The withdrawal of Russian forces from Qamishli airport does not signal the decline of Russia’s presence in Syria, but rather its adjustment to new strategic realities following Damascus’ consolidation of control in the country’s east. Moscow is focusing on maintaining key coastal assets and preserving its role as a mediator and security guarantor, both within Syria and in the broader regional context.
Russia’s Presence in Qamishli as a Product of Great Power Politics
The deployment of Russian forces in Qamishli was the result of the reshuffling that took place in northeastern Syria in the autumn of 2019, triggered by Turkey’s operation “Peace Spring” directed against the military presence of Kurdish forces in the area. Ankara managed to persuade the United States to withdraw from several bases, including near Qamishli. Left exposed, Kurdish forces appealed to Russia and then-President Bashar al-Assad to take over positions abandoned by American troops in order to halt the advancing Turkish offensive. Moscow agreed and adapted the civilian airport in Qamishli into a military facility. The airport, which had functioned throughout the war partly under Damascus’ control and maintained civilian connections with the capital, was subsequently used as a logistical hub and operational point for Russian patrol helicopters. These were deployed to conduct joint Russian-Turkish patrols, which for Ankara served as compensation after Russia effectively compelled Turkey to halt further expansion of Operation Peace Spring.
The use of Qamishli airport by Russian armed forces had both technical and operational dimensions, as well as strategic significance. A limited aviation component was stationed there, including Mi-8 and Mi-35 helicopters transferred in 2019 from the Hmeimim airbase. The facility was secured by short-range air defense systems and infantry units responsible for protecting the site. Unlike the key Hmeimim base in Latakia province, Qamishli lacked layered air defense and a permanent fighter wing. The only air defense element deployed there consisted of Pantsir-S1 missile-artillery systems, underscoring Qamishli’s lower priority compared to Hmeimim, where advanced S-300 and S-400 systems are stationed. The base’s primary function was to support stabilization patrols in northeastern Syria and to signal Russia’s presence in a zone where the interests of Ankara, Damascus, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (backed by the United States) intersected.
Although tensions in the Qamishli area in 2019 and Russia’s role in reducing them suggested the base held strategic importance, Qamishli never constituted a pillar of Russia’s regional power projection. It was rather a tool for managing the local balance of forces during a specific phase of the Syrian conflict, when northeastern Syria remained a contested arena among key actors. This configuration began to change with the fall of Assad’s government and the gradual takeover by the new authorities in Damascus of territories previously controlled by the SDF. In that context, the function of Qamishli airport was reassessed.
Withdrawal from Qamishli and the Transfer of Control to Damascus
At the turn of January and February 2026, reports emerged that the government in Damascus had requested Russia to withdraw its troops from Qamishli airport. Within days, the relocation of Russian personnel and equipment began. According to media reports, part of the contingent was transferred to Hmeimim, while the remaining personnel were expected to return to Russia. Military equipment was airlifted over several days, although no official data has been released regarding the precise scope or destination of the transfer.
Simultaneously, Syrian authorities announced the assumption of full control over the city of Qamishli and its airport, which, after the Russian departure, remained under SDF control for several days. Under an agreement with the SDF, management of the facility was to be transferred to central state institutions, including civilian aviation authorities and the Ministry of Defense. This move formed part of a broader process through which Damascus has been reclaiming strategic infrastructure in eastern Syria, including oil fields and border crossings.
Importantly, the withdrawal did not take a confrontational form and was not portrayed as the result of tensions between Moscow and Syria’s new authorities. On the contrary, pro-government Syrian sources described it as a gesture of goodwill by Russia toward the al-Sharaa administration, which seeks to consolidate control over the entire national territory. In this sense, Qamishli became part of a wider process of rationalizing the presence of foreign actors in Syria. After more than a decade of military involvement in northeastern Syria, the United States also withdrew, which facilitated the takeover of these territories by Syrian armed forces. A similar development occurred at the strategic al-Tanf base, located near the tri-border area with Jordan and Iraq. While the United States had viewed its presence primarily as a buffer preventing Iran from exploiting Syrian territory (a rationale that lost relevance after Assad’s fall), Russia’s involvement in Syria has, since Soviet times, served as a barometer of its position in the Middle East.
