The fall of Bashar al-Assad did not resolve the question of Syria’s future. It moved it into a new phase, in which the central issue is no longer only who controls territory, but who shapes the institutions of the new state. At the heart of this struggle lies the security sector – the army, police, intelligence structures, and the state’s ability to regain a monopoly on force.
The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharaa did not end the struggle for Syria. It only changed its character. For more than a decade, the most important struggles over the country’s future took place primarily on the military field: through offensives, external interventions, support for local factions, and the fight for territorial control. After the new authorities took Damascus and later consolidated control over most of the country’s territory, the center of gravity began to shift elsewhere. The new race for Syria is now primarily about who will participate in rebuilding the state.
Al-Sharaa’s Syria did not inherit from al-Assad a functioning state apparatus that simply needed new staff. After years of conflict, the state was devastated economically, institutionally, and socially. This is well illustrated by the 2024 Fragile States Index, in which Syria ranked fourth among the world’s most dysfunctional states. Particularly important were the categories related to the security apparatus, factionalized elites, state legitimacy, public services, and external intervention. It should also be remembered that this ranking still essentially described Syria in the late al-Assad period. It therefore shows the starting point from which the new authorities took over the country.
This is precisely why rebuilding the security sector is not a technical issue for Syria. It is not only about the number of soldiers, bases, aircraft, tanks, air defense systems, or police vehicles. What is at stake is rebuilding the state’s monopoly on violence from the ground up. The new Syria must create an army, police, and security services that function as state institutions, not as a loose coalition of former factions and local networks dependent on external patrons.
The problem is that Damascus cannot do this on its own. The economy remains devastated, institutions are weak, and reconstruction needs to cover almost every area of state functioning. External assistance is therefore a necessity for Ahmad al-Sharaa. At the same time, it is not neutral. Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and other actors offer support, but they also treat it as an investment in their future influence in Syria. Training, advisory support, funding for administration, police cooperation, intelligence sharing, and assistance in rebuilding the army are becoming tools of a new policy toward Damascus.
Why is the Security Sector Crucial?
The Fragile States Index captures this problem well through its indicator on the security apparatus. It does not limit itself to the question of whether a state has an army and police. It also covers the existence of militias, armed groups, paramilitary activity, terrorism, organized crime, arms proliferation, public trust in the security forces, police professionalization, and the state’s ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. In Syria’s case, almost every one of these elements reveals the scale of the erosion of statehood.
After the fall of al-Assad, the problem was not only that the old army and security services were in a state of decay. Over years of conflict, an entire system of local loyalties, militias, rebel factions, self-defense structures, externally supported formations, and groups controlling their own territories emerged alongside formal institutions. The new authorities dissolved the old regime’s institutions and began building a new army. Early on, al-Sharaa announced that the new armed forces would not be based on universal conscription, but on a professional army model, except in emergency situations such as war. However, the declaration of professionalization alone did not yet mean the creation of a unified command structure. Damascus may formally subordinate various groups to the Ministry of Defense, but as long as they retain their own commanders, interests, areas of influence, and links to external patrons, the new army remains more a federation of former rebel forces than a classical state institution. This is best seen in the case of the Syrian National Army (SNA), which was formally incorporated into the new structures but, during the first year after HTS took power, remained financially, organizationally, and politically linked to Turkey.
A similar problem applies to the police and internal security. Syria needs not only soldiers capable of fighting an external enemy or the remnants of ISIS. It also needs professional law enforcement forces able to operate in cities, control crime, protect borders, counter smuggling, limit retaliatory violence, and build at least a minimum level of public trust. This is especially important in a state where different social and religious groups have fresh experiences of violence, repression, displacement, and betrayal by the state apparatus.
This is why rebuilding the security sector is a test of statehood for Syria. If al-Sharaa manages to use external assistance to create relatively coherent, professional, and representative institutions, it will be one of the most important steps toward the real reconstruction of the state. If, however, different parts of the security apparatus become linked to different patrons, Syria may leave the military phase of the conflict behind, only to enter a stage of institutional dependence and, above all, remain vulnerable to potential internal tensions.
