Debate Over Iran’s Nuclear Doctrine Reaches the Highest Levels: Is Withdrawal from the NPT the First Step?

Recent statements by Iran’s senior security officials and the positions adopted by several political institutions indicate that reconsideration of the country’s nuclear doctrine is no longer confined to commentators, analysts, or hardline political factions. Military strikes, the erosion of confidence in conventional deterrence, the weakening of regional proxy forces, and uncertainty over diplomatic assurances have compelled Tehran to reassess its security calculations more fundamentally.

The debate over nuclear weapons in Iran has now reached a critical threshold in the country’s political arena. An issue that, until recently, was largely confined to statements by hardline figures, parliamentary initiatives, and expert discussions is now being openly addressed at the highest levels of Iran’s political and national security establishment.

The central question is whether the strategic assumptions that have kept Tehran a nuclear threshold state, without crossing the threshold into actual nuclear weapon possession, remain viable in the aftermath of repeated military confrontations. Has the policy under which Iran sought to derive deterrent benefits from its latent nuclear capabilities, without openly manufacturing a nuclear weapon, lost its credibility? And if so, could withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) constitute the first step toward a fundamental shift in Iran’s nuclear doctrine?

From Threats Against Nuclear Facilities to Debate Within the National Security Establishment

Discussion of a possible change in Iran’s nuclear doctrine gradually entered the country’s political discourse before the 2025 Twelve-Day War. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and amid Israeli threats to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, several Iranian political and military officials identified such an attack as a potential trigger for a revision of the country’s nuclear doctrine.

A few days after Iran and Israel entered into direct confrontation, following Israel’s April 2024 attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus that killed seven Iranian officers, and as the two countries moved from their longstanding shadow conflict into open military confrontation, Brigadier General Ahmad Haqtalab, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Protection and Security of Nuclear Centers, stated that if Israel decided to attack any of Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Islamic Republic could reconsider its nuclear doctrine concerning weapons of mass destruction.

Within the same context, Kamal Kharrazi, Chairman of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations and senior adviser to the then Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, stated in an interview with Al Jazeera Mubasher on May 9, 2024: “We have no intention of building a nuclear bomb, but if Iran’s existence is threatened, we will have no choice but to change our nuclear doctrine.” Kharrazi also warned that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would alter Tehran’s deterrence posture.

Subsequently, Iranian military officials also indicated that an Israeli attack on the country’s nuclear facilities could make a reassessment of Iran’s nuclear doctrine and policies, including a departure from previously declared constraints, a plausible and conceivable option.

Previously, on July 17, 2022, Kharrazi stated in an interview with Al Jazeera that Iran possessed the technical capability to manufacture a nuclear bomb, while emphasizing that Tehran had no intention of doing so. He stated: “It is no secret that we have the technical capability to build a nuclear bomb, but we have no intention of doing so.” Kharrazi also noted that Iran had managed to increase its uranium enrichment level from 20 percent to 60 percent within a matter of days and could readily raise it to 90 percent.

Earlier, in 2021, Mahmoud Alavi, Iran’s then Minister of Intelligence, had stated that Western pressure could push the Islamic Republic toward acquiring nuclear weapons. Alavi’s remarks represented one of the most explicit statements by an Iranian intelligence and security official concerning the country’s potential transition toward nuclear weapon acquisition.

These statements were made against the backdrop of a religious decree (fatwa) issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in April 2010, prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons and declaring the use of such weapons religiously forbidden (haram) under Islam.

In the latest religious inquiry concerning Iran’s former Supreme Leader, published by Tabnak, a media outlet close to Mohsen Rezaei, then Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, on November 3, 2025, following the 2025 Twelve-Day War, the same fatwa was reaffirmed.

Nevertheless, following the 40-Day War of 2026, reconsideration of Iran’s nuclear doctrine increasingly came to be portrayed by certain political factions as an unavoidable necessity, gaining greater prominence within the country’s political power structure.

On October 31, 2026, Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, acknowledged that an internal debate was underway over whether Tehran should retain its existing nuclear doctrine in the event of another war. He also referred to growing public demands for a reassessment of the policy following attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, which, according to Iranian officials, had taken place despite the facilities’ previous cooperation with international inspectors. Rezaei emphasized that no formal decision had yet been made to change the doctrine.

Nevertheless, the significance of his remarks should not be underestimated: the issue of nuclear weaponization has moved beyond the realm of political commentary and entered the deliberative and decision-making processes of Iran’s highest national security institutions.

The Erosion of Iran’s Deterrence Strategy

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Iran pursued an organized nuclear weapons-related program known as the AMAD Plan. The program was halted in the autumn of 2003, and its activities were subsequently reorganized. Nevertheless, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed that certain related activities continued after 2003, although it found no credible indications of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.

