Relations between the Gulf states and Iran became tense in 1979, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s former leader, promised to export the revolution that had brought him to power that same year. This led to decades of ideologically charged proxy conflict, and the Gulf states viewed Iran as the principal destabilizing force in the Middle East.
The Gulf states once encouraged the United States to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program — in the words of Saudi King Abdullah in 2008, to “cut off the head of the snake” — and during the Obama era and the first Trump administration they rejected nuclear diplomacy with Iran. However, they also sought to contain Iran’s regional influence.
For example, the Gulf Arab countries opposed the 2015 nuclear agreement because they considered it too limited and believed Iran should not merely normalize relations with the West without halting its regional activities in the Middle East.
The Saudi crown prince once pledged that if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, his country would follow the same path. In recent years, however, Mohammed bin Salman has attempted to reduce regional tensions in order to focus on his domestic economic program. In 2023, after seven years of severed relations, he restored the kingdom’s diplomatic relations with Iran.
In this context, GCC member states in recent years have reduced tensions with Iran and pursued a path different from Washington, their main security partner. The September 2019 attack on Aramco and the weak U.S. response demonstrated Saudi vulnerability to attacks by Iran’s proxy forces and the unreliability of the United States, prompting Riyadh to distance itself from its previous aggressive posture toward Iran. Saudi Arabia then initiated a multi-year process of normalizing diplomatic relations with Tehran, culminating in the signing of the Saudi–Iran agreement in Beijing in March 2023.
In fact, growing doubts about U.S. commitments to defend them in the event of direct confrontation led to a shift in U.S. foreign policy – the pivot to Asia and the containment of China, reflected in the offshore balancing strategy, meant Washington no longer provided the level of security guarantee it had previously provided to the Persian Gulf region. Subsequently, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) began prioritizing bilateral engagement and diplomacy with Tehran to manage tensions on its own. This reorientation is also closely tied to Gulf economic ambitions that depend on stability, predictability, and investment attraction — goals incompatible with sustained tension.
The Gulf states publicly condemned Israeli attacks on Iran during the 12-day war and reassured Tehran they would not support or facilitate any aggression.
From Iran’s perspective, the return to normal relations with Arab neighbors separated U.S. and GCC positions regarding Iran. Most GCC member states rejected the use of their territory and airspace for provocative military action against Iran and declined participation in U.S. operations against the Houthis in the Red Sea and Yemen. Iran was also able to rely on GCC states to facilitate nuclear negotiations with Washington, transmit messages to the U.S. administration, and lobby President Donald Trump to prevent or reduce conflict in the region.
The continuation of the Gulf Arab de-escalation approach toward Iran was reflected in their support for Iran–U.S. negotiations. For instance, although Saudi Arabia adopted a cautious stance toward the JCPOA a decade ago and supported Trump’s withdrawal from it in 2018, it now supports reaching a similar agreement with Iran.
Accordingly, with the start of a new round of negotiations between Iran and the United States in Muscat, Oman, on 6 February 2026, the Arab Gulf states welcomed and supported the talks, assessing them as conducive to regional stability.
Support for diplomacy and opposition to excluding Iran from the regional order by GCC members result from past experiences and lessons from the regional security order. Developments after the Arab Spring and the region’s involvement in proxy wars contradict the political, economic, and security interests of regional countries, including the Gulf Arabs. In this regard, they have tried to distance themselves from the Iran–Israel/U.S. conflict.
Direct war between Iran and Israel/the United States would pose threats inconsistent with their economic visions. After 7 October 2023, Iran and Israel entered direct military confrontation twice. Although regional states declared neutrality and opposed any war, during the 12-day June war between Iran and Israel — with U.S. entry into the conflict — the war’s scope extended to Qatar as well. In retaliation for U.S. attacks on its nuclear facilities in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, Iran attacked the U.S. Al-Udeid base in Qatar.
This war demonstrated that if the United States enters war with Iran, U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf could become targets. In case of escalation, the Strait of Hormuz — vital for oil and gas exports of Gulf Arab countries — could also face closure, as Iran threatened during the recent Iran–Israel/U.S. war.