Turkey: the Military, the SNA, and a Package of Influence
Among the external actors involved in rebuilding Syria’s security sector, Turkey occupies a special position. From the beginning of the conflict, Ankara was one of the most important external actors influencing its course, and after 2016 it also became a direct military player in northern Syria. After Ahmad al-Sharaa took power, this influence did not disappear, and Turkey decided to strengthen its position as the main power broker in the new Syria.
The most important signal of this shift was the Turkish-Syrian agreement on military training and advisory support, signed in August 2025 by representatives of the defense ministries of Turkey and Syria. According to available information, it is intended to cover training programs, advisory support, technical assistance, the modernization of defense capabilities, and the institutional development of the Syrian armed forces. In practice, the agreement is expected to include the regular exchange of military personnel, specialized training, and technical assistance. According to Syrian and Turkish statements, its aim is not only to improve the combat capabilities of the new army, but also to develop its institutions and structures and support reform of the entire security sector. This is not merely a symbolic gesture of normalized relations. It is Turkey’s formal entry into the process of rebuilding Syria’s armed forces.
Further reports confirmed that the agreement did not remain at the level of declarations. Syrian military units began training in Turkey, using Turkish Armed Forces barracks and training areas, while the first group of 49 Syrian cadets was sent to Turkish military academies. Among them were 10 land forces cadets, 18 naval cadets, and 21 air force cadets. This matters because the training of officer cadres is one of the most durable forms of influence. Equipment can be replaced, and contracts can be renegotiated, but military cadres trained in a particular system often retain ties, organizational habits, and contacts with the state that trained them for years. Turkey may also become an important supplier of equipment and technical support, with media reports pointing to possible deliveries of armored vehicles, drones, artillery, rockets, and air defense systems.
The issue of the Tiyas airbase, known as T4, in Homs province is also linked to Turkey’s military presence. Under al-Assad, the base was used, among others, by Russia, and after al-Assad’s fall and the reduction of the Russian presence, it was destroyed in a series of Israeli airstrikes. In 2025, reports appeared that Turkey could be interested in a presence at this base and in deploying air defense elements there, potentially including S-400 systems that Turkey had previously acquired from Russia. These reports should be treated with caution, as some of them are based on unofficial sources, but the issue itself shows that Turkish involvement may go beyond training and advisory support. It also concerns Ankara’s possible entry into Syria’s strategic military infrastructure, especially in the context of Israel’s activities on Syrian soil and in its airspace and rising tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
An important tool of Turkey’s influence remains its position toward the Syrian National Army. The SNA is a complex structure composed of factions with different backgrounds: some are Islamist in character, some originate from the former Free Syrian Army, and some have a strong Turkmen component. For years, it was shaped and financed by Turkey, especially after Turkish military operations in northern Syria. For Ankara, the SNA was one of the main tools for limiting Kurdish political-military autonomy in northern Syria, which Turkey associated with the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Relations between the SNA and HTS were tense and ambiguous for years. The two structures could cooperate tactically against common enemies, but they also competed for influence within the anti-Assad camp. HTS did not want to become a simple executor of Turkey’s agenda, while the SNA remained closer to Ankara. An important factor was the group’s stance towards the Kurdish question: The SNA did not treat the YPG as a competitor within the anti-Assad camp, but as its main military and political opponent. This hostility was for years one of the reasons for the SNA’s dependence on Turkey and one of Ankara’s tools of pressure on Damascus.
After the new authorities consolidated control over areas previously held by the Kurds, the significance of this issue did not disappear, but its character changed. For Turkey, the problem was no longer the mere existence of a separate Kurdish administration controlling significant territory, but the risk of Kurdish political-military autonomy re-emerging and former YPG structures retaining influence in north-eastern Syria. For this reason, Ankara continues to view the rebuilding of the Syrian army and the integration of former armed formations as a process directly linked to its own security.
In this sense, Turkey occupies a dual position. On the one hand, it is an indispensable partner for Damascus. It can train cadres, provide equipment, support the rebuilding of the army, and help complete the state’s control over the north of the country. On the other hand, it remains a state with its own agenda, its own assets in Syria, and its own vision of security along the northern border. Al-Sharaa may need Turkey, but he cannot allow the rebuilding of the Syrian army to become an extension of Turkish regional policy.
