Where are we standing now?
The military operation launched by the United States and Israel against Iran has concluded its initial month. Donald Trump has consistently asserted that we have triumphed in the war, that operations are progressing ahead of schedule, and this past weekend, the U.S. president declared that Washington has accomplished regime change in Iran by eliminating its most influential leaders. After a month, the objective of this conflict from the American perspective is becoming increasingly ambiguous.
What is becoming clear is that, as a result of the war, Washington must defend one of the most important principles of the rule-based international order—freedom of navigation—in the Strait of Hormuz, a development many view as an unexpected consequence of the current conflict. Trump has formally prolonged the deadline for negotiating with the Iranian leadership by 10 days, to April 6; should no agreement be achieved by that date, Iran will confront the most substantial U.S. intervention in history.
This analysis seeks to assess the situation one month into the war, focusing on the probability of ground troop deployment or, alternatively, de-escalation. The author contends that recent developments indicate a potential for greater escalation: new participants, namely the Yemeni Houthis, are joining the fight, while Iran’s strategy of intensification and assaults on energy infrastructure, as well as the US’ recent deployment of 3500 marines near the Strait of Hormuz, is complicating the situation further.
Yemeni Houthis Enter the War
In a statement issued on March 27, Yemen’s Ansar Allah announced that it was joining the war against Iran and would attack U.S. and Israeli interests in the coming period, including those of their allied states. On March 28, as has been customary since October 2023, they fired rockets toward Israel, which were, however, intercepted. It is unclear why the Houthis have entered the conflict and why they decided to do so at this particular time. In recent weeks, the Houthis have largely stayed in the background and have not intervened on Iran’s side, which is what everyone logically expected. This also confirms that the organization cannot be viewed merely as an Iranian proxy, but rather as a quasi-state entity that makes decisions based on the domestic balance of power.
In Yemen, following the Saudi involvement against the southern rebels in December, the Houthis have strengthened their position and solidified control over critical strategic locations, including Hodeida. The U.S. assaults in the spring of 2025 and the Israeli incursion, resulting in the assassination of the Houthi prime minister, undeniably diminished the movement’s strength. At the same time, it is also true that Ansar Allah possesses significant offensive capabilities and has likely weighed in its strategic calculations when it can best advance its interests. The disruption of free passage for commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz could also amplify their impact.
Saudi Arabia has recently attempted to export oil through a route that circumvents the Strait of Hormuz, specifically the East-West Pipeline, which has a capacity of seven million barrels per day, while the port of Yanbu, situated at the pipeline’s terminus on the Red Sea coast, can accommodate four million barrels per day. Nonetheless, this necessitates that goods can transit from the port of Yanbu across the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. A Saudi tanker has arrived in Japan, signifying the inaugural successful cargo to the island nation since the commencement of the war. In this context, Ansar Allah may intensify the energy crisis and have the capability to target this infrastructure and tankers transiting through Bab al-Mandeb. If this way is more obstructed, we will be nearer to the peril—which appeared to be Iranian propaganda a month prior—that oil prices could ascend to $200 per barrel.
Two more causes, in conjunction with advantageous external circumstances, may have compelled the Houthis to reach this choice. The U.S. Navy is positioned near Yemen, with numerous warships stationed close to the port of Salalah in Oman, available for potential military operations in Yemen. From the Houthis’ perspective, another factor is the intensifying geopolitical rivalry in the Red Sea region and the growing presence of the United States, Israel, and the UAE. In December, Israel acknowledged Somaliland as an independent state, situated directly across from the Yemeni shore. The U.S. presence in Djibouti may exacerbate tensions. The economic situation in Yemen is dire, and the over $1 billion in aid pledged by the Saudis has yet to materialize, resulting in civil servants not receiving their salaries for months. Military engagement may enhance the movement’s coherence and, primarily, its domestic acceptance. Currently, it remains ambiguous to what degree the Houthis’ actions are influencing the Iranian conflict and the implications this may have for the United States and Israel. The involvement of additional participants in the conflict is undoubtedly complicating diplomatic efforts to achieve its resolution.
The Chance of Achieving a ‘Grand Bargain’ with Iran is Modest
U.S. President Donald Trump has often claimed—an assumption frequently denied by Tehran—that Iran is pursuing negotiations with the United States and that a deal is close. The Islamic Republic replied to the United States’ 15-point list of demands with a five-point set of conditions. This indicates that the viewpoints remain very divergent. Washington seeks to terminate the ongoing armed conflict by forcing Iran to accept a comprehensive solution that includes not only the suspension of its nuclear program but also the halting of actions carried out by Iranian proxies. Furthermore, Israel intentionally eliminated Ali Larijani, regarded by many as a negotiator capable of achieving consensus even with hardliners and potentially securing an agreement with the United States. Indeed, several Iranian officials possess the capability for negotiation; a notable example is Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who has recently garnered attention in the media and whom Pakistan successfully extricated from Israel’s target list by diplomatic intervention.