Such concerns currently exist regarding ongoing Iran–U.S. negotiations. Some Arab states warned Washington against attacking Iran amid rising tensions before the February 2026 talks. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman held consultations with the White House to persuade it not to attack Iran, adopting a stance opposing any escalation despite being close U.S. allies in the region. According to some reports, these three GCC countries played an important role in dissuading Trump from military action against Iran — at least for now.
Importantly, most regional actors view escalation through a lens of caution and risk avoidance rather than ideological alignment. They have also facilitated Iran–U.S. negotiations and supported Oman’s mediation role, despite years in which Muscat’s quiet diplomacy across the Gulf was viewed skeptically. Oman’s insistence on maintaining open channels with Tehran – especially during periods of intense regional tension – once made it appear an outlier within the GCC. Some partners considered it naïve, others overly independent and unconstructive, and some feared its neutrality would weaken collective pressure on Iran. Now, as Gulf monarchies lobby in Washington for continued dialogue with Iran in Muscat, this perception has changed.
By February 2026, most Gulf capitals had come not only to appreciate the value of Omani mediation but also to recognize its necessity. This shift became evident in mid-January, when simultaneous nationwide protests in Iran sharply increased fears of a U.S. attack.
The importance of diplomacy can be examined in several ways. First, Arab countries — especially GCC members — seek to prevent the region from becoming a battlefield for global powers. They have experienced past conflicts such as the Iraq war and Yemen tensions, and understand the devastating human and economic costs of war.
In the event of war, oil markets would face shock, investor confidence would collapse, and Iranian retaliation would almost certainly reach Gulf territories. The 2019 attack on Saudi oil facilities and Iran’s June 2025 attack on Al-Udeid — following U.S. strikes during the 12-day Israel–Iran war — are vivid reminders of how escalation can quickly cross borders.
However, when the Islamic Republic carried out its threat and launched missiles toward Al-Udeid – the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East – an important detail existed: the action had been pre-coordinated; satellite images showed aircraft stationed at the base in Qatar had been relocated beforehand. Damage was minimal, and Trump described the attack as “weak.” Nevertheless, the Qatar episode altered regional perceptions in a way the Ain al-Asad incident had not: between the two longtime rivals, Israel and Iran, Israel increasingly came to be seen as the greater threat.
Most telling was the behavior of the Gulf Arab states, which – despite condemning Iran’s attack on Al-Udeid – equally emphasized maintaining their restored relations with Tehran. Two weeks after the Iran–Israel ceasefire, Mohammed bin Salman hosted Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Jeddah for talks. Qatari and Emirati officials maintained direct communication with their Iranian counterparts, and Oman went further by declaring Israel had “ignited the fire of escalation.” Strategic pragmatism prevailed: a weakened but predictable Iran was preferable to a bold and unrestrained Israel.
Second, negotiations allow them to act as mediators and prevent the imposition of intensified sanctions or military actions that could pressure fragile regional economies. Oman’s role in comprehensive and nuclear negotiations, and Qatar’s role in limited, issue-specific talks, are prominent.
If there is one strategic lesson Gulf leaders have drawn from this crisis, it is that diplomacy with Iran has been wise. By acting independently – often in defiance of Washington – they have established communication channels that partially shield them from the worst-case consequences. Tehran’s avoidance of targeting Gulf interests or closing the Strait of Hormuz is generally attributed to this diplomacy. This approach has increased Iran’s dependence on regional relations to withstand U.S. pressure and given Gulf states new leverage.
Their concerns are not limited to military issues. They fear indirect effects such as disruption of global energy markets, mass migration, and the growth of extremist groups.
Meanwhile, the region’s approach reflects a development-oriented, economically driven foreign policy, evident in its development visions, which require regional stability and economic and transit connectivity. For instance, Saudi Arabia, within Vision 2030, seeks economic diversification, reduced oil dependence, and a position as a regional commercial, technological, and tourism hub. War or instability threatens these programs. Therefore, peaceful coexistence and cooperation with Tehran are necessary to achieve the GCC members’ vision goals. The tense period from 2016 to 2020 included attacks on tankers near Fujairah and drone and missile strikes on Saudi oil facilities, largely attributed to Tehran and its proxies.
