The leader of the Iraqi Kurdish ruling Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Bafel Talabani, announced on November 5 that his party will withdraw from the government and will not recognize the Kurdistan Region’s recently formed parliament. His call renewed fears among locals of a return to the two-administration period during the civil war in the 1990s.
In his speech, Mr. Talabani promised that they “will not let a single drop of anyone’s blood be shed in Kurdistan.” He also threatened to form his own government if the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) proceeded to form a government without the PUK.
The move further damages the Kurdistan Region’s reputation and comes shortly after the Kurds unified the KDP’s and PUK’s Peshmerga units under the Ministry of Peshmerga on September 21, 2026.
The Kurdistan Region held parliamentary elections on October 20, 2024. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led with 39 seats, followed by the PUK with 23 seats, and the New Generation Movement with 15 seats. Subsequent attempts to convene parliament and form a new Kurdish government have failed despite repeated talks between the KDP and PUK.The KDP and PUK used to divide authority over the Kurdistan Region through a 50-50 power-sharing agreement in 2007, with KDP leader Masoud Barzani as President of the Kurdistan Region and Jalal Talabani as President of Iraq in Baghdad. However, the KDP has now argued that the government formation should reflect the parties’ electoral strength. The PUK has kept losing seats to other political parties, and split-off opposition parties, such as Gorran, established in 2009 by a former PUK leader who managed to ‘beat’ the PUK in 2013’s elections. In 1992, both parties had 50 seats.
Internal PUK Divisions
The PUK has also faced internal disputes and a power struggle since the death of its leader Jalal Talabani, who passed away on 3 October 2017. Lahur Talabani, a nephew of the late President Jalal Talabani, shared the PUK leadership with his cousin Bafel Talabani until he was removed in 2021. He created the People’s Front party, which gained two seats in the 2024 parliament elections. Bafel Talabani became the sole president of the PUK on August 28, 2022. On October 15, 2026, Lahur Talabani was sentenced to five years in jail after he was arrested following deadly clashes with the PUK on August 22, 2025, amid PUK allegations that he had plans to assassinate Bafel Talabani.
After Jalal Talabani’s death, the KDP and PUK, for the first time since 1992, ran on separate lists during the 12 May 2018 Iraqi parliamentary election. In the Kurdistan parliament elections on 30 September 2018, they also ran separately, with the PUK gaining 21 seats compared with 45 for the KDP.
On May 15, 2025, KDP leader Masoud Barzani, for the first time, publicly stated that the government based on a 50-50 split of power was over following the October 2024 elections. However, the PUK has insisted on continuing 50-50 power-sharing in the government, based on territorial control. While the KDP’s security forces control the so-called yellow zone in Erbil and Duhok, the PUK’s security forces control the green zone in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja since the end of the Kurdish civil war in 1998. Any government formed in Erbil without the PUK would see its authority end at the Erbil-Sulaymaniyah border.
In response to electoral losses, the PUK formed an alliance with the New Generation opposition party in January 2026, after briefly jailing its leader, combining 38 seats. However, the KDP has not recognized this alliance.
The question now is how to break this political deadlock. “I don’t think the two parties can reach an agreement without making compromises, though neither side has shown a willingness to make sufficient concessions given the current balance of power and lack of strategic incentives,” Shivan Fazil, a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science at Boston University, said. The KDP President, Masoud Barzani, on Nov. 9 called for a KDP-PUK meeting to “bring an end to the political crisis in the Kurdistan Region.”
“The KDP has been ascendant and wants a new arrangement, while the PUK is insisting on a modus vivendi based on equal power. Any new arrangement would need to address this imbalance of power,” Fazil added.
Bafel Talabani’s withdrawal this month from the ninth cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) came after the KDP managed to reactivate the Kurdistan Parliament on November 5, gaining the support of 52 parliament members, reaching the quorum of 51 seats and electing Dr. Vala Farid (KDP) as Speaker of Parliament, Ramy Noori (Christian) as Deputy Speaker, and Muna Qahwachi (Turkmen) as Parliament Secretary.
