The recent war in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region began with a joint US-Israeli military action against Iran on February 28, 2026, and quickly assumed regional dimensions. Its dangerous security, economic, energy, and other repercussions not only engulfed the entire region but also impacted the global economy.
Unlike the 12-day war of June 2025, which largely bypassed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Iran, perceiving the war as an existential threat and fighting for its survival, immediately and intensely attacked the GCC countries.
Iran’s Approach
Following the US-Israeli war against Iran in February 2026, Iran’s approach towards the Persian Gulf Arab states can be described as a combination of maintaining regional influence, de-escalating direct tensions, and preparing for potential deterrence.
In this regard, Iran’s approach towards the Persian Gulf Arab states can be analyzed within a dual framework of conditional threat and cautious cooperation. While issuing vehement military warnings if neighbors align with Washington, Tehran also emphasizes good neighborliness and dialogue regarding security concerns.
Drawing from wartime experience, Iran has maintained the regionalization of war as a threat against the Persian Gulf Arab states. Even after the ceasefire and subsequent US threats to Iran’s infrastructure, Tehran threatened to attack Arab countries’ infrastructure. In effect, the regionalization of war is not only a tool of threat for Iran in the future but also a deterrent factor. Iran’s primary goal vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf states is the universalization of war costs.
On the other hand, from Iran’s perspective, the regionalization of war means the revival, actualization, and activation of Iran’s geopolitical power; the expansion and deepening of Iran’s strategic geopolitical depth; and the liberation of Iran’s geopolitical energy capabilities and capacities through the control of the Strait of Hormuz.
Tehran has now concluded that missile power alone cannot maintain deterrence. The 12-day war in June had also shown that stockpiles of enriched uranium were not a deterrent factor either. Moreover, proxy forces had failed to prevent direct Israeli clashes with Iran following the events of October 7, 2023.
Accordingly, Iran’s desired solution is permanent control over the Strait of Hormuz — providing services, collecting tolls, and, most importantly, ensuring not just the security of the Persian Gulf, but a valuable lever over the global economy.
Iran’s view of the Strait of Hormuz, especially considering its impact in the February war, is not merely a tool for deterrence or a temporary bargaining chip in future equations. Iran considers the strait a strategic asset to alter regional and international equations in its favor.
This was reflected in the message of Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s new leader, on April 30, 2026, on the occasion of Persian Gulf National Day, stating that the war’s achievement is the creation of a “new chapter for the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.” He emphasized that the “new management of the Strait of Hormuz would bring peace and economic benefits to all countries bordering the Persian Gulf.
This development also helps explain a broader shift in the hierarchy of Iran’s tools. For years, Iran’s nuclear program was central to its bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States and its partners. Today, control over the Strait of Hormuz offers a different kind of leverage: one that is immediately visible in global markets, continuously applicable, and less dependent on lengthy negotiation cycles and diplomatic processes.
From Iran’s perspective, maintaining the closure of the Strait of Hormuz will shift the regional balance of power in its favor. On the other hand, countries highly dependent on Persian Gulf energy will inevitably have to reset their geopolitical calculations regarding Iran. Consequently, Iran can leverage its geographical position and strategic capacities to enhance its bargaining power in regional and international equations. This could also influence the behavior of regional and extra-regional actors, steering them towards more cautious engagement with Tehran.
Iran’s approach to the Gulf Arab states must be considered in light of the February war’s impact on the regional order. Iran believes that a new regional system and order will be born from the ashes of this war.
The most significant identity-forming elements of this nascent order are: the decline of America’s regional hegemony; the enhancement of Iran’s strategic and decisive role; the increased perception of the Israeli regime as the primary cause of regional insecurity and instability; the increased influence and presence of China and Russia in the region; the strengthening of balanced relations between China and Russia with both Iran and the Arabs within the framework of an active neutrality policy; the reshaping of friendship and enmity patterns around the Iran-Israeli regime axis; the increased determinative coefficient of energy geopolitics and the Strait of Hormuz; the strengthening of Hedging policy, meaning risk management and immunization in Arab foreign policy within the context of regional strategic autonomy; the strengthening and development of the GCC’s strategic relations with China and Russia while maintaining security and defense dependence on the US.
From Iran’s perspective, three scenarios are conceivable and realizable regarding Arab relations with Iran and Israel:
First, normalization, strengthening, and development of relations, alliances, and coalitions with the Israeli regime.
Second, normalization, strengthening, and development of relations, alliances, and coalitions with Iran.
Third, maintaining balanced and moderate relations with both Iran and the Israeli regime within the framework of a balancing strategy.
According to Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi, Secretary of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations—a think tank influential on Iran’s foreign policy—evidence and clues suggest the third scenario is the most likely to materialize.
