The twelve-day war between Iran and Israel exposed significant shortcomings in Iran’s deterrence and defense capabilities. In its aftermath, Tehran announced the creation of the Supreme Defense Council (SDC) as a subsidiary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). This institutional innovation is intended to centralize wartime decision-making, enhance coordination among the armed forces, and address operational vulnerabilities revealed during the conflict. At the same time, the leadership’s choice to appoint Ali Larijani as Secretary of the SNSC reflects a parallel political objective: rebalancing the domestic power structure in favor of pragmatism and moderation, while reducing the dominance of hardline factions.
Larijani’s appointment is notable not only for his institutional role but also for his political symbolism. A long-serving insider with experience in the SNSC, Parliament, and diplomatic engagement, he returns to the security sphere at a critical juncture. His re-entry suggests a convergence between the presidency of Masoud Pezeshkian and the Supreme Leader’s office on the need to navigate both internal and external crises through pragmatic management, without abandoning the ideological underpinnings of the Islamic Republic.
Larijani’s Political Role
Having served as a full or legal member of the SNSC for over two decades, Larijani is a familiar figure in Iran’s security decision-making apparatus. After his parliamentary speakership ended and his disqualification from two presidential elections, he primarily operated as an advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei. His current mandate, however, positions him at the heart of wartime security governance. As both secretary of the SNSC and the Supreme Leader’s representative in the council, Larijani gains formal voting rights in one of Iran’s most influential policy-making bodies.
The timing of this appointment suggests an intent to strengthen the Pezeshkian government’s hand against hardline currents. Larijani has a record of cooperating effectively with Pezeshkian during their parliamentary tenure, and his reputation as a pragmatic conservative makes him a credible broker between rival factions. Supporters argue that his presence may limit the influence of extremist elements within the so-called Resistance Front, pushing them to the political margins. Critics, however, warn of potential resistance from these factions, whether through parliamentary maneuvers or aligned media outlets, which could lead to new political confrontations.
Historical Background of the Supreme Defense Council
The current SDC is not without precedent. Following the 1979 Revolution, amid internal instability and the looming threat of war, the Ministry of National Defense proposed a Supreme National Defense Council. Enshrined under Article 110 of the 1979 Constitution, this body reported directly to the Leader and was tasked with advising on key military appointments, declarations of war and peace, and the mobilization of forces. Its membership bridged civilian and military leadership to ensure decisions were integrated across political and operational domains.
During the Iran–Iraq War, the Council played a pivotal role in operational planning, coordinating between the Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and ensuring civilian institutions were aligned with wartime priorities. Over time, some operational responsibilities shifted to the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, but the Council remained a central venue for high-level defense coordination.
The 1989 constitutional revision replaced the Supreme National Defense Council with the Supreme National Security Council, transferring its constitutional basis from Article 110 to Article 176. The new SNSC absorbed broader political, economic, and security functions, while defense-specific policymaking became one of several portfolios. The re-establishment of a specialized SDC under the SNSC is thus a reversion to a wartime governance model that Iran last employed during existential conflict.
Strategic Imperatives After the 12-Day War
The decision to reconstitute the SDC was shaped by post-war assessments of Iran’s strategic posture. The conflict revealed vulnerabilities in air defense, cyber resilience, and the protection of senior military leaders, several of whom were killed in targeted strikes. Coordination gaps between different branches of the armed forces and delays in decision-making during high-intensity engagements also became apparent. These weaknesses, coupled with the broader erosion of Iran’s Axis of Resistance network, raised urgent questions about deterrence and readiness.
In this context, the SDC’s primary function is to act as a centralized command body during wartime, capable of integrating the efforts of the armed forces, intelligence services, and relevant civilian institutions. Its remit includes reviewing and designing defense plans, strengthening force capabilities, and ensuring unity of command under the president’s leadership. By situating the Council within the SNSC framework, the leadership aims to avoid the parallel decision-making and institutional overlap that have, in the past, hampered swift responses to crises.
