With the rising war siren in the Strait of Hormuz, President Trump’s expectation from allies became more explicit. Yet the response was not exactly what he was hoping for.
Trump wanted close allies, such as Japan and Australia, to support Washington’s effort to secure one of the world’s most significant maritime chokepoints, the Strait of Hormuz. The expectation was grounded on the assumption that freedom of navigation, energy security, and alliance solidarity would naturally converge. But Washington’s two closest partners in the Indo-Pacific, Japan and Australia, showed reluctance and caution in expressing any kind of immediate military alignment. The leadership’s statements show serious concerns over maritime security, but they distanced themselves from committing to military participation in an ongoing, escalating US-Israel-Iran war.
This raises the question of why two allies – strong and deeply embedded in the US-led security order – do not respond uniformly or differently to the Hormuz crisis that is impacting both, as the global energy and supply chain face shutdown? The answer lies in alliance rejigging, not in weariness with Trump’s uncertain foreign policy. Japan and Australia are supporting Trump’s concerns with the Hormuz crisis. Yet, they are not willing to support the USA unconditionally, thus redefining the terms on which they would offer support. It is, therefore, misleading to say that Tokyo and Canberra refused Trump’s call to join Hormuz. Instead, both countries explicitly supported stability in the Gulf, but in different ways, guided by their own strategic and structural constraints. In this piece, we illustrate how Japan’s response and Australia’s strategic priorities limit their intervention in the escalating Hormuz crisis. Their foreign policy behavior shows that allies’ support no longer converges naturally; it has become conditional and distinct.
Japan – Support without Combat
The longstanding dilemma between alliance expectations and domestic limitations unexpectedly constrains Tokyo’s stance on the Hormuz crisis. The legacy of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution, which renounces war and permits only the minimal necessary level of military forces for self-defense, shape the choices Tokyo makes about deploying overseas military to support alliances operations, such as in the Strait of Hormuz, which has come under direct Iranian threat causing major oil and gas shortages and supply chain disruption across world, driving crude prices high every day.
Despite such urgency, Japan has preferred and always insisted on non-combat roles, such as intelligence gathering and sharing, satellite surveillance, and logistical support across oceans, and has strictly avoided participating in combat missions. This behavior of Tokyo shows that alliance unity matters and allies are supported, but without crossing the threshold limit, which restricts Japan’s direct military engagement in the Iran conflict. Japan’s current policy behavior is very much in continuity with what had been practiced, ‘support without involvement.’
The Strait of Hormuz crisis directly affects Tokyo. Japan relies heavily on the Hormuz route, and domestic gas prices have already peaked since the war started. Even then, and despite such dependency, the Japan-US alliance did not automatically translate into military alignment. Instead, Japan distanced itself to avoid further escalation that could damage the supply chain further. Also, the peaking gas prices at home demanded protection of Japanese-linked ships crossing Hormuz from Iranian and their proxies’ retaliation. Lastly, Japan’s diplomatic composure and maturity have balanced Iran against the US by not overtly aligning with the latter’s side. For Japan, preserving this diplomatic space is important for preserving its strategic autonomy.
Japan’s approach to the crisis should be understood as alliance hedging through role differentiation. Tokyo supports the United States but does so without compromising its domestic interests, respecting its pacifist constitution, and continuing to aid and assist in the Hormuz region from behind the scenes.
Australia – Priorities over Participation
Australia’s hesitation to support Trump’s call for Hormuz presents a different set of dynamics. Unlike Tokyo, Canberra boasts participation in combat roles alongside the US on foreign soil, as well as in maritime security, including past engagements in the Gulf. However, in the current scenario, it has shown strategic restraint, which again, should not be considered as a rejection of alliance commitments, but reassessment in its response, adhering to its strategic priorities.
Canberra is heavily invested and has its naval defense forces postured towards the Indo-Pacific, particularly in response to China’s rise. Diverting already invested naval assets to the Middle East risks opportunity costs that are difficult to justify. Additionally, Australia’s naval force is relatively small and already stretched across the Pacific, and the reserve contingency limits its capacity to sustain high-risk operational deployments in distant theatres at this moment. In a crisis like this, where escalation risks are testing new heights each day and end goals are unclear, caution and restraint become a more natural and rational choice than a political oddity.
Like Tokyo, Canberra is also exposed to energy shocks originating from the Strait of Hormuz. But it imports refined oil from Asian hubs like Singapore, so its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz is less direct than Japan’s, reducing the urgency to commit war resources to secure Gulf shipping lanes.
This sends out a clear message that Canberra is beginning to list out national security priorities. Not all crises are equal, and not all US requests will get the same amount of attention. Support from the alliance remains, but it is increasingly judged by national security priorities.
Conclusion & Policy Implications
Japan and Australia’s responses to the Strait of Hormuz crisis illustrate a change in how US alliances function in the current uncertain world (dis)order. The old expectation of natural convergence among allies is giving way to a more conditional and context-specific model.
Three changes are observed. First, alliances no longer align automatically and offer conditional support. Alliances now access ground realities and respond accordingly based on national security priorities. Second, they are becoming theatre-specific. Commitment in the Indo-Pacific does not translate into any obligations in another theatre. Third, military support is necessary but not sufficient; hence, non-combatant roles equally matter and are gaining prominence in modern warfare. This is a clear sign of renegotiation among allies and should not be seen as a weakening of alliances. Allies are not withdrawing their support but are negotiating the terms of engagement in ways that reflect domestic priorities, resource realities, and strategic constraints.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis exposes changing alliance foreign policy behavior. US policymakers can no longer anticipate uniform responses from their allies, regardless of the crisis’s seriousness. Automatic burden-sharing no longer applies; it will be negotiated on a case-by-case basis, and allies will contribute in different ways. Their differentiated contribution risks misinterpretation. If Washington reads strategic restraint as disloyalty, the alliance will suffer. This also creates an opportunity to develop a flexible and effective division of labor in which allies contribute according to their respective advantages.
Importantly, Hormuz also set the tone for future crises. If allies differentiated their responses in the Gulf, it may follow similar patterns in the Indo-Pacific. It is not sufficient to ask whether allies support the US in the Indo-Pacific, but on what terms and conditions, and where each ally would draw its red lines.