Iran and the GCC
Since the GCC’s establishment in 1981, Iran has viewed it as a bloc opposed to it and has sought to sow rifts within it. Iran’s preference has been to deal with member states individually. Meanwhile, Iran has had very good relations with Oman, and Oman has played the primary mediation role in Tehran-Washington negotiations at various junctures. Before the recent war began on February 28, 2026, Iran-US mediation efforts were underway, with Oman as a special mediator for Iran.
During the war, despite Iran’s attacks on Oman, Muscat did not participate in anti-Iranian proposals or resolutions, including Bahrain’s initiative at the UN Security Council. Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, traveled to Oman following the ceasefire with the US. From Iran’s perspective, Oman, while under pressure from other Arab states and accused of aligning with Iran, continues its traditional policy of neutrality. Furthermore, Iran hopes to align Oman with its plans regarding the Strait of Hormuz to establish a new protocol for ship passage through the Strait, which is shared between the two countries.
Relations with Saudi Arabia, following a Chinese-brokered rapprochement, had set the stage for improving Tehran-Riyadh ties, which also impacted Bahrain’s relations with Iran and led to a détente process before the February war.
Economic relations and Abu Dhabi’s role in circumventing sanctions shaped Tehran’s relationship with this country. Nevertheless, the UAE was the most attacked country by Iran in the recent war, suffering over 1,138 attacks targeting its oil infrastructure, airports, and ports. Despite this, a process of de-escalation between the two countries has begun. This comes even as Abu Dhabi continues to pursue broader relations with both Israel and the United States.
The February war demonstrated that the US, as a traditional ally of the Gulf Arabs, prioritizes Israel’s interests over those of the Arabs. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio indicated this by stating that the United States coordinated the timing of this war with Israel’s plans. Despite these countries’ efforts to prevent the war or attacks on Iran’s energy infrastructure, the US ignored their pressure.
Iran extensively maneuvered on this narrative during the war. Iran declared that the reason for attacking these countries was their hosting of US military bases and questioned the image that the presence of US forces in the region is a deterrent and brings them stability. The argument for withdrawing US forces from the region and creating a security mechanism by the regional countries themselves has been repeatedly made by Iran in the years following the 1979 revolution. This war serves to actualize this narrative from Iran’s perspective: that the presence of US forces causes regional instability and victimizes regional countries.
Iran also highlighted during the war the narrative that the Gulf Arab states lack control over the US’s use of their bases, and that these bases serve US interests and its regional wars, regardless of the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the Arab states. In this context, the remarks of Qatar’s Prime Minister regarding the construction of Qatar’s Al Udeid base were referenced. This point was emphasized to show that targeting these bases does not relate to the national sovereignty of these countries because the bases are entirely under US control.
Nevertheless, some observers believe it cannot be said that if US bases were not in these countries, Iran would not have attacked them. Despite the fact that all Gulf governments refused to allow US forces to use their facilities to attack Iran (although they did grant the US access for other purposes like refueling), Tehran still targeted them.
Accordingly, Iran’s strategy of horizontally escalating tensions by targeting infrastructure, energy pipelines, hotels, and civilian airports in the Persian Gulf Arab states was ostensibly designed to impose equal pressure on the global economy and the Gulf states themselves, compelling the United States to end the conflict. In this strategy, Gulf states are targeted regardless of whether they host US bases.
On the other hand, this war showed that Gulf states can no longer rely solely on US security guarantees and must develop greater hard power to defend themselves. In this direction, GCC states are engaging in “dual insurance.” They are not severing their strategic relationship with the US (as they have no viable alternative), but they are expanding military cooperation with China, Russia, India, Turkey, and South Korea to reduce dependence on any single power.
The inability of the US security umbrella to protect the Persian Gulf Arab states, the weakening of America’s hegemonic order in the region, and Washington’s prioritization of Israel’s interests are assessed by Iran as determining elements of the future regional order.
Furthermore, emphasizing a coherent security mechanism within the GCC might be given greater priority on the members’ agenda.
There are indications that at least some in the Gulf region are thinking along these lines. For example, on March 13, 2026, Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, Qatar’s former Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister), called for the creation of a NATO-style military and security coalition. However, previous efforts to create region-wide security and defense arrangements have made little progress.
Iran may increasingly try to fracture GCC unity. For example, it might seek to exploit differences in interests and perspectives among Gulf states, each one with distinct relations with Iran, the US, Israel, and one another. To date, in the face of Iran’s attacks, a significant “rally-’round-the-flag” dynamic has been observed, obscuring differences among Gulf states. Nevertheless, it has been reported that some Gulf states have asked the US to find a way out of the crisis. In other cases, some have advised intensifying attacks to destroy Iran’s regime. These conflicting preferences among Gulf states signal a worrying trend.