A Shift in Russia’s Model of Presence in Syria
At first glance, the withdrawal from Qamishli may appear as a reduction of Russia’s presence in Syria. This perception is reinforced by the fact that in mid-2025, amid growing tensions between Damascus and the SDF, Russia increased its troop presence in Qamishli to approximately 200 personnel. However, estimates from December 2024 placed the total Russian contingent in Syria at around 7500 troops, indicating that the Qamishli component was limited and did not represent the core of Moscow’s military footprint. The reinforcement suggested that Russia sought additional leverage in dealing with the new authorities and aimed to remain a credible interlocutor for the SDF. The decision to withdraw was therefore more likely the result of shifting internal dynamics in Syria and a redefinition of Russia’s regional priorities. In broader terms, it reflects a process of reorganization rather than a strategic retreat.
First, local conditions have changed. For years, northeastern Syria represented a complex balance between Damascus, Ankara, and Washington. In such an environment, Russia’s presence in Qamishli played a stabilizing role, signaling Moscow’s influence amid competing ambitions. As the central government has regained control of key infrastructure and reduced the SDF’s role, the base’s strategic significance has diminished. Although Qamishli airport is the only airport in eastern Syria and the city lies near the Turkish border, its relevance for Russia derived from its position within a contested zone. Once large-scale hostilities subsided and Damascus consolidated territorial control, maintaining the base became less essential for shaping the local balance of power.
Second, this does not indicate the beginning of a general Russian withdrawal from Syria. Key strategic assets, namely the Hmeimim airbase and the naval facility in Tartus, remain operational. These installations have constituted the backbone of Russia’s power projection in the eastern Mediterranean since the 1970s and serve as logistical hubs for activities in the wider region, including Libya and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. In this sense, Qamishli was a flexible asset that could be relinquished without undermining Russia’s fundamental objectives in Syria. Insistence on retaining it might have been interpreted as unwillingness to compromise, potentially complicating the long-term status of the coastal bases.
Third, Russia continues to pursue a mediating role within Syria’s security architecture. This applies both to relations between Damascus and internal actors and to southern Syria, where Russian military police previously operated as a buffer near the Israeli border. In the post-Assad configuration, this function may carry greater weight for Moscow than maintaining dispersed infrastructure in the northeast. While Russia is cultivating relations with the new authorities in Damascus, it may also present itself as a “protector of minorities,” particularly in efforts to manage relations with the Druze community in Suwayda province. In southern Syria, Moscow has positioned itself as a force separating Israeli and Syrian forces and is regarded as a credible interlocutor by both Damascus and Tel Aviv. Amid growing Turkish-Israeli tensions (Turkey being perceived as the main external patron of Syria’s new authorities), Russia, despite losing its long-standing ally Bashar al-Assad, may still retain a central balancing and mediating role similar to the one it assumed upon entering the Syrian conflict in 2015.
From this perspective, the withdrawal from Qamishli might be understood as an adaptation to shifting internal balances rather than as a sign of declining Russian influence. Moscow is relinquishing a position that has lost its functional justification to concentrate resources on areas of higher strategic and political value.
Russia and the al-Sharaa Government: A Pragmatic Rapprochement
The withdrawal from Qamishli coincides with the development of relations between Moscow and Syria’s new leadership. President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s two visits to Moscow and his declarations regarding the honoring of previous military agreements suggest a mutual interest in deepening ties.
