While currently deeply strained, Kuwaiti-Iranian relations are rooted in a long and shared history. During several historical periods, Kuwait was part of the Iranian Empire.
Kuwaiti-Iranian relations were closely cooperative in economic and security fields from 1961 (when Kuwait gained independence) to 1979. Despite periodic tensions and deterioration following 1979, relations improved after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990-1991.
After 2016, despite numerous challenges, relations did not deteriorate significantly. Before 2026, with numerous talks and mutual meetings between officials from both countries, the focus of some Iranian-Kuwaiti meetings was on common positions and concerns about regional stability and security, as well as on improving multidimensional relations.
Kuwait condemned the Israeli attack on Iran in June 2025, and the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister made a phone call with his Iranian counterpart and emphasized solidarity with Iran. Therefore, by adopting the policy of “no alliance, no confrontation”, Kuwait did not align itself with the camp opposing Iran.
Variables Affecting Threats of the Anti-Iran War on Iran-Kuwait Relations
The US and Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, 2026, led to a strong Iranian response, including firing missiles and drones at US military bases and assets in Kuwait. Kuwait, after the UAE, suffered the most from Iranian attacks.
According to numerous letters from Iran to the United Nations and numerous protests and statements from Tehran, many attacks on Iran were launched from Kuwait.
Reasons such as frequent statements by American officials naming and appreciating Kuwait’s support, the presence of military bases and the deployment of 13,000 American troops in Kuwait, and the United States’ use of facilities in March have led Iran to pressure Kuwait to expel the US army and limit Washington’s access.
While Kuwait has denied any responsibility for the attacks on Iran, it has strongly condemned Iran’s attacks as “criminal” and a “blatant violation of national sovereignty.” From Tehran’s perspective, Kuwait is the “front line” for fighter jets to bomb Iran, deploy commandos and helicopters for ground operations, and is a base for ceasefire-violating attacks.
In recent months, Kuwait has announced that it has foiled plots linked to Hezbollah involving Kuwaiti, Iranian, and Lebanese citizens, as well as another plot against critical infrastructure. Also, in addition to several previous statements about the discovery of “silent security cores,” Kuwait claimed in May that a six-member Iranian team had attempted to infiltrate Bubiyan Island. Therefore, it summoned the Iranian ambassador to Kuwait, held Iran responsible, and demanded accountability.
In contrast, Tehran called the attack on the Iranian border guard vessel and the arrest of these individuals illegal, and did not consider the allegations made in line with the principle of good neighborliness, and demanded the release of Iranian citizens.
In fact, while Tehran considers the accusation of organized infiltration and Iran’s planning to carry out hostile actions against Kuwait to be absolutely baseless and rejected, and refers to the disruption of the system of navigation and guidance as “unintentionally” affecting Kuwaiti territorial waters, it seems that Kuwait sees that matter as an anti-terrorism and a proxy matter. In the recent incident in June and the explosion at Kuwait airport, accusations were also directed at Iran. Although Iran did not accept them, Kuwait summoned the Iranian chargé d’affaires, issued an official protest note about “Iran’s continued attacks,” and expelled two Iranian diplomats.
In the view of many in Tehran, Kuwait is trying to use regional and international multilateral institutions to challenge Tehran, keep it under pressure, and create a basis for sanctions. From this perspective, while Kuwait provided facilities, territory, and airspace to Washington, Kuwait’s direct and indirect cooperation in the war against Iran contradicts its efforts to be neutral. Therefore, Tehran continues to pursue Kuwait’s international responsibility and full compensation for damages.
About 30 percent of Kuwait’s population is Shiite, and many of these citizens maintain some relations with Iran. Kuwait’s concerns about movements and groups aligned with or supporting Iran (especially from Iraq) have led to the confrontation, detention, as well as expulsion of a significant number of Iranians in Kuwait, while keeping the Kuwaiti Shiites under growing pressure, including restrictions on holding Shiite religious rituals and ceremonies.
Meanwhile, Iran has increased its doctrine from regional war to the level of trans-regional aggression. Kuwait’s concerns about the resumption of war and its spread to critical infrastructure, such as attacks on desalination plants (providing approximately 90 percent of the country’s drinking water), have increased.
With the recent visit of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to Kuwait on June 25 and promises to Kuwaiti allies, while Kuwait still sees the United States as a strategic ally, Tehran views the US military presence in Kuwait as a threat to regional security.
On the other hand, Tehran believes that Iran’s actions in the Strait of Hormuz have legal legitimacy and are internationally defensible. From this perspective, Iran’s new arrangements are the lawful right of a coastal state, legitimizing the existence of the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), a supervisory body established by the Revolutionary Guards in May 2026.
However, Kuwait disagrees with Iran’s approach. It considers the major and future disruption of the “new arrangements for the management of the Strait of Hormuz” and the constant leverage of Iran’s pressure against its interests.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have already launched a huge project to produce gas from the offshore field of Arash (Al-Durrah). However, the challenge of joint ownership of the Arash (Al-Durrah) oil field between Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia remains a source of disagreement.
Kuwait’s options in the current geopolitical situation (especially regarding its position in the Gulf Cooperation Council and its relations with the United States) have led it to align more with Washington to gain more support.