Despite the tough rhetoric from the UAE regarding the complete elimination of the Iranian threat (guaranteeing it no longer poses a threat to the Persian Gulf), countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman have pursued a different tone.
Although Iran might seek to exploit the divisions among GCC members, one should not overlook these countries’ efforts to create anti-Iran coalitions. The GCC members’ emphasis on the necessity of creating collective defense mechanisms and rumors about an anti-Iran Arab coalition are assessable in this context. However, it appears that after the war, countries like Oman will likely remain committed to their long-standing foreign policy doctrine of neutrality and friendship with all.
Saudi Arabia has adopted a more balanced but worried stance, is concerned about an uncontainable Israel, factors regional mechanisms into containing Iran, while maintaining communication channels with Iran.
Although Saudi Arabia, for the first time since the Gulf War, made the King Fahd Air Base in Taif available to US forces during the recent conflict, the country’s approach toward Iran is assessed as one of deterrence without direct confrontation.
Despite the UAE’s initially harsh rhetoric and its expanding relations with Israel, Abu Dhabi—while not aligning with the Saudi-Egyptian-Turkish-Pakistani bloc—has nonetheless turned toward de-escalation with Iran.
The shift in UAE-Iran relations is a direct consequence of a strategic calculation following a costly war. This change in approach stems from an economic and security imperative and has been accompanied by financial and political mediation.
Following the signing of the now-defunct US-Iran ceasefire memorandum on June 17, 2026, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, including the UAE, concluded that they had no choice but to support it in order to prevent an even greater catastrophe—even though they viewed it as an imperfect agreement. This short-lived memorandum, signed to establish a ceasefire and resume shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, effectively paved the way for de-escalation.
The core of the de-escalation between Iran and the UAE appears to have been a direct financial deal. According to multiple reports, the UAE agreed to provide Iran with access to its frozen financial assets in order to halt Iranian attacks. One of the main motivations for the UAE and other Gulf states to pursue de-escalation with Tehran has been diminished confidence in US security commitments following the war. These countries came to realize that Washington lacks either the willingness or the capability to completely overthrow the Iranian regime, and thus they have no choice but to manage their relations and coexist with a powerful and hostile neighbor.
While the war temporarily increased military cooperation between Israel and the UAE—including the deployment of Iron Dome systems—the interests and priorities of the two countries ultimately diverged. Israel continues to view Iran as an existential threat, whereas the UAE prioritizes economic stability and secure passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and even attempted to keep the details of its peace negotiations hidden from Israel.
However, for the Persian Gulf Arab states that paid the principal cost of the war, a structural paradox exists. A campaign meant to weaken Iran instead makes it more destructive, militarized, and uncontrollable, with spillover effects on maritime security and regional alignment widening.
Accordingly, Iran will pursue differentiated relations with the GCC members, similar to the past arrangements. These relations will be influenced by the war and the extent of damage and vulnerability of each country. Oman, in this context, can balance Iran’s relations with the other GCC members; although Iran’s relations will remain influenced by the macro-strategies of these countries.
On the other hand, the Arab Gulf states’ approach toward Iran after the February 2026 war will be divergent, cautious, and pragmatic. Contrary to common perception, these countries are not following a single, unified path. In this context, the policy of the Gulf Arabs is defined by robust deterrence alongside tension management, as they are fully aware that Iran will remain their permanent neighbor.
Conclusion
Iran’s approach to the Persian Gulf Arabs after the war is a combination of smart reprisal and forced realism. Aware of its post-war isolation, Iran tries to leverage its battlefield achievements (such as controlling the Strait of Hormuz) in future negotiations to gain concessions like the lifting of sanctions with minimal reduction of its missile capabilities.
This approach is a blend of threat for deterrence and diplomacy for conflict management. Tehran has explicitly stated that it will respond to any use of Arab soil against Iran with extensive attacks, including a complete shutdown of Middle Eastern oil, while simultaneously keeping the doors of dialogue open to reach a new order under its own dominance in the region.
Iran believes that the most significant identity-forming elements of the nascent order resulting from the February War are the decline of America’s regional hegemony, the enhancement of Iran’s strategic and decisive role, and the increased perception of the Israeli threat.
Nevertheless, Arab states can no longer see Tehran as a regional partner but rather as a permanent geopolitical challenge that must be contained by strengthening joint military cooperation (potentially involving Israel).
Accordingly, one can predict that the Persian Gulf region is moving towards a more militarized, more networked, and more crisis-prone order: an order where Gulf security, Iran’s nuclear threshold status, Israel’s freedom of action, America’s forward presence, and the role of middle-power mediators will all be redefined simultaneously.
Image: Lenka Hrabalová
