Tuesday, July 1, marked the 100th day since the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. On this account, Turkey’s largest opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), organized fresh protests outside the metropolitan authority’s headquarters. However, the level of public mobilization is less than that of the first weeks after the incident. The ruling coalition has weathered and suppressed the most intense phase of the protests, and has now moved to a counteroffensive. What is the current situation on the ground and its possible outcomes?
The original version of this article was published in Polish in Obserwator Międzynarodowy.
Turbulent Weeks for Turkey’s Political System
On March 18, 2025, Istanbul University authorities revoked Ekrem İmamoğlu’s graduation diploma, setting a formal obstacle in his path to the presidency.[1] He was detained on corruption charges and imprisoned in Silivri District Prison a day later[2]. Several waves of detentions of his City Hall associates were also carried out, resulting in the arrest of a total of approximately 229 people. However, Istanbul remained under opposition control, as the acting mayor was elected by the Republican People’s Party (CHP)-controlled city council. The opposition described the events as a civilian coup.
Ekrem İmamoğlu, with his charisma and ability to successfully win over the nationalist and Kurdish electorate, is the biggest threat to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has ruled Turkey since 2003. İmamoğlu’s detention sparked the largest public demonstrations in Turkey since the 2013 defence of Gezi Park, posing an even more serious threat to Erdoğan’s power.
The CHP leadership, headed by Chairman Özgür Özel, intended to capitalize on the wave of social mobilization. On Sunday, March 23, the previously announced party primaries were held to select a candidate for the state presidency in elections scheduled for 2028 – Ekrem İmamoğlu was the only candidate in them. Along with ballot boxes for party members, the organization’s units also provided ballot boxes for ordinary citizens, who were able to express their dissatisfaction with the actions of the ruling coalition. As a result of this vote, 15 million Turks cast their vote (of which 1.7 million party members). At the same time, people were mobilized for regular anti-government protests – weekly demonstrations outside Istanbul City Hall, as well as in regions traditionally supportive of President Erdoğan’s party (such as Konya, or Rize).
A boycott of businesses affiliated with the ruling coalition was also announced, primarily targeting TV channels and a popular network of coffee shops, with April 2 designated as a day of total consumer boycott. The campaign to call early parliamentary and presidential elections has also intensified – the party has begun the process of collecting signatures on a petition in this regard. At the same time, the CHP began to rise in the polls, catching up with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP); it would thus be the beneficiary of possible early elections.
The Ruling Coalition’s Political Counter-Offensive
The government in Ankara has waited out and effectively crushed the hottest phase of the protests using water cannons, rubber bullets, and making numerous arrests among the protesters (about 1,880 people, mostly students, but also foreign journalists). Restrictions were also imposed on traditional and social media where Turks followed the demonstrations. The effective crackdown on anti-government protests indicates the high level of consolidation and subordination of the repressive apparatus under the government’s authority.
The Turkish prosecutor’s office as recently as February 2025 opened an investigation into electoral irregularities[3] during the CHP’s 38th Congress of November 2023, which resulted in the faction of Ekrem İmamoğlu and Özgür Özel ousting from power Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who had led the party for the past 13 years. The complaint to the prosecutor’s office was filed by a CHP member. The largest opposition party is therefore threatened with the removal of the current leadership and the imprisonment and banning of its key members from political activity for alleged fraud in party elections. These actions would result in the return to power of the previous chairman (who has already expressed his readiness to take over the leadership again) or the appointment of a trustee by the authorities.
Amid accusations by the ruling coalition that the CHP’s central leadership is illegitimate, an extraordinary party congress was held on April 6, at which the mandate of the current leadership was reaffirmed. However, this did not remove the threat of Özgür Özel’s removal through judicial intervention. On June 30, 2025, an Ankara court postponed hearings on irregularities at the 38th CHP Congress until September. Maintaining the status quo of uncertainty surrounding the legitimacy of the current CHP leadership benefits the power coalition and aims to portray the opposition as internally divided and incapable of ruling.