U.S. tolerance for geopolitical uncertainty – globally and regionally – contrasts with Gulf risk-reduction approaches, especially in Saudi Arabia, given the large economic and energy projects underway. Development of AI infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE could be jeopardized by any new or prolonged conflict with Iran, as could multi-trillion-dollar investments promised during Trump’s May 2025 Gulf tour and meetings with White House officials in his first presidential year. A major concern is that U.S. and Israeli actions may push Iran toward nuclear weaponization – viewed as an existential threat. Simultaneously, there is deep concern about Israel’s overt efforts for regime change and eventual collapse of the Iranian state, which would open a Pandora’s box and destabilize the entire region. Israel also appears to seek regional dominance, alarming Arab powers; its envisioned “new Middle East” anchored in decisive military power would leave little room for Gulf interests and independence.
Nevertheless, Arab rivals of Tehran prefer dealing with a “non-dangerous” Iran to pursuing regime change that could produce instability. In the Gulf, there is sympathy for Iranian society alongside recognition of historical and cultural ties linking the region’s peoples. In 2022, Mohammed bin Salman described Iran as a “permanent neighbor,” and with such a neighborhood comes a preference for stability over collapse. Gulf states do not want Iran plunged into chaos, which could trigger humanitarian crises and refugee flows — morally troubling and economically disastrous for the region.
In fact, they seek calm to advance domestic growth programs and economic visions. Any prolonged conflict or internal turmoil in Iran is seen as a potential threat to tourism, trade, and foreign investment in regional countries; for example, the closure of the Gulf airspace and stock market declines during the conflict illustrated this. Gulf Arabs fear escalation between Iran and the United States and the outbreak of a new regional war, worrying they may become legitimate targets of retaliatory strikes on U.S. bases in host countries.
Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf warned the U.S. president that if Iran were attacked, both Israel and all U.S. military centers, bases, and ships in the region would be legitimate targets, and Iran would not limit itself to reactive measures but act based on objective threat indicators.
The pattern of escalation in each conflict round has increased uncertainty about lines that may later be crossed, including targeting energy infrastructure and vital infrastructure such as refineries, and causing serious disruption to Gulf shipping.
Geopolitical dynamics have also intensified regional concern about a potential U.S. attack on Iran. After October 2023, many Arab countries increasingly regarded Israel — not Iran — as the principal threat to regional stability. Israel has bombed seven regional countries since 7 October 2023, evident during and after the June 2025 12-day war and Israeli strikes on Iran, especially the strike in Doha aimed at assassinating Hamas officials.
Thus, Gulf Arabs fear that a further weakening of Iran would significantly upset the regional balance of power in Israel’s favor and facilitate Israeli ambitions and expansionism after 7 October 2023. Some Gulf governments conclude that Israel is a bellicose state seeking Middle East dominance and potentially a greater threat to stability than Iran.
Accordingly, weakening Iran could contribute to an Israel-centric regional order. Given issues such as bombing and presence in Syria, presence in southern Lebanon, recognition of Somaliland independence, support for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, and broader attempts to fragment regional states, countries including Gulf Arabs and Turkey prefer Iran not be further weakened.
Therefore, many Middle Eastern countries deeply fear the immediate destabilizing consequences of U.S. and Israeli military intervention against Iran. Gulf monarchies worry that the ripple effects of an escalation or a possible Iranian state collapse could endanger their own security and undermine their credibility as safe regional hubs for trade and tourism. Rather than producing a stable post-conflict order, they fear an attack on Iran would create prolonged chaos and even civil war, generating large refugee waves and severe pressure on already strained political and economic systems.
For Gulf Arab countries, a stable Iran aligns with their logic of “stability for development,” where ambitious national projects require calm neighbors. What Iran needs is economic revival, which itself requires reforms by its leadership.
The role of Arab diplomatic actors such as Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia highlights the importance of diplomacy and risk management in a region highly sensitive to instability. Their ability to offer de-escalatory pathways to Washington shows regional actors are not passive spectators but active shapers of strategic outcomes.
The experience of U.S. military campaigns across the Islamic world — from Afghanistan and Iraq to Libya — has deepened this caution and produced widespread skepticism toward externally imposed military solutions. Ultimately, the calculation between escalation and restraint reflects a pragmatic recognition that chaos in Iran could spread across West Asia and weaken both regional stability and global interests.
Within this framework, diplomacy, calibrated engagement, and regional consultation are not merely preferred options but essential tools for maintaining a fragile balance in a geopolitical landscape.