The Iranian leadership demonstrates disagreement regarding negotiations with the United States: President Pezeskian exhibits a greater willingness to engage in discussions and even issued a statement of regret in early March over the strikes on neighboring countries, whilst IRGC Commander-in-Chief Vahidi opposes such talks. Iran is presently under military governance, rather than that of Mojtaba Khamenei, who assumed the position of Supreme Leader on March 9. Despite the IRGC’s lack of homogeneity, it adopts a hardline position on the war narrative, perceiving the present escalation as a preventive rather than the previously stated—and sometimes ineffective—forward deterrence. It is challenging to dispute the Iranian argument that there is minimal foundation for negotiations at this juncture, considering that the discussions—characterized as fundamentally progressive before the conflict last June and the intervention this February—ultimately resulted in military intervention by the United States and Israel. The prolonged escalation strategy employed by Iran and the escalating harm it does to the world economy—especially affecting the United States and Israel—will increasingly dissuade Washington and Tel Aviv from additional military involvement.
The negotiations are challenging because the conflict involves not only two/three governments but also 13 additional states and numerous non-state entities. Recently, the United Arab Emirates asserted that Iran is obligated to provide compensation for the damaged infrastructure. These concerns are interdependent. Additionally, there exists the phenomenon known as the Israel factor. Although Washington seeks to resolve this conflict expeditiously through diplomatic and military success, Israel has fundamentally divergent goals and will persist with its military actions. The objective is to diminish Iran’s military capabilities; concurrently, due to Iranian aggression, the GCC governments are adopting a progressively anti-Iranian position and are actively aligning themselves in the ongoing armed war.
Four nations—Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—are participating in synchronized diplomatic discussions to facilitate indirect negotiations between the U.S. and Iran. Pakistan occupies a difficult position, as it sustains remarkable relations not only with Iran but also with most of the powers attacked by the Islamic Republic, excluding Israel. Additionally, Pakistan entered into a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia last year, raising concerns that Islamabad may become entangled in the conflict in some capacity. The increasing security collaboration among the four nations may establish the foundation for a novel Middle Eastern security framework. Despite widespread belief in diminished willingness to collaborate with Turkey in this domain, Ankara may nevertheless gain advantages from the prevailing circumstances via its defense sector. Nevertheless, none of this contributes to the success of the negotiations.
If Negotiations Fail, Are Boots on the Ground Inevitable?
Recently, the USS Tripoli, another U.S. warship, has arrived in the Strait of Hormuz region; with 3,500 Marines aboard, in addition to the soldiers already deployed there, it may now constitute a formidable force for ground operations. Trump has asserted that the strategically positioned Kharg Island, through which 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports are transported, must be seized. The U.S. airstrikes on Kharg Island predominantly focused on military installations, while preserving the oil infrastructure. Since the onset of the war, multiple Iranian tankers have traversed the Strait of Hormuz bound for China. The takeover of Kharg Island alone does not address the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. A multitude of military professionals are currently deliberating the necessity of occupying and sustaining authority over the seven small islands situated around the Strait of Hormuz. This would only restrict Iran’s actions, though it would be inadequate to reinstate unfettered navigation.
There is speculation that the United States may deploy a specialized commando force in Iran, potentially to conduct surveillance on nuclear sites. The latter scenario is improbable, as a limited contingent of American forces would encounter substantial resistance in unfamiliar terrain. Maintaining control over the islands requires considerable resources and may produce ambiguous outcomes. Given that the negotiations are unlikely to produce a breakthrough despite both parties’ aspirations for an agreement, a certain level of escalation is probable.
This may also challenge the patience of the GCC governments, as essential infrastructure has recently been targeted by frequent ballistic missile and drone assaults. Iran is anticipated to get a steady influx of newly acquired Russian drones, guaranteeing sufficient stockpiles. Houthi operations may possibly escalate. These trends are likely to compel U.S. President Donald Trump to make increasingly detrimental decisions. The war with Iran has exacerbated the already tenuous regional security, presenting new concerns. The incremental progression toward conflict serves as a salient illustration of the partial accountability of both Iran and the aggressors. The actions of non-state actors present additional substantial issues that cannot be addressed solely through military solutions. This situation is creating further obstacles, and it is anticipated that land-based pipelines circumventing the Strait of Hormuz may see new assaults. The UAE’s suggestion for a multinational naval task force to oversee navigation in the Strait of Hormuz appears commendable, but it will not deter Iran’s subversive actions.