Ekrem İmamoğlu is not the only opposition figure to be detained and removed from his office. A widespread crackdown on the largest opposition party is currently underway in Turkey through the use of a politicized judiciary. Between January 17, 2025, and the time of writing, 14 mayors affiliated with the CHP (including the mayors of İzmir, Adıyaman, Antalya, and Adana) have been detained or imprisoned. The government in Ankara has also intensified its actions in the media sphere, by ordering the arrest of the owner of Halk TV, or shutting down the Sözcü TV station for 10 days (after 16 prior financial penalties and suspensions of broadcasts, counting from January 2025), one of the most important opposition TV channels. Previously, we have seen parallel actions directed at the pro-Kurdish People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), when mayors were replaced with government trustees due to alleged cooperation with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
President Erdoğan’s actions against the opposition have not been strongly opposed by European allies, who, given the current geopolitical situation, value cooperation with Turkey in the security field more than Turkey’s internal human rights issues. The bigger issue is the reaction of markets and international investors. The Turkish economy is in a state of permanent crisis. Despite effective measures, by internationally respected Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek, to quell high inflation and rebuild the economy’s credibility, the situation in the country has still not returned to a satisfactory level. It is worth noting that in the aftermath of the economic turmoil that hit the economy shortly after the arrest of the Istanbul mayor, the central bank spent approximately $40 billion in foreign exchange reserves in the first month after the incident to defend the Turkish lira and stabilize the economy.
The Government’s Current and Future Status
The issue of the state of democracy in Turkey over the past two decades is among the most controversial ones. Before Ekrem İmamoğlu’s arrest, the prevailing view was that the best term for Turkey’s political regime was competitive authoritarianism.[4] Its key component is the existence of real political contest for power, while the incumbent’s structural competitive advantage prevents the opposition from seizing it. Since taking office in 2003, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his inner circle have accumulated several advantages in the areas of political, social, and economic institutions. The Istanbul mayor’s arrest, who became a real and unprecedented threat to Erdoğan’s grip on power, has fundamentally disrupted the possibility of free political competition. Therefore, given the events described in the text above and their consequences, one might conclude that the era of Turkey as a competitive authoritarian regime is over, reinforcing the trend of transformation towards a more consolidated autocracy.
The most crucial issues for the future of Turkey and its political system are the finalization of a new “Kurdish opening” process and the stabilization of the Turkish economy. The economic crisis is a primary reason for the decline in support for the incumbent president and the ruling coalition. Eliminating this factor could stop the process of voter flow to opposition parties. In the Kurdish context, we can see the historic process of dissolution and disarmament of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In March, the organization announced a unilateral ceasefire, and in May, it dissolved. On July 11, 2025, in Iraq’s Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Sulaimaniyah province, 30 PKK fighters publicly laid down their armsas a show of goodwill. The next step is expected to be the establishment of a special parliamentary committee in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) to structure the process politically. Ending the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, which has been ongoing since 1984, would be a major and historic achievement for President Erdoğan, which would likely influence the outcome of the next elections. However, despite all the positive signs, it remains uncertain what the final outcome of this process will be. The Turkish-Kurdish negotiations in Turkey are also part of a broader geopolitical reconstruction of the Middle East region, where the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria has been crucial.
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[1] The President of the Republic of Turkey is required to have a higher educational degree.
[2] Corruption is not the only accusation the Istanbul mayor faces. Along with these, supporting the PKK, insulting a public official (the prosecutor for the Istanbul region), attempting to influence a judge’s verdict, or insulting members of the state election commission in 2019 are also serious charges. Read further: BIA News Desk, Criminal cases and investigations against Ekrem İmamoğlu, https://bianet.org/haber/criminal-cases-and-investigations-against-ekrem-imamoglu-308458, (03.07.2025).
[3] Among the irregularities indicated were a significant increase in the wealth of some delegates after the congress, and reports of pressure, financial inducements, manipulation, and alleged appointments to important positions in the field in exchange for votes for Özgül. These accusations lack a strong evidence base for support.
[4] The concept was developed by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. These authors define it as “a regime in which there are formal democratic institutions, widely regarded as the most important way to gain power; however, the abuse of power by incumbents gives them a significant advantage over the opposition. These regimes are competitive because opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest incumbent power and realistically fight for it; at the same time, they cannot be considered democratic because of the “uneven playing field” favoring incumbents (uneven playing field between government and opposition). Competition is therefore real, but unfair.” Elections are conducted on a regular basis and are generally free of mass fraud, which is often unnecessary, as those in power ruthlessly exploit the incumbency advantage, among other things, by seizing media space. Read further: S. Levitsky, L.A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War, Cambridge 2010, pp. 5.