Qatar and Saudi Arabia: Money, Stabilization, and Internal Security
Qatar is not the same kind of military partner for Syria as Turkey. This stems from the very nature of Qatari foreign policy. Doha does not build influence primarily through a heavy military presence. Its strength lies in financial support, active diplomacy, networks of contacts, relations with selected Islamist actors, and the ability to move quickly into political and institutional processes.
In Syria’s case, this gives Qatar a special position. For years, Doha was among the most consistent opponents of al-Assad and maintained relations with part of the anti-Assad opposition. After Ahmad al-Sharaa took power, it could therefore present itself more easily than many other actors as a partner of the new authorities, rather than, like other Arab states, as a force only trying to adjust to the changed balance of power.
The most important information concerns internal security. The Syrian Ministry of Interior maintained contacts with Qatari security structures, including the elite Internal Security Force (Lekhwiya). In April 2025, Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab met in Damascus with a Qatari security delegation headed by Staff Lieutenant Colonel Saleh Abdul Wahab Al-Muhannadi, commander of the Support and Reinforcement Group in the Lekhwiya. The talks concerned security and police cooperation, the exchange of experience, and deeper coordination between the two sides. At the same time, a Syrian delegation also visited the Qatar Police Academy, where it reviewed training facilities, cadre development programs, and the training of future security personnel. These visits do not yet prove that Qatar is running a broad training program for the Syrian police. They do, however, indicate a direction: Doha wants to be present not only in Syria’s political reconstruction but also in shaping its internal security apparatus.
In this context, reports about the training of Syrian officers in Qatar should also be noted. According to some reports, Qatar had begun training small groups of Syrian officers who, upon returning, were expected to perform police and public order functions. Other sources referred to larger programs involving members of the General Security Directorate, but this information should be treated with caution, as it was based on anonymous sources. Even so, these reports fit into the broader pattern of Qatari involvement: support for structures intended to enable the new authorities to maintain order and stabilize the state from within.
Saudi Arabia is entering post-Assad Syria differently. Riyadh does not have the same direct military tools in Syria as Ankara, nor did it develop the same close relationship with Muslim Brotherhood-linked elements of the opposition as Doha. During the conflict, Qatar cultivated ties with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist actors, while Saudi Arabia generally sought alternative partners, including more secular opposition figures as well as Islamist factions less closely associated with the Brotherhood. These differences became part of a broader Saudi-Qatari competition for influence within the Syrian opposition. Riyadh does, however, have money, political weight in the Arab world, institutional contacts, and specific interests linked to Syria’s stabilization. For Saudi Arabia, a weak, fragmented, and uncontrolled Syria means drug smuggling, ISIS cell activity, border instability, migration, sectarian violence, and space for interference by external actors.
The most concrete area of Saudi-Syrian security cooperation is the fight against organized crime, above all the captagon trade. For years, al-Assad’s Syria was one of the main centers of production and smuggling of this drug, while the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, were among its main destination markets. For Riyadh, this is not a secondary or purely policing issue. It is a matter of internal security, border control, and rebuilding the Syrian state’s capacity to fight networks linked to organized crime and local power structures.
In this context, reports about intelligence and organizational cooperation between the Syrian Ministry of Interior and Saudi Arabia are important. According to available reports, this cooperation includes information sharing, actions against organized crime, counterterrorism, and border protection. One example of this cooperation was reportedly an operation in which the Syrian authorities, acting on information from Saudi intelligence, seized significant quantities of amphetamine tablets hidden in the provinces of Idlib and Aleppo. According to the Syrian Ministry of Interior, these actions were intended to strike captagon smuggling networks linked to remnants of the previous regime. This is a different model of involvement from Turkish military cooperation. Riyadh is not primarily building the new Syrian army. It is trying to strengthen those elements of the security apparatus that can limit the export of instability from Syria. In April 2025, Saudi Arabia also hosted a Syrian security delegation that studied Saudi policing practices and advanced security systems.
Financing is an important element of Qatar and Saudi Arabia’s policy. The two states repaid Syria’s arrears to the World Bank, amounting to around 15.5 million dollars, which opened the way for Damascus to once again access the institution’s instruments. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Qatar launched, in partnership with UNDP, a joint $89 million initiative to support part of the salaries of civilian public-sector employees and the continuity of essential public services over a three-month period. At first glance, this is not directly a matter of the army or the police. In practice, however, it has security implications. A state that cannot pay administrators, doctors, teachers, or civil servants will also be unable to build stable security institutions. Collapsing public services, corruption, and unpaid salaries quickly translate into a loss of trust in the state and the return of local power networks.