For Damascus, Russia remains a useful security partner, both as a potential arms supplier and as a mediator in dealings with Israel. The perception that Moscow retains influence over former members of the Alawite elite, some of whom have found refuge in Russia, also matters in the context of stabilization. While Bashar al-Assad has withdrawn from political life, figures such as former commander Gen. Kamal Hassan and businessman Rami Makhlouf are reportedly working to mobilize elements of resistance within the Alawite community. By positioning itself as a credible partner to Moscow, the al-Sharaa government seeks Russian support to prevent former elites from undermining the new order. For Russia, cooperation with the central government in Damascus is essential to maintaining its coastal installations and preserving influence over the emerging post-conflict security architecture in Syria and the wider Middle East.
In this light, the withdrawal from Qamishli can be interpreted as a political signal: Russia does not intend to obstruct Damascus’ consolidation of control in the east. At the same time, it secures acceptance for maintaining its presence where its strategic significance transcends the local context.
Qamishli in Syria’s New Configuration
The withdrawal coincided with Damascus’s consolidation of authority over territories that had long remained outside its full control. This process includes the takeover of military infrastructure, airports, oil fields, and border crossings. Qamishli thus became part of a broader closure of the era of fragmented territorial spheres of influence that characterized the protracted conflict.
For Damascus, the reduction of Russia’s presence in the northeast marks progress toward state unification and centralization. At the same time, the continued operation of Russian bases along the coast and the expansion of military and political cooperation indicate that the relationship is being transformed rather than terminated. Under new circumstances, Moscow is no longer the protector of a specific regime but functions as one of the guarantors of stability within a reconfigured order.
For Russia, the priority is to preserve presence where its relevance extends beyond Syria itself. The naval base in Tartus and the airbase in Hmeimim provide strategic footholds for activity in the Mediterranean and Africa. Simultaneously, Moscow seeks to maintain communication channels with Damascus, Israel, and Turkey, positioning itself as a mediator in regional disputes. In this context, Russian forces were invited by the Syrian government to establish a patrol zone in the southwest near the demarcation line with Israel. In November 2025, military delegations from both countries met in the area to discuss cooperation.
In this sense, leaving Qamishli symbolizes an adjustment to a new model of presence, less dispersed infrastructure, and greater emphasis on strategic strongholds and political functions. This shift is characteristic of the post-Assad phase that began in late 2024, during which Russia has been redefining its role in Syria by prioritizing its coastal military presence, developing relations with President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s government, and maintaining a balancing role among key external actors in the Syrian theater.
The Ukrainian Context
The decision to withdraw from Qamishli cannot be entirely separated from the broader context of the war in Ukraine. The ongoing conflict increases pressure on resource management and reinforces the need to retain only those foreign deployments with tangible operational and political value. In this sense, scaling down peripheral infrastructure aligns with a logic of rationalization.
At the same time, there is no evidence that the Qamishli base held strategic significance for Russia’s military potential in relation to Ukraine. Its function was local and stabilizing, and the forces stationed there did not constitute assets with a meaningful impact on offensive capabilities. The war in Ukraine therefore serves more as a contextual backdrop to the optimization of Russia’s Syrian presence than as its direct cause. Qamishli was a position whose continued maintenance no longer corresponded to the evolving balance of power within Syria itself.
Conclusion
Russia’s withdrawal from Qamishli does not indicate the winding down of its military presence in Syria. It is more accurately understood as a reorganization in response to shifting internal and external conditions. As Damascus consolidates control in the east and US forces draw down, the functional relevance of the base diminished, prompting Moscow to concentrate resources on areas of greater strategic value.
Russia remains entrenched along the coast, retains key military installations, and continues to pursue a mediating role within the regional security architecture. In Syria’s new configuration, Moscow’s objective is no longer to sustain a specific regime but to secure enduring points of influence and maintain leverage over political and security processes across the region. In that sense, Qamishli was never an existential asset for Russia’s regional strategy. The withdrawal from the northeast represents an adaptation to post-conflict realities and to the emerging security architecture in Syria and the wider Middle East.
Image credit: Marek Čejka
