The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Türkiye, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have recently formalized the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, underscoring their mutual commitment to collective security, strategic defense cooperation, and regional stability. Rooted in decades of amity, Islamic solidarity, and shared strategic interests, this accord enhances collaboration across all defense domains and establishes a framework stipulating that an armed attack against any signatory state shall be construed as an attack against all parties.
In a joint statement issued after the signing, the three nations declared that an agreement had been reached to develop and strengthen coordination across all areas of military-technical cooperation among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, with the explicit objective of bolstering collective deterrence against any hostile action.
The signatories have asserted that the agreement is purely defensive in nature, emphasizing mutual commitment to reciprocal support exclusively within the defense sphere, is not directed against any specific third party, and remains open to accession by other Islamic nations. Furthermore, it has been stipulated that this agreement neither abrogates nor supersedes any existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements.
Drivers of Formation
Among the principal catalysts for this trilateral coalition are shared security concerns emanating from the Middle East. The US-Israeli strikes against Iran have substantially escalated regional tensions and imperiled the security of the Persian Gulf littoral states.
This dynamic, compounded by the subsequent developments following Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack against Israel—which precipitated the expansion and intensification of Israeli military operations—holds significant implications for the pact’s signatories.
Saudi Arabia has been subjected to direct attacks from Iran and its affiliated proxy networks (including Yemen’s Houthis and Iraq’s Hashd al-Shaabi). This has generated profound apprehensions regarding Riyadh’s capacity to secure its national territory and safeguard its petroleum exports.
The ongoing conflict has disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea—critical arteries for the transit of hydrocarbons and essential commodities. In this context, the joint statement articulated the three nations’ shared commitment to further strengthening collective security and promoting peace, security, and stability in the region and beyond.
The eruption of these crises has raised serious questions concerning the reliability of the traditional US security umbrella for its regional allies, compelling states to reinforce regional coalition architectures.
According to Dania Thafer, Executive Director of the Gulf International Forum, this pact constitutes a hedging maneuver against what many in the Gulf region perceive as Washington’s increasingly unreliable security umbrella, without severing ties with the United States.
By incorporating Türkiye, the previous bilateral defense pact between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—signed on 17 September 2025—has been transformed into a trilateral mechanism. This earlier bilateral arrangement had already signaled to Washington Riyadh’s dissatisfaction with eroding US security guarantees and its readiness to employ ‘strategic ambiguity’ amid mounting pressures to balance against both Israel and Iran.
Murad Aslan, an analyst at the Turkish think tank SETA, contends that the conclusion of this agreement reflects a broader search for novel regional security arrangements amidst shifting geopolitical dynamics. He anticipates that this partnership will expand defense industrial cooperation, enhance deterrence, and improve security coordination. Furthermore, Türkiye’s NATO membership, its burgeoning defense capabilities, and strategic geographic positioning will reinforce its role as a pivotal regional security partner.
The defense pact also constitutes a response to Israel’s regional posture following Hamas’s 7 October attack. In the aftermath, Israel has struck not only Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon but has also targeted Syria and Qatar.
In this vein, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, one day after the signing of the joint defense agreement with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, characterized Israel as a “threat” to all Islamic nations and called for Muslim unity against the regime.
Concerning this pact, it should be noted that Saudi Arabia, as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf region, commands substantial economic and political weight and hosts Islam’s holiest sites. Türkiye possesses the second-largest military in NATO and constitutes a major military and industrial power in the region. Pakistan remains the sole nuclear-armed state in the Islamic world—a distinguishing feature that confers a pivotal role in regional deterrence equations. Collectively, these three states represent a confluence of economic might, military capability, and nuclear deterrence.
Pakistan and Türkiye contribute robust defense industries to this coalition, while Saudi Arabia can participate by financing technology. However, this agreement likely excludes Pakistan’s nuclear component, as Islamabad’s nuclear deterrent remains primarily focused on the perceived threat from India.
Indeed, Pakistan seeks leverage through its pacts with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, while simultaneously aiming to generate foreign currency through the export of military expertise.