The joint actions of Saudi Arabia and Qatar are also important from the perspective of a long-term approach to stability in the Middle East. For years, the two states often represented different approaches to the region, especially toward internal conflicts. In Syria after al-Assad, competition for influence between them has not disappeared, but space for cooperation has also emerged. For both capitals, stabilizing Damascus may be more beneficial than further state collapse. A weak Syria would mean more space for smuggling, extremism, local militias, sectarian violence, and external interventions.
Opportunity or New Dependence?
The new race for Syria is not a simple repetition of the earlier phase of the conflict transferred onto political and economic ground. For years, external forces strengthened their own local partners, financed factions, supplied weapons, conducted military operations, and tried to influence the course of the fighting. The result was the further fragmentation of Syria. Today, the stakes are different. It is less about holding a specific front and more about influence over the reconstruction of the state. This does not mean that rivalry has disappeared. Its tools have changed.
Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia do not have identical interests. Ankara wants to secure northern Syria and prevent the re-emergence of Kurdish political-military autonomy, which it has long associated with the YPG, maintain influence over Damascus, and become Syria’s main military partner. Qatar uses money, political relations, and institutional ties to remain close to the new authorities and support them in administration and internal security. Saudi Arabia views Syria through the prism of stabilization, the fight against captagon, limiting Iranian influence, and restoring an Arab role in Damascus. Each of these states wants influence over the new Syria, but each does so differently and for different reasons.
At the same time, post-Assad Syria shows that regional rivalry does not have to function today in the same way as it did during the most intense years of the war. In certain areas, the interests of Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are beginning to overlap. All of these states may have an interest in Syria no longer being a reservoir of chaos. Further fragmentation of the country would mean more space for ISIS, smuggling, local militias, sectarian violence, new waves of refugees, and external interventions. For Ankara, Doha, and Riyadh, stabilizing Syria may therefore be more beneficial than continuing to sustain its weakness.
In this equation, the role of Israel cannot be ignored. After the fall of al-Assad, the armed forces of that state used the security vacuum to further expand the area under their control on Syrian territory in order to create a so-called buffer zone. Israel also carried out a series of airstrikes aimed at destroying Syria’s remaining defensive capabilities. From the perspective of Damascus, this means that rebuilding the army, air defense, the ability to control borders and territory, and intelligence structures is a condition for limiting external pressure. From the perspective of Turkey, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia, a weak Syria may be convenient only in the short term. It may be easier to control and manipulate, but in the longer term, a state unable to defend and control its own territory creates more space for further Israeli expansion. This is important for these states given the growing concern over Israel’s regional position, which has been contributing to deeper cooperation between Ankara, Doha, Riyadh, and other states, including Egypt and Pakistan.
For Syria, this situation is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, competition among partners gives al-Sharaa room for maneuver. He can accept Turkish military training and equipment, Qatari money, and Saudi stabilization support without fully locking himself into one patron. On the other hand, the more external actors participate in rebuilding the security apparatus, the greater the risk that individual elements of the state will become linked to different external interests. In that case, Syria will not regain full autonomy, but will exchange its former military fragmentation for a new institutional fragmentation.
This is why the question of Syria’s security sector is, in fact, a question about the future of post-Assad Syria as a whole. Will the new authorities build a state capable of acting independently, or merely a new configuration of external influences? The answer does not depend only on how much equipment, money, and training Damascus receives. It depends above all on whether Interim President al-Sharaa will be able to turn external assistance into a tool of state reconstruction, rather than another mechanism deepening Syria’s dependence. Damascus may, however, try to turn regional concern over Israel’s policy into its own advantage. If some states in the region come to see the rebuilding of Syria’s defensive capabilities as part of balancing Israel’s advantage, al-Sharaa will gain an additional argument for the rapid reconstruction of the army, air defense, and security infrastructure. Syria will obviously not easily or quickly return to the military position it held in the 1970s, but the very memory of the period when it was one of Israel’s main Arab adversaries may strengthen the political significance of rebuilding its defense potential.
Image: Marek Čejka
