enough to remove old enmities. Accordingly, Hezbollah, after receiving signals from the Iranians, has turned to Saudi Arabia, and Ali Larijani has advised Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, to show goodwill towards Saudi Arabia. The issue of Hezbollah’s weapons was one of the main topics of discussion during Larijani’s visit to Riyadh, and Larijani told Saudi Arabia that neither Lebanon nor the wider region would benefit from Hezbollah’s disarmament.
Iran also sees the Saudi-Pakistani defense pact as a move to weaken the American order in the region, involving India, the Arab Gulf states (especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia), and Israel through the I2U2 alliance and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The development of the IMEC corridor, in which Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, is supposed to become a pivotal hub connecting India to Europe, may lose momentum if Saudi strategic calculations shift towards Pakistan. Even if trade cooperation continues, maintaining political trust will be more difficult, casting a shadow of doubt over the fate of a corridor introduced as a counterbalance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The importance of the I2U2 alliance and the IMEC corridor as symbols of the American order for the Middle East is such that the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel was carried out by Iran as a response to this order and its destruction; an attack that was carried out with Iran’s support.
Conclusion
In sum, Iran’s support for the Saudi-Pakistani defense pact must be assessed within Tehran’s interpretation of the prevailing order in the region, especially after the Israeli attack on Qatar. Based on this, Tehran evaluates the Arab Gulf states’ uncertainty about US security guarantees and their dissatisfaction with the unwavering US support for Israel’s expansion of regional influence in the form of “Greater Israel” as an opportunity for divergence from the “American order”. Iran is also trying to use this trend to stop the process of normalizing Arab relations with Israel and reduce Saudi pressure on regional proxy forces such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.
