After the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Syria remains torn between the pragmatism of Ahmad al-Sharaa and the jihadist zeal of his allies. The fragile balance of power reveals how internal fractures may reshape the country’s post-war trajectory.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad and the takeover of Damascus by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, have not yet brought an end to Syria’s long-running conflict. The country remains an arena of tension, violence, and precarious balance, with stabilization seeming a distant prospect. Although the revolutionary goal has been achieved, internal divisions continue to deepen. Among the likely, yet unexpected, scenarios is a growing conflict within the former HTS structures – between pragmatists centered around Al-Sharaa and radicals loyal to the ideology of jihad. Current events reinforce the image of Syria as a broken state, where former allies are gradually becoming rivals.
On June 22, a terrorist attack on St. Elias Church in Damascus killed 25 people. Initially, responsibility for the attack was attributed to the so-called Islamic State (Daesh), but two days later, the Saraya Ansar al-Sunna organization claimed responsibility. A search began for links between this group and the remnants of Bashar al-Assad’s former regime, suggesting that the attack was intended to discredit the new government and undermine its efforts to stabilize the country. The group remains active; in October, it used its Telegram channel to announce new attacks targeting Alawite and Christian communities, heightening pressure on the authorities and deepening fears among minorities.
However, according to an analysis by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, it is highly likely that Saraya Ansar al-Sunna originated from the former HTS structures and cooperated with them until al-Assad was overthrown, sharing common ideological goals. It was only after Ahmed al-Sharaa took power that the paths of the two groups began to diverge, especially on issues concerning the treatment of religious minorities and the future ideological direction of the new Syria.
HTS as an Armed Opposition – Combining Ideology and Pragmatism as a Source of Success
A broader view of current events in Syria requires going back a few years, to the birth of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. The organization was formed in 2017 as a result of the transformation of the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra. The decision to undergo this transformation was motivated by a combination of the ideological goal of building an Islamic emirate and a pragmatic adaptation to political and military realities. Ahmed al-Sharaa (then known as Mohammad al-Joulani) realized that without formally severing ties with al-Qaeda, HTS would risk international ostracism and being commonly perceived as a terrorist organization, which would make it impossible to obtain any external support. Moreover, the link with Al-Qaeda made the group a target for “target killing” operations, carried out in particular by the United States.
While maintaining the ideological roots of Salafi jihadism, al-Sharaa decided to make the organization more flexible, allowing it to survive in a changing military situation. Between 2017 and 2020, HTS in the Syrian province of Idlib found itself on the defensive against offensives by the Syrian government army supported by Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Paradoxically, this period proved to be one of consolidation for the group. Although HTS was not a monolith, but rather a coalition of numerous factions and cells, its strength stemmed from ideological discipline and efficient leadership. Thanks to this, it managed to subjugate or defeat other rebel/jihadist groups in the province of Idlib, including those supported by Turkey. As a result, Ankara, initially reluctant towards HTS, recognized the need for cooperation and provided the organization with a protective umbrella, halting al-Assad’s military offensive.
Despite losing significant territories, HTS survived and maintained its combat capability. Between 2020 and 2024, it controlled only parts of Idlib, but managed to maintain its structural and ideological cohesion. This process culminated in November and December 2024, when, during a lightning-fast operation, HTS overthrew Bashar al-Assad’s regime and brought Ahmed al-Sharaa to power. This success was due to the leader’s model, which combined religious radicalism with political pragmatism and efficient management. The combination of ideology and tactical flexibility allowed HTS not only to survive but also to break the deadlock in the conflict and become the main actor in the new Syrian order.
HTS in Power – Ideology versus Pragmatism: When the Existing Strength Becomes a Threat
In December 2024, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham took power in Damascus and most of Syria, achieving two main goals – overthrowing the regime of Bashar al-Assad and gaining a dominant political position. Although there were still enclaves outside the control of the new government, primarily in the Kurdish regions, this moment represented a historic turning point. Yet this moment revealed a familiar revolutionary dilemma: how to move from insurgency to governance.
