As the US-Israeli war on Iran is in its third week, Iran’s brazen strategy of pressuring the US through indiscriminate attacks against its Gulf neighbors puts increasing pressure on the latter to act in self-defense.
It is the UN Charter-sanctioned right of any sovereign country under unprovoked attack to respond with military force to protect its territorial integrity.
The Gulf countries may not add considerable military clout to the combined might of the world’s strongest and most resourceful armies. However, they owe it to their own people to stand up to the aggression they are innocent of. Hosting military bases, even of a belligerent, is no excuse for a peaceful country being attacked. Nations that suddenly see their normal lives disrupted, their basic infrastructure and production facilities, communication, transport and commerce coming under attack, are sooner than later expected to retaliate.
This would be the logic followed under normal circumstances, but those in the current Gulf conflict are anything but.
The countries of the Gulf are all new nation-states, but they cherish histories and traditions that go back millennia. Their unique culture is founded on the search for consensus in settling disputes between them. A plethora of tribes and clans, the traditional building blocks of their societies, had many issues to sort out among themselves. This reality engendered a political wisdom that helped them avert, and in the worst case, heal rifts through dialogue before they turned into all-out warfare. The history of the region was therefore characterized by skirmishes rather than major wars over the centuries.
This logic applied even when Britain sailed into the Gulf to secure maritime peace in defense of its communication with India. The British met resistance here and there, like from the fiercely proud Qasimis of Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah, but eventually managed to come to terms with the Sheikdoms of the Gulf through treaties securing a general truce, rather than protracted war – hence the name Trucial Coast.
All this happened thanks to the propensity of the Gulf polities to settle disputes amicably and not through war. The only exception was the Arab uprising against Turkey in WWI, instigated by the British, which ended direct foreign rule from Istanbul in the Hijaz. Other than that, border and resource disputes among the tribes of the region were settled through the uniquely Gulf-flavored “sulh”, a form of renewable ceasefire ending hostilities.
The first time the Gulf faced external military intervention in modern times was when Mohammed Reza Shah of Iran occupied the Gulf islands of Greater and Lesser Tumb and Abu Musa, three strategic locations near the Strait of Hormuz. Even then, the newly minted United Arab Emirates, until then holding sway over the islands through its constituent Emirate of Sharjah, did not raise a complaint asking for the peaceful settlement of the dispute at the UN. Iran never consented, and the islands remain disputed.
Against this background, it is hard to imagine the Gulf nations, hard-pressed as they are, resorting to armed force, even as they suffer constant attacks from Iran. Wisdom taught them to endure and wait until circumstances ultimately serve them. This is what they did during the First Gulf War when Iran attacked Gulf shipping, disrupting their energy exports. Patience paid off as the conflict drew to a close, and uninterrupted shipping traffic was restored.
It is not just pure reason that dictates prudence to the Gulf states when they contemplate whether they should resort to arms in defense of their sovereignty. The fate of the current Gulf conflict hinges on the dynamics of Iran’s internal politics, as pressure piles up on the country from outside. The belligerents of the ongoing kinetic conflict are Iran and the two nations Tehran designated as mortal enemies since the inception of the Islamic Republic, the US and Israel. Should the Gulf nations engage in the hostilities, which they would only collectively do, the conflict would significantly escalate, well beyond its current scope. More than that, the entry of the Arab neighbors into the hostilities would revive the memories of the Iraq – Iran war, the last pitting Arabs and Iranians against each other. Never mind that a response from the Gulf would have no objective other than stemming aggression from Iran’s side. In the Iranian psyche, it would appear as the renewal of age-old hostility buried under centuries of history. The Arabs swarmed Persia in the 7th century CE, spreading Islam, and the people of Iran still harbor resentment about the invasion. Arab countries turning on Iran would inevitably result in a rally around the flag effect, regardless of who is for or against the Tehran regime.
Walking a tightrope, the Gulf Arabs ought to preserve the wisdom of their forefathers and deny the fraying Tehran regime the opportunity to revive itself on the steroid of Persian nationalism, as it had done during the Iraq-Iran war. Hard as it may be, restraint and cold calculation may pay off and avert the Gulf Arabs from what may be armed confrontation with no end in sight. Meanwhile, it would leave the door open for negotiations until a permanent settlement is worked out with a de-fanged Iran.