Riyadh now fears that a new regional order may be imposed upon the region, leaving no space for Saudi Arabia’s influential role.
Andreas Krieg of King’s College London observes that this accord reflects a clear inclination to diversify security alliances beyond the United States. According to him, “Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are not seeking to replace the United States; they are building capacity to defend their interests at a time when Washington cannot or will not do so.” He further emphasizes that Riyadh seeks multiple layers of security rather than a single American umbrella.
Notwithstanding, some observers contend that this agreement does not foreclose the prospect of Saudi-Israeli normalization. From Israel’s perspective, the pact should not be interpreted as a determinative factor for the future of normalization with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh’s security partnerships and its relations with Israel, while interrelated, ultimately constitute parallel tracks. This agreement does not fundamentally alter this calculus.
In sum, the Mecca Agreement represents a strategic response by three significant and aligned regional powers to enhance deterrence and collective security against destabilizing waves emanating from recent tensions, while establishing a formidable bloc for regional crisis management.
In this context, Abdulaziz Sagar, Director of the Gulf Research Centre in Saudi Arabia, underscores the potent political symbolism of this accord, contending that the convergence of three influential Islamic world powers at a time of unprecedented regional uncertainty signals the growing inclination of regional and middle powers toward closer security coordination. He posits that should this trilateral framework become institutionalized and translate into concrete cooperation, it could amplify the collective diplomatic and defensive weight of the three nations and contribute to the formulation of a regional security architecture.
The most critical driver of this pact is the recent developments and conflicts in the region. The partial erosion of the deterrence balance in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea has instilled alarm in Riyadh, as Saudi tankers have come under direct threat. Ankara, confronting various challenges including security tensions in Syria and Iraq, remains concerned about instability along its southern borders. Islamabad, however, occupies a distinct position: while benefiting from cooperation with Riyadh to pressure India and secure financial assistance, it seeks to avoid entanglement with Tehran, having previously served as a mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia on multiple occasions.
Nevertheless, it must be considered that collective defense typically presupposes a shared adversary, yet most Islamic nations harbor divergent security concerns. For instance, Pakistan’s presumed adversary—India—maintains an annual trade relationship with Saudi Arabia valued at $41 billion, nearly half of Pakistan’s total trade volume ($90 billion). Riyadh can scarcely envision itself engaging in combat alongside Pakistan against India.
However, Pakistan’s reliability as a security partner for the Saudis in the new Middle Eastern environment remains questionable. The emergence of the Iranian threat across large swathes of the Arab world has challenged Pakistan’s traditional paradigm of uniting Muslim nations against non-Muslim powers such as the former Soviet Union or Israel. Several regional conflicts now pit Muslims against Muslims, and Pakistan has frequently refrained from taking positions. The Saudis still recall Pakistan’s refusal to deploy forces to the 2015 military intervention against Yemen’s Houthis.
Iran’s recent strikes against Persian Gulf States in response to US-Israeli strikes on Iran created a similar dilemma. US President Donald Trump’s need for a mediator with Tehran, coupled with Pakistan’s willingness to assume this role, prevented a full test of the Saudi-Pakistani agreement. As a mediator, Pakistan could not have been expected to join military operations on behalf of Saudi Arabia—a position the Saudis appear to accept, albeit one that is problematic for others such as the United Arab Emirates.
This divergence in the ‘threat map’ suggests that should regional tensions subside, trilateral coordination would likely loosen as well. A pact founded upon a ‘common concern’ endures only as long as the defining concern persists. In this regard, the medium-term trajectory of this agreement remains largely contingent upon regional developments.
Iran’s Response
Initially, Iran welcomed the Saudi-Pakistani agreement concluded after the 12-day war, characterizing it as a positive step toward establishing a regional security framework excluding extra-regional powers. This perspective aligned with the Islamic Republic’s longstanding principles opposing foreign presence in the region and advocating for regional states to provide their own security.
The strategic importance of endorsing this pact for Iran was such that it featured in Iran President Masoud Pezeshkian’s address to the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in New York, where it was welcomed as the commencement of a comprehensive regional security system with the cooperation of West Asian Muslim nations across political, security, and defense domains.