The termination of the AMAD Plan, however, should not be equated with the elimination of Iran’s accumulated nuclear knowledge or technical capabilities.

By initiating 60-percent uranium enrichment in April 2021 and continuously expanding its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, Iran gradually established itself as a Nuclear Threshold State. This refers to a country that does not possess nuclear weapons but has acquired the technical capabilities and fissile material necessary to rapidly produce weapons-grade uranium, generally defined as uranium enriched to approximately 90 percent. According to the IAEA, Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent had reached approximately 440.9 kilograms by June 13, 2025. If further enriched, this quantity would have been sufficient, in terms of feed material, for the production of several nuclear weapons. These advances substantially reduced Iran’s nuclear breakout time, defined as the period required to produce sufficient fissile material for one nuclear weapon. However, the accumulation of sufficient fissile material does not, in itself, constitute completion of the weaponization process or the development of an operational nuclear weapon.

This approach offered several strategic advantages: technological autonomy, leverage in diplomatic negotiations, preservation of a nuclear threshold capability, and the possibility of deriving certain deterrent benefits without immediately incurring the consequences associated with nuclear weaponization.

However, the military confrontations of June 2025 and February 2026 fundamentally altered the strategic environment in which this approach had been pursued.

These attacks demonstrated that an advanced nuclear program, even when formally maintained within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), does not necessarily protect a state against military intervention.

Military strikes may ultimately encourage Tehran to pursue nuclear weapons more seriously. Although the attacks inflicted significant damage on key facilities, they could not eliminate Iran’s accumulated scientific knowledge or permanently eradicate its capacity to rebuild its nuclear infrastructure.

The issue extends beyond Iran’s nuclear program itself. The country’s missile capabilities and regional partnerships, once essential components of its deterrence strategy, have also come under considerable pressure.

The war has transformed the regional balance of power and generated new strategic calculations for both Tehran and its adversaries. For Iranian policymakers, the conclusion has been that the previous combination of conventional deterrence, regional influence, and deliberate postponement of nuclear weapon acquisition is no longer sufficient to prevent another military confrontation.

Why Has the Nuclear Debate Reached the Highest Levels of Leadership?

Prior to the June 2025 Twelve-Day War, the issue of revising Iran’s nuclear doctrine had gradually entered the official discourse of the country’s political and military authorities.

At that stage, these statements could be interpreted as part of a strategy of nuclear ambiguity designed to enhance deterrence leverage and strengthen Iran’s bargaining position in diplomatic negotiations with the West. Nevertheless, diplomatic leverage cannot be regarded as the sole motivation behind these statements.

However, following the 2025 Twelve-Day War and the direct US and Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, the debate moved beyond conditional warnings and political signaling. Three major developments contributed to its growing prominence: the demonstrated vulnerabilities of conventional deterrence, the weakening of Iran’s regional strategic depth, and declining confidence in diplomatic mechanisms and international security assurances.

First, the military attacks strengthened domestic political arguments against nuclear restraint. Some Iranian political figures are now questioning why the country should continue accepting international restrictions and inspections when its nuclear infrastructure remains vulnerable to military strikes.

The second consequence of the war has been the erosion of confidence in diplomatic assurances. Washington’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement, followed by military action against Iranian facilities, has reinforced the perception among certain policymakers that agreements with Western governments cannot provide sustainable security guarantees.

The third development concerns the transformation of the regional security environment, particularly following Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli military campaigns, which weakened Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon and ultimately contributed to the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria. The weakening of Iran’s regional proxy forces as a result of these developments, together with the exposure of the limitations of its conventional deterrence strategy, commonly referred to as Forward Defense, has intensified the search for additional instruments capable of preventing future attacks.

Arguments for and Against Iran’s Nuclear Weaponization

Proponents of nuclear weaponization in Iran argue that if the country possessed nuclear weapons, the United States and Israel would have been unable to attack Iranian territory or assassinate its Supreme Leader.

Advocates of this position frequently refer to the theoretical argument advanced by American political scientist Kenneth Waltz in a 2012 article published in Foreign Affairs. According to Waltz’s argument, if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, a deterrence equilibrium would emerge vis-à-vis Israel and Iran’s other adversaries, potentially discouraging Israel from attacking Iran and its regional partners.

Hardline conservatives, including the newspaper Kayhan, similarly argue that if Libya had acquired nuclear weapons, the country would not have met the same fate, and that the leader of the Islamic Republic would not have been assassinated in the same manner had Iran possessed nuclear weapons. According to this line of reasoning, since the right to take countermeasures is recognized under international law, a change in nuclear doctrine and the resulting enhancement of deterrence could prevent threats to the Islamic Republic’s political system and the country’s territorial sovereignty.

The experience of Libya and the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi following the abandonment of its nuclear program, the contrast between nuclear-armed North Korea and non-nuclear Iraq, and Ukraine’s experience following the relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal are frequently cited by proponents as evidence of the strategic importance of maintaining nuclear and other strategic capabilities.

