Egypt and Iran are two countries with two ancient civilizations at a crossroads. The war on Iran, which was started by the USA and Israeli attacks in February 2026, has put Egypt in a critical situation.
Egypt and Iran both are lands of civilizations and have respected each other for a long time before the overthrow of the Shah’s regime and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. The relations between Egypt and Iran then became really tense after the assassination of President Anwar El Sadat in 1981, when the Islamic Republic celebrated his death and named a street after the assassin in Tehran, and have never truly improved.
This paper argues that Egypt is in a critical position as it takes a stand in the current war. There are several arguments to explain its stand.
In the 1940s, an intermarriage took place between the Egyptian and Persian royal families. It did not last long, but left behind positive ties between the two countries.
When the Islamic revolution in Iran erupted in 1979, the overthrown Shah sought medical refuge in Egypt and was welcomed by President Sadat until he died and was buried in Cairo. This support for the Shah agitated the Islamic regime’s sentiments towards Egypt, along with other reasons such as signing a peace agreement with Israel. Tehran sent a very clear political message by naming a main street in Tehran after the murderer of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, thus celebrating the removal of an enemy of the Islamic regime. Since then, relations have grown tense, and Egypt has not had full diplomatic representation in Tehran; it only has a small office run by the Head of Mission to handle Egyptian affairs in Iran.
Over the years, there were a few attempts to improve relations, but a full normalization never occurred. The most significant one took place during Mubarak’s administration in 2007, when Mubarak and Khatami seemed to be developing a cordial relationship. However, the closeness between the leaders did not lead all the way to the normalization of ties between their countries.
Another attempt to bring Egyptian-Iranian relations closer happened during the Presidency of Mohamed Morsi, who was the first Egyptian President to visit Tehran since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Morsi invited Iranians to visit Egypt and its Shia shrines, but, again, the reaction was unenthusiastic in both Egypt and Iran, and normalization was postponed.
Since then, relations with Iran have not been a priority in Egypt’s foreign policy agenda. When the US-Israel war on Iran broke out in February 2026, Egypt became divided on the issue. The government saw this war as “miscalculated by many actors involved,” as Ambassador Khaled Emera explained in his interview with the Almenassa podcast. In Egypt’s view, the war has involved several miscalculations on multiple fronts. First, Egypt saw the USA-Israel actions as violating international law by launching this war and attacking Iran first. Second, the Iranian regime miscalculated by undermining its support at home by its reaction to the 2025/26 popular uprising. Third, the Arab Gulf States underestimated the impact of hosting American military bases. Thus, Egypt views Iran as being in a ‘defensive’ position, and as having the right to repel aggression on its territory (Emera, 2026), and, given its respect for states’ sovereignty, it rejects US-Israeli interference in Iran.
Also, Egypt might want to support Iran because of their Muslim identity, both countries being members of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). At the same time, Egypt is in a complex situation with its Arab League co-members. Egypt feels obliged to support the Arab Gulf States because of Pan-Arabism and its Arab identity. Another strong reason for loyalty towards the Arab Gulf countries are the large sums of funding these Arab states have invested in and lent to Egypt as part of their counter-terrorism policies. Such investments and loans obliged Egypt to make a promise that “Arab states’ security is an extension of Egypt’s national security,” as President Sisi said to Kuwait’s Foreign Minister. Sisi has also promised them to be “on the way,” which became a slogan that promised that Egypt would be next to its Arab Gulf brothers whenever they call for help. However, when the war broke out, and Iran started targeting many US military bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, Egypt was not really ‘on the way’ to defend them. This reluctance was met by an uproar in Arab Gulf societies, who condemned Egypt’s slow moves, and not hurrying with its strong military to defend them against what was perceived as the evil Iran. Furthermore, Egypt has so far been unable to take a clear stand against the USA and Israel, since it does not want to risk its relationship with its biggest ally, the USA, which in extension means avoiding conflict with Israel. This explains its slow steps towards taking serious actions in this war at the beginning.