The move by the KDP came as a surprise to its rivals. The KDP managed to reach the quorum through defections from rival parties, including three members of the PUK. Mr. Bafel Talabani accused the KDP of buying the members of parliament. The issue was widely discussed by Kurdish commentators, although members of parties in the Kurdistan Region regularly switched loyalties.
The renewed tensions between the PUK and KDP are another setback for the Kurdistan Region and could further weaken it after the withdrawal of the U.S.-led Coalition on September 30, making it easier for Iran and Baghdad to undermine Kurdish autonomy. There has also been a lot of speculation about an alleged role of Iran in the worsening disputes between the KDP and PUK, but Iran on Nov. 9 has called on the two sides to bridge their differences.
“Judging by statements from KDP leaders, the move to reconvene the Kurdistan parliament was not intended to exclude the PUK from the government. Rather, it was an attempt to jolt into motion a political process that the KDP believes the PUK has stalled and obstructed for the past two years,” Mohammed Salih, a Senior Fellow at the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute, told Khayrion.
“Indeed, this appears to be a calculated yet flexible move by the KDP, which has drawn a distinction between reconvening parliament and forming a government that includes the PUK. The KDP has clearly left the door open for the PUK to participate in the KRG cabinet and parliament and other institutions,” he said, adding that the PUK should reach “a reasonable power-sharing agreement with the KDP that reflects its electoral weight.”
Despite worries among Kurdish civilians about the return of a two-party administration, Fazil underlined that a PUK withdrawal would not lead to the collapse of the KRG or a return to two administrations. “Instead, it is a countermove to keep the KDP from unilaterally driving the next steps of government formation,” Fazil said.
U.S. Mediation Role?
Fazil argued that the US could play a pivotal role in resolving KDP-PUK disputes through mediation efforts and confidence-building measures—and it’s in the U.S. interest to have a unified, stable, and prosperous Kurdistan Region. “Unlike other non-state actors, the Kurds have consistently advanced U.S. interests in the Middle East and, over the past decade, played a crucial role in the war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria,” he said.
Former U.S. officials are disappointed in the breakdown in KDP-PUK relations. Victoria J. Taylor, Former Deputy Assistant U.S. Secretary for Iraq and Iran, posted on X that the tensions between the KDP and PUK are “bad for Kurds, bad for Kurdistan, and bad for the American interests”.
She argued that previous U.S. intervention has helped prevent a complete rupture in relations between the KDP and PUK, but that the Trump administration is less interested in getting into the weeds of KRG internal politics. “Yet, the divisions within Kurdistan undermine the strength of one the strongest U.S. partners in Iraq,” she said.
Signs suggest this assessment is correct. U.S. President Donald Trump’s Special Envoy to Iraq, Tom Barrack, visited Baghdad on Nov. 5; he did not visit the Kurdistan Region amid the crisis.
“The U.S. Government has often played a pivotal role in mediating disputes within the Kurdistan Region and between the Region and the federal government. Perhaps the most famous of these was when then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright helped reconcile differences between Mam Jalal and Kak Massoud in 1998,” Joey Hood, the former US Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, told Khayrion.
“Other efforts were less visible, and some, such as the recently concluded effort to unify the Peshmerga units, were more focused on security rather than politics. But what was common to all of these efforts was a very active U.S. diplomatic presence that was committed to a prosperous, secure Region within a strong Iraq.”
“Special Envoy Tom Barrack does not appear to believe in that formula, according to statements he has made about the failure of federalism in Iraq. In addition, his visits to Erbil and Suleimaniya are few and far between, yet I know from experience that constant contact with all the parties – and sometimes applying leverage – is essential to reconciling different stances,” Ambassador Hood stated.
Kurdish officials have also confirmed to the author that the Trump administration is more interested in the Kurds supporting the agenda of Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi rather than focusing on internal Kurdish disputes.
Thus, Ambassador Hood concluded that the Kurdistan Region’s “parties are going to need to find their own way back to reconciliation quickly, or their adversaries will take full advantage, as we have just seen with the major drone attack on the Khor Mor gas field.”
The KDP leader’s olive branch could provide both parties with an opportunity to reconcile; otherwise, the Kurdistan Region risks becoming further weakened.