Essentially, their argument is that possession of nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a form of deterrence capable of raising the costs of military aggression against the country to an unacceptable level for its adversaries.

This argument gained particular prominence following the 40-Day War of 2026, which Iran viewed as an existential threat. In this context, nuclear weapons were increasingly presented as a means of guaranteeing the survival of the Islamic Republic.

Some proponents have gone even further, arguing that the preservation of the Islamic Republic constitutes a higher overriding interest than certain religious and ethical considerations, thereby making a revision of the existing religious decree conceivable under conditions of extreme necessity.

Hasanali Akhlaghi Amiri, a member of the Twelfth Parliament’s Cultural Affairs Committee, stated in this regard: “The fatwa issued by the Leader of the Revolution in 2010 prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons remains valid in its proper context… However, the Supreme Leader, as the Islamic jurist vested with governing authority, possesses the religious authority to alter even an original ruling.”

According to proponents of Iranian nuclear weaponization, developments since October 7, and particularly the two military attacks by the United States and Israel, have created an imperative for substantial changes in Iran’s security doctrine and a reassessment of its nuclear posture.

Within this framework, the weakening of the Axis of Resistance, limitations on missile-based deterrence, and the damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear program have demonstrated, in their view, that maintaining a nuclear threshold status can no longer guarantee the security of the Islamic Republic. Iran therefore requires a new form of deterrence.

In particular, following the 2025 Twelve-Day War, during which Israel and the United States attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow, proponents argue that Iran has already paid the price for lacking nuclear deterrence and that only the actual possession of nuclear weapons can prevent future attacks.

Conversely, sections of Iran’s political and expert communities remain skeptical about the capacity of nuclear weapons to provide effective deterrence. Their central argument is that recent experience demonstrates that even nuclear-armed states are not immune to military attacks. From this perspective, nuclear weapons alone cannot guarantee national security; domestic stability, conventional military capabilities, regional policy, and intelligence capabilities also play essential roles in safeguarding a state.

Critics further emphasize that effective nuclear deterrence cannot be achieved merely by possessing a limited number of nuclear warheads. It requires rapid and credible decision-making, sufficient conventional military capabilities to buy time, a willingness to absorb international costs, the ability to build strategic coalitions with other actors, and access to reliable strategic intelligence.

Furthermore, opponents of Iranian nuclear weaponization consider the pathway toward acquiring a nuclear bomb particularly difficult in light of the extensive intelligence penetration capabilities of Israel and the United States. They argue that even if Iran succeeded in manufacturing a nuclear weapon, its conventional military capabilities and infrastructure would not necessarily guarantee its ability to employ or credibly threaten to employ that weapon under crisis conditions.

Others argue that even actual possession of nuclear weapons would not automatically guarantee deterrence. In this regard, they cite Hamas’s attacks against nuclear-armed Israel, Iran’s own attacks against Israel, and Ukraine’s military operations against nuclear-armed Russia. Within this framework, one of the most important arguments is that the decisive factor in nuclear deterrence is the ability to deliver a second strike, rather than merely possessing a first-strike capability.

Mohammad Javad Zarif, a prominent critic of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, argues that the ability to conduct a second strike is the critical component of nuclear deterrence. On this basis, he challenges the arguments advanced by proponents of nuclear weapon acquisition.

Zarif has even accused proponents of nuclear weapon acquisition of lacking adequate knowledge of nuclear deterrence theory, arguing that their line of thinking serves the interests of Israel and hardline factions in the United States.

Furthermore, achieving a fully credible nuclear deterrent would theoretically require Iran to develop a nuclear triad consisting of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and nuclear-powered submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles. Although Iran possesses sufficient fissile material for the production of several nuclear weapons, its only potential delivery system at present is its missile arsenal.

Some opponents of nuclear weapon development are also concerned about the potential regional proliferation cascade that could follow an Iranian decision to acquire nuclear weapons, particularly the possibility of encouraging Saudi Arabia to pursue its own nuclear weapons capability.

Moreover, unlike North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel, all of which acquired nuclear weapons outside the NPT framework, Iran has not received explicit support from any major power for developing nuclear weapons, despite its strengthening relations with Russia and China.

In this context, an important distinction must be made between the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons, the political decision to manufacture them, and the establishment of a credible nuclear deterrence posture. These three stages are not necessarily simultaneous, and achieving the first does not guarantee success in either of the subsequent stages.

Withdrawal from the NPT

Despite the growing prominence of the debate over changing Iran’s nuclear doctrine, it should not be conflated with a formal decision to manufacture a nuclear bomb. Iran’s political establishment remains divided over whether nuclear weaponization would enhance national security or expose the country to even greater strategic risks.

