The majority of the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, an alliance of six Iranian Kurdish opposition parties formed in February, has reportedly been targeted hundreds of times in Iranian drone and missile strikes in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, resulting in the deaths of at least 9 of its members during the ongoing war.
Confrontational Stance
“PJAK has adopted a more confrontational stance toward Iran and has repeatedly warned that attacks on its members would be met with retaliation,” Afshin Ismaeli, a Kurdish-Norwegian freelance journalist, told Khayrion.
“A notable example occurred in July 2025, when PJAK responded to the killing of one of its guerrilla fighters by launching an attack on Iranian border guards, reportedly resulting in several casualties. Such incidents may increase the potential costs of escalation for Iran and contribute to a more cautious approach.”
“The PJAK has a much stronger ‘violence capital’ compared to the other Iranian Kurdish parties. A large-scale attack on the PJAK could easily put the group back in the spotlight and potentially trigger a wider military response from the organization and its networks,” former PJAK official Shamal Bishir told Khayrion.
One year before the war, on July 19, 2025, an Iranian drone strike allegedly killed a PJAK commander, Simko Kobane, triggering retaliatory attacks by the PJAK on July 23 in Iran’s Kurdish region that left three Iranian border guards dead. However, the PJAK later said Kobane was killed by an informant with links to the Iranian regime who planted an explosive, and not a drone.
However, there was one incident in which clashes took place between the PJAK and the IRGC inside Iran. The PJAK’s armed wing on June 12 stated that PJAK forces clashed with Iranian armed forces in the Kurdish town of Marivan after they were attacked by artillery and mortar fire on June 7, inflicting casualties on the ranks of Iranian forces. The town of Marivan borders the town of Penjwin in Iraqi Kurdistan, where the PJAK has camps.
Furthermore, on May 22, PJAK forces killed Omid Vashkelani in Marivan in Iran on the accusation of collaborating with the Iranian regime and promoting prostitution and narcotics. Afshin Ismaeli also said that the PJAK announced the death of one of its fighters in late May 2026, claiming he was killed by Iranian forces.
Underground Structures
Another reason why the PJAK has not faced many attacks is that, unlike the other Iranian Kurdish camps that are out in the open, such as in Koya, Surdash, and near Darashukran, and are easier to target, PJAK camps are primarily located underground in caves.
“The PJAK’s forces are largely based in mountainous areas and extensive tunnel networks, making them difficult targets for drones, missiles, and other forms of conventional military pressure. From a military perspective, the costs and effectiveness of such operations may be limited,” Ismaeli said.
Former PJAK member Bishir added that attacks against the PJAK are unlikely to be very effective.
“Much of the organization operates underground or in difficult mountainous terrain, meaning that shelling and drone strikes would probably have limited impact on its actual structure and capabilities,” Bishir said.
Furthermore, some of the Iranian Kurdish parties also have bases near disputed territories in Iraq, such as in Mosul, from where the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have carried out attacks. For instance, the Kurdish party Khabat was targeted by PMF groups in Bashiqa, losing two fighters
According to Aliza Marcus’s latest book, Resurgence and Revolution: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight in Turkey and Syria, PKK fighters spent increasingly longer periods of time in dug-out caves in the mountains to avoid drone targeting by Turkey. The PKK started to build tunnels after they saw how Hamas used this against Israel (in the 2000s), a former PKK fighter told Marcus.
Political Messaging
“Iran’s attacks on Kurdish groups were as much aimed at the groups as they were a message to the Kurdistan Regional Government,” Marcus told Khayrion.
Furthermore, the Iranian attacks are also messages to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). At the beginning of the war in March, President Trump also called the leaders of the PUK and KDP to discuss the Iranian war.
“The message was that the KRG should not get involved in the war and should not allow Kurdish groups, who have been given shelter by the KRG, to attack Iran. The PJAK is different. It’s not supported by the KRG in any way, and so Iran can communicate through different channels to warn off the PJAK, which is part of the PKK. And finally, after what happened to the PKK’s Syrian affiliate and how it was abandoned by the U.S., it was clear the PJAK was going to need more than vague promises to get involved in any U.S. fight,” Marcus said.
Bishir also agreed that it is about messaging. “It is also important to understand that the attacks on Kurdish opposition groups in Sulaimaniyah and Erbil are not only about those organizations themselves. They are also political messages directed at the KRG, the KDP, the PUK, as well as the Americans and Israelis.”
Regional Connections
The PJAK was also targeted by Turkish drone strikes in both Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan. On August 6 2022, in Qamishli city, a senior PJAK member was killed by a Turkish drone strike.
On 22 October 2024, Turkey launched a new peace process with the PKK, and on February 27, 2025, imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan made a call for the PKK to lay down their weapons. Since the new peace process, there have been no more Turkish drone strikes targeting the PKK.
Bishir also added that the PJAK is part of a much broader regional movement, and Iran does not want a major confrontation with the PJAK. “Any major confrontation with the PJAK would have consequences far beyond Iran itself. It seems that Tehran does not fully trust the ongoing peace process in Turkey and therefore does not want to completely burn its bridges with the wider PKK movement.
There was also a ceasefire between the PJAK and Iran in 2011 after Iran agreed to stop executing PJAK political prisoners. This also came at the time when the PKK started to get more active in Syria. Despite the ceasefire, irregular clashes have continued to occur from time to time.
The PJAK was also one of the reasons why Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan persuaded U.S. President Donald Trump to abandon a plan to support Iranian Kurdish opposition groups to cross the border and take Kurdish majority areas in western Iran. Turkey also threatened to intervene if the PJAK were to get involved in an offensive against the Iranian regime. The Turkish government did not want to repeat what happened in Syria, where the PKK-linked Democratic Union Party (PYD) managed to control major territory and set up an autonomous administration during the Syrian civil war. The Turkish military, as a result, carried out three cross-border offensives in Syria with the aim of preventing the PYD from expanding its control.
In January, Turkey’s intelligence agency had warned Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) of PJAK fighters crossing the border, leading to clashes. Turkey, during the 28 February war, has also stated it was closely monitoring PJAK activities.
Concluding Remarks
Taken together, the PJAK’s military capabilities, underground cave infrastructures, and the broader geopolitical calculations by Iran surrounding the PKK and the peace process in Turkey help explain why it has largely escaped the sustained campaign of drone and missile attacks that have affected other Iranian Kurdish opposition parties in Iraqi Kurdistan. Now that the United States and Iran have reached a deal last Sunday to end the war, it remains to be seen if Iran will continue to hit Iranian Kurdish opposition parties with drones and missiles. After the ceasefire on 8 April, attacks continued, but from Sunday until the date of publication, there have been no new strikes.
Image: Lenka Hrabalová