However, Egyptian President Sisi and his foreign minister have made several shuttle visits to Arab Gulf countries to reassure them that Egypt is close to them and will defend them whenever needed. Furthermore, Egyptian diplomacy was evident in its mediation efforts between the US and Israel on one side and Iran on the other. Egyptian mediation comes from its “balanced” relationship between all parties involved, as Hamzawy described.
The aim of the mediation is to bring a truce to the region that has been in constant turmoil since 2023 due to the ongoing war in Gaza. Egypt, like the rest of the region, is exhausted by the constant unrest, which is negatively impacting its economy. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is negatively affecting international trade and navigation along routes leading to the Suez Canal.
On the other hand, the Egyptian population is deeply divided on the issue. A certain segment of the population, consisting mainly of citizens who have a family member residing in the Arab Gulf countries to earn a living and send remittances to their families in foreign currency, has a clear interest in persuading the Egyptian government to adopt the Arab Gulf States’ firm stance against Iran. The same Egyptians became disturbed upon the death of an Egyptian petroleum engineer in the UAE in one of the strikes by Iran on Abu Dhabi in April 2026.
The opposing stance is represented by Egyptians who have no connections to the Arab Gulf states; they have never worked there and have no relatives there, so they feel apprehensive towards the Arab Gulf countries while also feeling some sympathy for Iranian society. The sympathy comes from the fact that the attacks on Iran started during the holy month of Ramadan, which angered many Muslims in Egypt. The US and Israel’s attack on the school in Minab, killing nearly 160 schoolgirls, further exacerbated this anger. Moreover, there are some Egyptians who sympathize with Iran because it is an enemy of Israel, which lost a lot of credit in the Egyptians’ eyes since the outbreak of the Gaza war in 2023. Many Egyptians saw Iran’s attack on Israel as a revenge for Gaza. Again, the Muslim identity resurfaces to play a role in sympathizing with Iran over the USA-Israel. A significant number of Egyptians believe that Iran is facing American imperialism and Israeli expansionist policies in the region, “as Egyptians are political by nature,” explained Ambassador Emera (2026). Moreover, Dr. El Fiky described to BBC Arabic that while Egypt is not supporting Iran, it stands against Israeli policies. What furthered Egyptian sympathy for Iran was a short video reel featuring the Iranian head of mission in Cairo, who praised Egyptian society and thanked them for their support for the Iranian people during these difficult times. In addition, “Egyptians are worried about their eastern borders due to the collapse of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon & Palestine, so they are unwilling to think that Iran would collapse as well”. Finally, many Egyptians have an unfavorable view of President Trump’s policies, considering the war on Iran is one of his many unsatisfactory policies.
The reaction of the Egyptian government after the heavy criticism it received on social media by many Arab Gulf politicians led Egypt’s foreign minister, Badr Abd El Aaty, to visit several Gulf states, and the Egyptian president Sisi to visit the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia on the eve of Eid al-Adha, showing the urgency felt by the government to show that Egypt is standing next to its brethren during hard times.
Meanwhile, Egyptians reacted by posting memes on social media featuring phrases from Egyptian comedy movies reflecting on the situation in the Gulf. The most common joke going around says, “Arab Gulf countries paid money to the Americans to defend them against Iran, so Israel attacked Iran, so Iran attacked the Gulf States, in turn, the Arab Gulf countries cursed Egypt, and Egypt said, ‘What’s my business in that?’”
At the same time, Egyptians with connections to the Gulf were posting statements on social media to show their support for the governments and people of the Arab Gulf States.
To conclude, taking a clear stance on a regional war is not an easy task. Any form of active participation would require extensive calculations on the Egyptian side. The situation is highly complex, and Egypt wants to avoid its intricacies as much as possible, as it needs to concentrate on its own developments, which have suffered immensely since 2003 from this instability in the wider region. At the same time, Egypt would want to keep its strong ties with its close allies, such as the USA and the Arab Gulf States. Meanwhile, it also wants to keep its benign relations with Iran. This explains the option Egypt picked: offering its mediation between the contending parties and using its diplomacy to secure a truce and, eventually, peace.