In fact, while the US attacks on Iran continue to result in a military response to US interests in Kuwait and Bahrain, Kuwait, apart from pursuing a partnership with the US, sees relations with Tehran as more influenced by the prospects of US relations with Tehran. In this regard, Kuwait’s diplomatic, media, and political reactions to Tehran continue in bilateral, multilateral, and international dimensions.
As stated on July 1, 2026, the Kuwaiti cabinet described the recent Iranian attacks as a clear violation of the country’s sovereignty, a direct threat to regional peace, and a violation of international law and the UN Charter, and on July 4, Kuwait condemned Iran’s attacks on Kuwait in the UN Security Council.
Also, the recent funeral of Ayatollah Khamenei in Tehran, while no Kuwaiti official attended, the significant presence of delegations from the Saudi Foreign Ministry, along with Qatari and Omani officials, was notable.
In fact, although Kuwait is inextricably linked to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) collective defense framework, it has not chosen the path of Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, while it is subject to Iranian military responses.
New Opportunities
On June 19, 2026, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and his Kuwaiti counterpart held their first public telephone conversation since the start of the war against Iran regarding the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, important issues in bilateral relations, and diplomatic consultations. This approach reflects an effort to rebuild relations and gradually reduce tensions.
Tehran’s claims of commitment to the good-neighborly policy, the need for dialogue with the GCC countries to promote interaction, resolve ambiguities, respect national sovereignty, and peacefully resolve disagreements are important.
Kuwait hopes that the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the United States and Iran will help promote regional stability, ensure security and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and resolve important issues.
Certainly, if a final agreement between Iran and the United States is reached, it could be an important point in the gradual resolution of Tehran’s problems with the countries of the region.
The June 17 memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran preserves the structure of the Persian Gulf security architecture and Iran’s approach to the Strait of Hormuz and the axis of resistance. But a plan for a fund of at least $300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of Iran, with possible participation from Kuwait, could also be a formula for rebuilding trust, cooperation, and mutual investment.
Also, plans to hold regional reconciliation talks in Saudi Arabia between Iran and Arab countries might promote mutual respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the involved countries, as well as regional collective security arrangements in the Persian Gulf.
In fact, while Iran and the United States seem to be on the path to resolving some of their disputes, the existing geopolitical realities and Iran’s efforts to distance Kuwait from US influence may cause a change in the mindset of some of the political elite and even the choice of a more multilateral foreign policy in Kuwait’s survival strategy.
Given the presence of about 400,000 Iranians or Kuwaitis of Iranian origin living in Kuwait, as well as mutual pilgrimages and tourism trips between the two countries, strengthening cultural diplomacy can be a useful platform for developing political relations.
In 2024, Kuwait exported $45.7 million to Iran, while Iran exported $328 million to Kuwait. Despite the low volume of trade in 2025, the signing of memorandums of understanding to develop interactions, extensive opportunities for economic cooperation, and the extensive assets of the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) can expand Kuwait-Iran economic ties.
Furthermore, factors such as bilateral basic economic agreements, Tehran’s incentives, the design of multilateral corridors and transit projects, the dispatch of Iranian labor to Kuwait, the improved functionality of the Iran-Kuwait Chamber, the launch of a sea line, facilitating the movement of passengers and cargo could lead to increased economic interactions.
Iran and Kuwait face numerous environmental challenges, such as water crises. Cooperation to combat climate change and devastating sandstorms in the region is essential. Also, the possibility of a full return to diplomatic and consular relations as of last year, the expansion of diplomatic, political, and cultural consultations, and pragmatic multilateral cooperation in regional and international institutions such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), OPEC, and the United Nations can increase opportunities for bilateral or multilateral convergence.
Outlook
The security, political, and geopolitical concerns and differences between the two sides are continuing. Certainly, challenges such as sanctions against Iran, the two countries’ different views on the axis of resistance, the presence of the United States, and ideological divergences are more obstacles to cooperation.
Certainly, the future of Iran-Kuwait relations is influenced by pragmatic interaction, continued high-level political meetings, and trade agreements focused on areas of mutual benefit, the pursuit of common interests, and the expansion of sustainable economic cooperation. Therefore, the desire to expand trade is likely to remain the main pillar of the relationship.
Despite the comprehensive development of relations with neighbors as one of the fundamental axes of Tehran’s foreign policy doctrine, any new realism, diversity, pragmatism, and security-political multilateralism in Kuwait’s foreign policy would also help expand relations with Iran.
Certainly, a successful model of security cooperation in the Persian Gulf also depends on the outcome of the current Iran-US negotiations. But the future of Iran-Kuwait relations cannot reach a strategic level unless the remaining political and geopolitical security challenges are resolved in a win-win manner.
In a more likely scenario, despite the ongoing tensions and disputes, accusations, and the US military presence in Kuwait, relations will face a gradual reduction in tension and normalization in the short and medium term.
In a likely scenario, if the current negotiations and regional talks are successful and foreign presence is reduced, cooperation within the GCC-Iran framework might deepen. In another scenario, a re-escalation of conflicts and proxy conflicts could lead to a severance of relations or even direct conflict.
