Dr. Ammar Kahf is co-founder and Executive Director of the Omran Strategic Studies think tank, and Board Member of The Syrian Forum. He served as the Chief of Staff to the Secretary General of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (2012 –2013). He gave the interview to Khayrion on the occasion of his visit to Prague, where he also spoke at a conference organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
First, please let me ask about the agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). How do you assess the agreement, and what will the integration of SDF fighters into the Syrian army look like?
There have been several agreements over time. However, the government’s consolidation of control over large parts of Syria significantly narrowed the space for maneuver and ultimately made serious negotiations possible. In the early stages, both sides misjudged each other’s leverage and power dynamics. Today, the talks are more realistic and more closely aligned with the situation on the ground.
That is why I am more optimistic about this agreement than about previous ones. Earlier arrangements — whether in January, March, or April — often lacked specificity. This one is more detailed and addresses the issue of trust directly. It proceeds gradually but within a defined framework. It is not open-ended.
In previous discussions, „integration” was never clearly defined. The SDF interpreted it as continued existence as a distinct structure within the national framework. The government, by contrast, understood integration as full dissolution, with individuals joining the national army. The current understanding appears to fall somewhere in between: SDF forces will be incorporated and reorganized within the existing military structure.
What will that reorganization look like in practice?
Formally speaking, the SDF as a separate entity will cease to exist — although neither side is likely to phrase it that way publicly. There is a strong element of face-saving involved.
The Syrian army is structured around divisions, with no formation currently exceeding that level. A division (firqa) consists of approximately 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers. In the northeast, the plan is to establish one division composed of three subdivisions, each numbering roughly 2,000 to 3,000 personnel. That would amount to a total of 9,000 to 10,000 troops. In addition, a separate battalion in Ain al-Arab (Kobani) will be attached to a different command structure.
In structural terms, this effectively ends the SDF’s independent military status. However, the political presentation of the arrangement avoids explicitly stating that fact. Whether this ambiguity will cause friction later remains to be seen.
So far, implementation has proceeded relatively smoothly. There have been concrete steps regarding oil fields, border management, and the departure of Turkish-backed fighters and PKK elements — all potential spoilers. Administrative integration is underway: officials are visiting municipalities, restructuring institutions, and harmonizing titles and organizational frameworks with those of the central government. Personnel are being interviewed and reassigned accordingly.
Importantly, the agreement stipulates that existing employees will be retained rather than dismissed.
In internal security matters, Damascus appointed the head of security, though he is a local figure. Recruitment will prioritize individuals already serving in local security bodies, who will be assessed and integrated into the national structure.
According to Kurdish media outlet Rudaw, around 300,000 internally displaced people remain in Rojava. Do you believe fears of violence or massacres have subsided?
I would not characterize the situation as a war against the Kurds. Much of the narrative was amplified by social media and diaspora networks. That said, fear was undeniably real. Emotions were running high.
The agreement between the government and the SDF was partly intended to prevent that tension from escalating into violence. As for internally displaced persons, many have already begun returning — for example, to Sheikh Maqsoud. Roads to Afrin and other areas have reopened. The government has publicly committed to facilitating returns, and this is explicitly included in the agreement.
Let’s turn to foreign fighters, particularly Uyghurs. Could their presence in Syrian armed structures complicate relations with China?
The Uyghur issue is currently the subject of direct negotiations between Damascus and Beijing. The Syrian government has provided assurances that Uyghur fighters will operate in accordance with Syrian law and will not threaten Chinese interests. Discussions have moved into more technical stages, and both sides appear interested in reaching a workable arrangement.
Estimates of the number involved reach as high as 3,000, but verification is ongoing.
Russian forces recently left Qamishli. Do you have information about their numbers, equipment, or redeployment?
Some personnel are likely returning to Russia, though details remain unclear. Overall, Russian military presence in Syria is currently limited and subject to renegotiation. Discussions are ongoing about the future scope of cooperation.
While there were proposals for a Russian role in a potential buffer zone with Israel, no agreement has been finalized. Increasingly, Russian-Syrian cooperation appears to be shifting toward economic and reconstruction efforts rather than direct military involvement.
There are reports that Syrian authorities are confiscating — and possibly purchasing — weapons from smugglers. Is that credible?
I cannot confirm whether the Syrian government is actively purchasing weapons. However, in post-conflict settings, buying weapons from illicit markets is a recognized component of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) processes. It serves not only to reduce the number of weapons in circulation but also to map illicit trade networks. Whether that specific policy is being implemented in Syria would need to be confirmed by officials.
What is the current situation in Suwayda? Could Hikmat al-Hijri’s forces reach a lasting agreement with Damascus?
Eventually, yes — but at present, neither side appears eager to escalate or finalize a settlement. The situation resembles a frozen front. Progress in Suwayda may depend heavily on broader regional dynamics, particularly any security arrangement involving Israel.
Speaking of Israel, how do you assess reported negotiations between Damascus and Tel Aviv in light of recent incidents, including alleged environmental damage near the border?
The situation is serious. Military actions, territorial occupation, and environmental destruction exacerbate regional insecurity, including food and water security concerns. Under current conditions, the most realistic objective would be a framework similar to the 1974 disengagement agreement.
In March, it will be one year since the massacres of Alawites on the coast. Have those responsible been brought to justice?
According to official investigations, most individuals directly implicated have been arrested and are undergoing judicial proceedings.
Regarding higher-level responsibility, both the government inquiry and the international commission reportedly found no evidence of a centrally ordered campaign. Authorities maintain there was no systematic chain of command directing such crimes. Any individuals found to have issued unlawful orders are under investigation.
On the economic front, Saudi Arabia has announced major investments, yet some European companies report slow funding flows. Is reconstruction capital arriving more slowly than expected?
Funding is indeed moving gradually. While numerous memoranda of understanding have been signed, some projects have advanced to binding contracts. The Silk Link corridor connecting Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Europe has reportedly reached the contract stage. Projects involving the airports in Aleppo and Damascus also appear to be progressing.
Finally, how has the public adapted to the new currency?
So far, the transition has been smooth. The reform was designed to restore confidence in the currency and reduce reliance on large volumes of banknotes. Authorities allowed a three-month replacement period followed by a six-month transitional exchange phase. Public adaptation has been largely orderly.
Thank you.
