A Preliminary Assessment After the First Day of the 2026 US-Israel War on the Islamic Republic: February 28, 2026
On 28 February 2026, the world awoke to a sudden and large-scale attack by the United States and Israel against Iran. While the past months had seen rising indicators of such a probability – like the unprecedentedUS military deployments to the Middle East since the Iraq War –, the precise timing of the strike, conducted amid ongoing negotiations in Geneva, on a Sabbath, and in broad daylight, still carried an element of surprise.
We now know that this military action had long been prepared, regardless of ongoing talks, as the diplomatic track served merely as a diversion, as claimed by the Israelis, with the clear objective to topple the regime or induce regime change, realizing what Netanyahu was endlessly repeating in the past years: to reshape a new Middle Eastern order.
Amid these developments, the key question becomes: what can Iran realistically do to counter this objective? And to what strategic end? To answer this question, let us assess Iran’s capabilities, their efficiency, and the strategic goals it can realistically achieve with them, one by one.
1. The Proxy Architecture: Unity of Fronts Under Strain
For decades, Iran sought to externalize strategic risk by building and arming a network of non-state actors – primarily Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Iraqi Shiʿa factions, and Hamas to a lesser extent – under the doctrine of the “unity of fronts.” This architecture was designed to create deterrence depth: Iran would externalize its frontline beyond its borders, while attacks on Iran would trigger a multi-front escalation. However, the current condition and stances of these proxies significantly changed from the past.
First, several of them – particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon – have been significantly weakened over the past two years of wars, conflicts, and Israeli strikes. Thus, a meaningful and noteworthy intervention of these actors is less likely to affect the course of the current war’s outcome. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Iran’s grip over these actors appears less solid than before. The wars in Gaza and Lebanon and the military campaigns in Yemen revealed a perception among segments of these movements’ constituencies that Iran was willing to appropriate victory but reluctant to absorb shared defeat. In Lebanon, for instance, many Hezbollah supporters interpreted Iran’s limited intervention during the 2023–2024 war as a form of abandonment or treason. That perception matters. It directly affects whether these actors are willing to escalate decisively in defense of the Iranian regime today, as they have to “sell” this intervention to their constituencies. Therefore, counting on already weakened, politically constrained, and potentially less motivated proxies is no longer a straightforward option for Iran.
2. Ballistic Missiles: Immediate Retaliation but Limited Strategic Gain?
On the first day alone, Iran reportedly launched approximately 220 missiles toward Israel and hundreds more toward US bases and targets in the Gulf. If such a rate were sustained, the central question becomes one of inventory depletion and time horizon: how long can such a tempo last, while various pre-escalation estimates considered that Iran possessed 1000–3000 ballistic missiles?
Unlike in June 2025, Iran deployed the Fattah-2 hypersonic system from the first day. This suggests an intention to demonstrate escalation capacity immediately rather than gradually. Is it to show that this time there are no more red lines, or because it does not have the capacity for a sustained long confrontation where escalation would be gradual? In both cases, the real question that has to be addressed is to what strategic end these missile stockpiles would be used.
If the objective is to impose costs sufficient to halt US and Israeli operations, the early evidence suggests limited effectiveness. Washington and Tel Aviv appear to have anticipated retaliation following the June 2025 confrontation and have signaled a willingness to absorb a certain level of damage. Also, Iranian missile launchers have reportedly suffered significant damage, raising questions about sustainability in the medium to long term. In addition, early reports following the first day of confrontation suggest that the missile attacks have had limited human casualties.
Moreover, strikes against US bases in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states may have generated more strategic harm for Iran than benefit. Even if Tehran framed these attacks as targeting American military assets, GCC governments perceived them as violations of their sovereignty. Civilian areas were also struck – whether intentionally or by error – including residential zones in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Bahrain, and even two of Kuwait’s civilian airports, with some civilian casualties like the death of an Asian expatriate.
Paradoxically, these states are among those who had publicly opposed the war, advocated for a peaceful solution, and proactively attempted mediation efforts to prevent escalation. Their stance towards Iran may now shift drastically under such circumstances, affecting the diplomatic configuration of the Gulf region.
3. Maritime Escalation: What For?
Beyond missile exchanges, Iran can escalate in the maritime theatre. The most frequently invoked option is the possible disruption or attempted closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Technically, Iran possesses the tools to disrupt or harass shipping through mining operations, missile launches from coastal batteries, or other limited naval engagements. However, the question that remains here, too, is for what strategic utility? Would disrupting Hormuz halt US or Israeli operations? It is far from certain. While energy markets would react sharply and global oil prices would surge, the United States has historically demonstrated both the naval capacity and political willingness to end sharply such forms of chantage. On the contrary, such a move could internationalize opposition to Tehran, particularly from Asian and European energy importers whose economic stability depends on uninterrupted flows from the Gulf.
Naval escalation could take more direct forms as well. Iran could deploy asymmetric maritime assets like torpedoes such as its famous Hoot, among others, against US naval platforms or ships in the Gulf. Yet here too, the strategic payoff is ambiguous. Tactical harassment might impose costs, but it would not fundamentally alter the balance of power at sea. Instead, it risks inviting overwhelming retaliation from the US Navy, which retains undisputed maritime superiority in the region.
In essence, maritime escalation cannot compel the United States or Israel to abandon a campaign aimed at regime destabilization.
4. Hybrid Escalation: How Effective?
Iran also has the option of implementing hybrid warfare tactics. Cyber operations against various Israeli or US targets, systems, or regional energy networks, or even various attacks against diplomatic targets, could be somewhat effective in inflicting psychological and economic costs. Yet here again, the strategic dilemma persists. Such actions’ capacity to alter the core political objective of Washington and Tel Aviv remains uncertain. Iran’s hybrid capabilities may also have been degraded, and unless a major strategic surprise is achieved, cyber or covert escalation alone is unlikely to compel a reversal.
Conclusion: What Does Iran Have to Lose?
Perhaps the more relevant question is not what Iran can do, but what it has left to lose. If regime change is indeed the ultimate declared objective of the US-Israel campaign, then the stakes for Tehran are existential. In such circumstances, the threshold for escalation – including the use of all above-mentioned means – rises dramatically. A regime facing potential annihilation may rationally accept risks it would otherwise avoid.
On the other hand, can the Islamic Republic be toppled through airpower and decapitation alone? Eliminating key leaders – starting with the Supreme Leader – may disrupt command structures and undermine troop morale, but it does not automatically guarantee regime collapse, especially in a system long trained to withstand external threats.
Since a full-scale ground invasion appears unlikely at this stage, especially given past US war experience in the region (Iraq, for example), fatigue and the political cost such a campaign would entail, modern warfare has evolved, and whether airpower combined with cyber, intelligence dominance, and internal destabilization can achieve regime collapse remains an open question.