Nevertheless, one of the most significant recent developments has been the growing emphasis on withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In a significant development on November 12, 2026, Iran’s Assembly of Experts, one of the country’s most important constitutional institutions, responsible for appointing and dismissing the Supreme Leader, issued a statement declaring: “Repeated threats by the aggressor enemy, particularly threats directed against the country’s nuclear knowledge, demonstrate that there can be no reliance on the international institutions responsible for this matter. Accordingly, consideration of withdrawal from the NPT, a reassessment of the country’s defense doctrine, and the establishment of the necessary deterrence have become an unavoidable necessity and a public and national demand. It is hoped that the responsible authorities will address this demand, drawing upon the wise guidance of the Supreme Leader.”

In a related development, Vahid Ahmadi, a member of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, announced that a proposal for Iran’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been introduced in Parliament and placed on its agenda.

These developments indicate that withdrawal from the NPT has evolved from a theoretical and peripheral option into an issue within Iran’s political agenda. Nevertheless, withdrawal from the treaty does not, in itself, constitute a definitive decision to manufacture nuclear weapons. Tehran could use the prospect of withdrawal as an instrument of political pressure, strategic ambiguity, or leverage to alter the terms of future negotiations.

In this regard, it is important to recognize that Tehran may currently be using the possibility of withdrawing from the NPT as leverage to deter further military action by the United States and as an instrument of strategic deterrence. At the same time, withdrawal from the NPT could entail substantial legal, diplomatic, and economic consequences and increase the likelihood of intensified international pressure or even preventive military action against Iran.

Iran’s Changing Military and Missile Doctrine

Alongside the nuclear debate, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has recently revised the country’s military doctrine, emphasizing an immediate and effective response, without geographical limitations, to any threat, with the stated objective of establishing maximum deterrence.

In the same context, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) lifted the 2,000-kilometer limit on Iran’s missile range, a restriction that had been adopted during the tenure of the previous Supreme Leader as a political rather than a technical decision.

The 2,000-kilometer ceiling had served not only to meet a substantial portion of Iran’s defense requirements against regional threats but also as a form of political and security reassurance to European countries. In other words, Tehran had sought to demonstrate that, despite possessing the technical capability to develop longer-range missiles, it had no intention of extending the geographical reach of its missile threats to Europe. This policy, alongside considerations aimed at preventing the emergence of an international consensus against Iran’s missile program, formed part of the strategic calculations of that period.

These developments suggest that Iran is reassessing its overall deterrence architecture, a process that may simultaneously involve strengthening conventional military capabilities, expanding the geographical scope of military retaliation, revising missile policy, and reconsidering the nuclear option.

Nevertheless, a change in missile doctrine does not necessarily imply a corresponding change in nuclear doctrine. Although these two domains can complement one another, they remain fundamentally distinct in terms of political decision-making, technical requirements, and international consequences.

Has Iran’s Nuclear Threshold Strategy Failed?

The key point is that the underlying assumptions of Iran’s previous nuclear policy are now undergoing reassessment.

Iran is confronting a security environment in which neither its nuclear threshold status nor its conventional military capabilities have succeeded in preventing direct military attacks.

In the nuclear domain, Tehran had assumed that maintaining a position at the nuclear threshold would itself generate a degree of deterrence. However, recent attacks exposed the weaknesses of Iran’s previous strategy, which rested on the assumption that advancing its nuclear program while stopping short of actually manufacturing nuclear weapons would effectively deter its adversaries from launching military strikes.

From this perspective, Iran’s nuclear threshold strategy has failed. However, this failure should not be interpreted as demonstrating that all of Iran’s nuclear achievements have become strategically irrelevant, or that nuclear threshold deterrence has lost its validity under all circumstances. Rather, it demonstrates the inadequacy of this strategy against a particular category of military threats.

The fundamental question, therefore, is whether Iran can establish an alternative form of deterrence, without acquiring nuclear weapons, that would prevent future military attacks, or whether the experience of recent wars has made the acquisition of a nuclear bomb an increasingly unavoidable option in the calculations of certain decision-makers.

Conclusion

The debate over Iran’s nuclear doctrine has moved beyond technical and political discourse into the country’s national security decision-making process. However, growing pressure for doctrinal revision, withdrawal from the NPT, and a decision to pursue nuclear weapons remain distinct policy choices.

Tehran may use strategic ambiguity over its nuclear trajectory as a means of deterrence and diplomatic leverage. Yet, a shift toward weaponization would carry significant security, diplomatic, and proliferation consequences.

Ultimately, the key determinant will be whether Iran’s leadership concludes that the security costs of remaining a non-nuclear-weapon state outweigh those of pursuing nuclear weapons. In this context, withdrawal from the NPT could signal a significant strategic shift, although it would not, in itself, constitute a decision to weaponize.

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