Institutional Design and Mandate
The SDC brings together the heads of the three branches of government, senior military commanders from the Army and IRGC, ministers with defense portfolios, and appointed representatives of the Supreme Leader. Its role is distinct from that of the SNSC: the latter remains responsible for political, economic, and strategic issues, while the SDC focuses exclusively on military and defense affairs.
Supporters of the reform describe the Council as a “wartime defense cabinet” designed for rapid response to evolving threats. It is also seen as a measure to enhance deterrence by demonstrating to adversaries that Iran has streamlined its defense governance. IRGC-affiliated outlets frame the initiative as a strategic realignment of national security architecture, intended to enable swift, coordinated action in the face of “emerging regional and extra-regional threats.”
Political Significance of Larijani’s Leadership
Beyond its operational role, the SDC is also a political instrument. Reformists and moderates view Larijani’s leadership as a counterweight to figures like Saeed Jalili, whose uncompromising stance on nuclear negotiations has hindered diplomatic flexibility. While Larijani’s earlier career placed him firmly within conservative ranks, his recent trajectory has been more pragmatic, engaging with strategic agreements such as the Iran–China partnership and supporting calibrated diplomatic engagement with the West.
His recent trip to Moscow, where he met with President Vladimir Putin as Pezeshkian’s envoy, underscores his role in integrating military and diplomatic strategy. Observers interpret his return as part of a broader “third path” approach—avoiding both unrestrained confrontation and wholesale concession—by combining active diplomacy with strengthened defense capabilities.
Adapting to Modern Warfare
Several senior officials have stressed that contemporary conflicts differ fundamentally from the conventional warfare of the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War. Hybrid warfare—incorporating drones, AI-driven targeting, cyber operations, and coordinated media campaigns—now dominates the battlefield. Initial strikes in such conflicts often target critical defense infrastructure, making rapid and coordinated decision-making essential.
Figures like Manouchehr Mottaki, a former foreign minister and current MP, argue that reviewing and modernizing Iran’s defense doctrine is unavoidable. The SDC’s creation reflects a recognition that military preparedness now depends as much on technological adaptation and cyber defense as on traditional force structure.
Internal Security and “Social Deterrence”
While the SDC’s mandate is military, its establishment is also tied to the political system’s concern for internal stability. The twelve-day war, while not triggering widespread unrest, heightened public anxiety about the risk of escalation. The leadership’s post-war rhetoric increasingly acknowledges that public trust and cohesion—what some officials term “social deterrence”—are as vital to national defense as military hardware.
Senior advisers such as Ali Akbar Velayati have called for policy adjustments to make public satisfaction “tangible,” suggesting that outdated governance approaches are insufficient in the current environment. Similarly, Mahmoud Vaezi has urged the reform of ineffective policies and the adoption of measures that visibly improve citizens’ welfare, linking social capital to the resilience of the political system.
Reform Prospects and Constraints
Larijani’s return to a central role indicates a tactical willingness to work with figures who maintain a degree of independence from hardline factions. This shift could translate into moderation in cultural, media, and social policy, though any such changes will remain within the bounds of the current constitutional order. Some political analysts, such as Mohammad Reza Tajik, caution that neither reformists nor conservatives fully grasp the evolving demands of Iranian society, limiting the transformative potential of such moves.
Nonetheless, the leadership appears intent on narrowing the gap between “regime security” and “human security,” acknowledging that sustainable deterrence requires public engagement and a sense of shared national purpose.
The formation of the Supreme Defense Council marks a significant institutional adaptation in Iran’s national security framework. It responds directly to operational lessons from the twelve-day war and reflects a broader strategic aim to centralize defense decision-making, modernize military capabilities, and project deterrence. Politically, it strengthens the hand of moderates within the system, embodied in Larijani’s leadership, and signals an effort to balance hard power with diplomatic flexibility.
Whether the SDC fulfills its intended role will depend on its ability to integrate Iran’s fragmented defense institutions, respond swiftly to complex threats, and translate strategic coordination into tangible deterrence. Equally, its success will hinge on the political system’s capacity to pair military readiness with social cohesion—ensuring that Iran’s defense posture is anchored not only in weaponry and command structures but also in the resilience and unity of its population.
Image source: Fararu
