What does the future hold for the Syrian transition for religious/ethnic minorities?
A major challenge in Syria’s political transition following the rapid collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 is the ability of former rebel leaders to maintain the country’s diverse social landscape. Syria is home to a number of religious and/or ethnic communities unique to the region, including the Alawites, the Druze, and the Kurds, among others. The new leaders of Syria should analyze various incidents from Middle Eastern history over the past two to three decades to ensure a seamless transition. Following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, apprehensions arose regarding the economic and political future of Sunni Arabs, who had previously maintained power despite being a minority within the population, in the newly formed Iraqi state. Despite commendable intentions, the Sunni minority experienced disenfranchisement, and the constitution-making process was predominantly boycotted, resulting in their marginalization. Arab Sunnis played a significant role in the Iraqi insurgency against the interim authorities and the US occupation, and in 2014, the Islamic State swiftly took control of these areas, compromising the state’s territorial integrity.
On 6 March 2025, Syrian government forces clashed with armed groups aligned with former President Assad, indicating a resurgence of these confrontations. A report from the UK-based Syrian Observer for Human Rights states that 148 pro-Assad militants and 125 security officers linked to the new administration were killed during the confrontations. In the following days, former rebels and other combatants motivated by vengeance assassinated 973 Alawites, including defenseless families, women, and children. This highlights the fragility of Syria’s political transition and the challenges it faces.
Alawites make up approximately 11 percent of Syria’s population, primarily located in the coastal areas, especially around Tartus and Lattakia. Over the decades of the Assad administration, the political and military elite has primarily, though not exclusively, comprised Alawites. The Alawite minority has its roots in Shi’ite Islam; however, in modern Syria, it is acknowledged as both a religious minority and an ethnoreligious community. The Salafi organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which previously governed Idlib and later took over Damascus militarily, exhibits a clear anti-Shiite position and has supported Israel’s initiatives against Hezbollah. Concurrently, its leader, the newly appointed President of Syria Ahmad al-Sharaa, has articulated his backing for ethnic and religious minorities. The prominent figures among the Alawites acknowledged the efforts of the former rebel movement and, in this regard, supported the newly formed government in Damascus.
Syria’s new president has called for accountability for military and political leaders who collaborated with the former Assad regime. Ahmad al-Sharaa has sought the extradition and prosecution of former President Assad, who took asylum in Russia after the fall of the regime in December 2024. The capacity of the new Syrian president to successfully integrate armed groups and avert collective accountability against the Alawite community among Sunni militants, driven by a desire for retribution for the atrocities perpetrated by the Assad regime, remains uncertain. The Syrian President has stated that those responsible for violence against civilians will face accountability.
This situation presents several complications. Local Syrian groups seem to be genuinely driven by a desire for revenge, leading them to conduct attacks on civilians. The Syrian government forces have received reinforcement from foreign Jihadists, including Uzbeks and Chechens, who continue to pursue their global aspirations while engaging in violent objectives within the state. Thirdly, Ahmad as-Sharaa’s approach to holding anti-Shiite gunmen accountable, who remain loyal to him yet are driven by a desire for vengeance, lacks persuasiveness.
The Alawite families currently face a deficiency of security within Syria. Some individuals have evacuated to Lebanon, while others are still considering this option as they lack confidence in the state’s ability to guarantee their safety and protection. This issue holds considerable significance from a European standpoint, as several EU member states, notably France and Germany, support the classification of Syria as a safe country and the formal recognition of the current regime. This would remove the legal barrier to the non-renewal of residence permits for Syrian refugees seeking asylum in EU member states, thus reducing social tensions that were a concern during the recent German elections and contributed to the rise of the AfD.
The Druze community in southwestern Syria, alongside the Alawite minority, has recently gained attention regarding its situation. Prior to the onset of the civil war, the Druze community represented approximately 3 percent of Syria’s population, totaling around 600,000 to 700,000 individuals. Over fifty percent of this population resides in Suweida province. The Druze community experienced a division regarding the anti-Assad protests that began in 2011. Support for the regime varied, with some individuals in favor and others in opposition. The Druze have preserved their quasi-autonomy in recent decades, as the Assad regime has exempted them from military conscription and supported a quasi-independent military force, which has offered protection against various threats, including the Islamic State. After the collapse of the Assad regime, Ahmad al-Sharaa aimed to integrate the Druze community. In early March 2025, protests occurred in Suweida province opposing the new Syrian government, driven by Druze leaders’ concerns about a potential marginalization of their community by Ahmad al-Sharaa’s government.
Additionally, an external factor influences this process: the Netanyahu government, which is implementing an expansionist policy in the Middle East. Netanyahu has violated the ceasefire in the Golan Heights, occupied additional villages beyond the Druze-majority Mount Hermon, and subsequently declared that the Syrian Druze are regarded as a natural ally, calling for the demilitarization of southern Syria. There are claims that the State of Israel is prepared to annex territory in southern Syria. Netanyahu indicated his readiness to provide the Druze community with Israeli work permits in the Golan Heights. This process constitutes a broader geopolitical rivalry between Israel and Turkey regarding the pursuit of influence in Syria.
On 10 March, Ahmad al-Sharaa announced an agreement with Druze representatives permitting security forces to conduct military operations in the south, incorporating the Druze into state administration and integrating armed organizations. The 13-year civil war in Syria has profoundly impacted society, resulting in a limited number of armed groups willing to re-engage in conflict, aside from radical jihadists, as the populace is fatigued by the ongoing violence.
The new President of Syria has reached an agreement with the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which governs the region, to terminate Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. The effectiveness of potential motivational tools, such as a power-sharing formula, that Ahmad al-Sharaa can provide to the local population post-civil war remains uncertain. The primary challenge for the SDF is Turkey, which openly regards the military force governing the region as a terrorist organization. The SDF seeks to maintain, without conflict, the achievements obtained during the civil war, including an autonomous administration and armed forces, the latter primarily supported by the United States in the campaign against the Islamic State. The extent to which US President Trump, who has previously characterized the fall of the Assad regime as “not our fight,” will defend the Kurdish minority against a more assertive Turkey remains uncertain.
Recently, Israel has requested that the United States persuade the Syrian interim government to permit Russia to retain its military bases, as Israel perceives this as a safeguard against the imminent presence of Turkish troops along its borders.
The minority issue is closely linked to regional and global power dynamics, hindering Syria’s capacity for independent internal development. The transition presents significant challenges, including economic recovery, provision of housing and livelihoods for returning refugees, and the integration of numerous fragmented armed groups into the military. The recent assault on Alawite civilian families has brought to the forefront a particularly violent phase of the Syrian civil war, highlighting its enduring impact on both the local populace and the international community. It is yet to be determined if this will occur again and what assurances the transitional government can offer to those communities. Israel may perceive the Alawites as a potential ally, notwithstanding their Shiite identity, as they represent a vulnerable community that the Israeli foreign minister has characterized as being targeted by “jihadists in suits.”