HTS, previously considered an armed jihadist organization, was faced with the need to create state structures and develop a vision for a new Syria. The group’s ideological profile suggested that the country would follow the path of Islamization and transformation into a Muslim emirate, which caused concern among both Syria’s religious minorities and the wider region. These fears were not unfounded – many HTS fighters identified the revolution with the need to purge Syria of Alawite and Christian influences, following the example of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
However, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was declared interim president, sought to give the new Syria a more pragmatic direction. The key objectives were stabilization, reconstruction, and the lifting of international sanctions, which required opening up to the world and softening the ideological course. Al-Shara launched a multi-vector foreign policy based on close relations with Turkey and Qatar, but also on dialogue with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the West. He also maintained pragmatic relations with Russia, allowing it to continue using the naval base in Tartus and the Hmeymim airbase in Latakia. As part of his broader normalization strategy, he also opened talks with Israel.
At the same time, Islamist reforms were launched, for instance, in the education sector, and a reference to the role of Islam as a principal source of law was included in the interim constitution. Despite these measures, some former fighters began to view the president’s policies as a betrayal of revolutionary ideals. Al-Sharaa, who presented himself as a moderate diplomat and reformer, failed to stem the growing tide of violence against minorities. Massacres of Alawitesand Druze, along with attacks on Christians and Kurds by Salafi militias, revealed the increasing autonomy of former HTS elements.
The activities of the Saraya Ansar al-Sunna group, described in an analysis by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, are an example of this fragmentation. The group, formerly loosely affiliated with HTS, now operates independently, using violence as a tool to pressure the government. Terrorist attacks, such as the bombing of a church in Damascus, are intended to warn the authorities against “deviating from the path of jihad” and being overly open to religious minorities. At the same time, every act of violence undermines the government’s credibility in the eyes of the international community, which expects stability and reform.
Al-Sharaa has found himself in a difficult position. On the one hand, he must condemn violence and distance himself from radical factions in order to maintain external support. On the other hand, too harsh a reaction towards his former comrades-in-arms risks open rebellion and another wave of conflict. As a result, what was once HTS’s greatest strength – a combination of ideology and pragmatism – has now become its greatest threat. Damascus’s official rhetoric continues to return to the theme of fighting the “remnants of the old regime.” This narrative, already present during the massacres of Alawites in early 2025, now serves as a tool to legitimize violence and divert attention from growing internal tensions. The authorities suggest that former Al-Assad officials may be responsible for some of the recent attacks, which is intended to reinforce the message of continuing the fight against the “relics of tyranny.” This approach allows the regime to simultaneously justify acts of “cleansing” the country and build its own image as the force responsible for rebuilding Syria after the destruction of the previous era.
Towards Pragmatism or Salafism? Two Scenarios for the Authorities in Damascus
Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government faces two possible courses of action, both of which carry equal risks. The first scenario is based on the president’s rational, long-term plan, which assumes that the construction of an Islamic emirate should proceed in stages – by ending the conflict, rebuilding the state, and gaining international recognition. Al-Sharaa, as the man who overthrew the dictator and brought about initial stabilization, could gain legitimacy as the architect of a new Syria. Consolidating power would then enable him to shape the ideological framework of the state. However, an obstacle to the implementation of this strategy remains his former comrades-in-arms – militants who share Al-Sharaa’s ideological beliefs but reject his pragmatism. Impatient and lacking diplomatic sensibility, they demand the immediate introduction of the principles of jihad, deepening the country’s fragmentation. What is more, they are driven by a desire for revenge against the “infidels,” whom they accuse of blocking power for legitimate Muslims in the lands of Islam (Dar al-Islam). For Al-Sharaa, inaction means a loss of authority and credibility in the eyes of the international community. At the same time, overly decisive action may be seen by radicals as a betrayal of the revolution and lead to another outbreak of conflict.
The second scenario reflects a more cynical dimension of pragmatism. In this view, Al-Sharaa may publicly emphasize his commitment to diplomacy, human rights, and moderation, while quietly tolerating or even exploiting the actions of militants as proof of his own strength. This approach aims to convince external actors that Syria’s stability depends on his continued rule: weakening Al-Sharaa would only empower the radical factions. Thus, violence becomes a tool for communicating with the international community: a signal that excessive pressure for reform or inclusiveness may deepen the chaos, and that support for the current regime is a guarantee of relative stability.
Regardless of the strategy adopted, divisions within the Syrian elite will deepen. Their dynamics will be shaped by three key factors: the nature and very fact of a potential normalization agreement with Israel; the degree of external interference – both from states and financial organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank; and, above all, the ideological direction of political and social reforms, which will determine Syria’s future identity and Ahmed al-Sharaa’s place between pragmatism and Salafism, as well as how his former comrades-in-arms perceive these reforms.