Iran perceived in this agreement an opportunity to undermine the US-led security order and curtail Israel’s further regional penetration. Moreover, the improvement in Iran-Saudi relations and support for this pact were interpreted as a strategic move to alleviate pressure on its regional allies, including Hezbollah, and discussions even emerged regarding Iran’s potential accession to such a coalition.
Iran evaluated this pact as emblematic of a transition from the US-led security order toward a multipolar architecture in the Middle East, particularly as it materialized following Israel’s strike against Hamas officials in Qatar, reflecting the profound and growing mistrust of Arab states toward Washington as a security guarantor.
Indeed, following Israel’s strike on Qatar, Iran sought to capitalize on Gulf Arab states’ concerns regarding Israel’s regional advances, accordingly emphasizing confidence-building, mutual respect, regional convergence, and multilateralism grounded in international law.
However, in the wake of the 40-day war and Iran’s strikes against all GCC member states—including the targeting of Saudi energy infrastructure by Iran and its proxy forces during the conflict, as well as Houthi and Hashd al-Shaabi attacks on Saudi Arabia—the formation of a coalition to contain Iran and its proxy networks culminated in the trilateral defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan.
In this regard, Omar Karim, an expert at Birmingham University, asserts that this alignment is clearly aimed at Iran and designed to respond to Iran’s new strategic approach, which tends toward dominance over the broader Gulf region. The fact that Türkiye and Pakistan share borders with Iran enables them to exert a different kind of leverage over Tehran.
Consequently, with recognition of the anti-Iranian character of this coalition, criticisms emerged from certain Iranian officials and media outlets, reflecting apprehension and skepticism regarding its objectives and ramifications.
Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, responded trenchantly, dismissing the agreement as a paper accord that would confer no security upon Saudi Arabia. Citing the experience of Saudi Arabia’s prior cooperation with the United States, he emphasized that policy change represents the primary solution for ensuring security, rather than reliance upon defense agreements with others.
The Kayhan newspaper, affiliated with the hardline faction, published an editorial by its editor-in-chief Hossein Shariatmadari characterizing the pact as directed against Iran and its regional proxy networks, and aligned with US and Israeli interests. The newspaper described the gathering of representatives from over 40 countries in Riyadh to sign an agreement to preserve the security of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb as another measure by Saudi Arabia and aligned states to confront Iran and the Axis of Resistance. The publication also attacked Pakistan’s role as mediator in Iran-US negotiations, calling for a reassessment of Islamabad’s continued mediation in this capacity.
Fars News Agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), published an article characterizing this pact as ineffectual and doomed to failure, akin to the “Islamic Anti-Terrorism Coalition” (2015) and the “Red Sea Coalition” (2026), asserting that it constitutes less a strategic trilateral coalition than a response to the Saudis’ temporary need for political backing in the region’s current circumstances.
According to this analysis, the inefficacy of the Mecca Pact stems from its being merely a repetition of failed models of previous Saudi coalition-building (such as Operation Decisive Storm, the Anti-Terrorism Coalition, and the Red Sea Coalition), lacking any genuine operational guarantees. In this regard, structural deficiencies—including the absence of a unified command structure, weapons incompatibility among the three militaries, lack of an automatic trigger mechanism for belligerency, insufficient logistical infrastructure and joint financial fund, as well as non-aligned security priorities (Yemen for Saudi Arabia, India for Pakistan, and Kurdish/Mediterranean issues for Türkiye)—render this pact more a psychological-propagandistic measure to project collective support amid escalating tensions with Sanaa than an effective security arrangement; a proposition clearly demonstrated by Pakistan’s prior inaction concerning previous attacks on Saudi territory and the ceremonial behavior of previous coalition members.
Nevertheless, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, employing diplomatic language that appears to respond to the Mecca Pact, called upon Islamic and neighboring nations to stand united and self-reliant against external threats. He simultaneously emphasized that Iran had proven its strength against the world’s most advanced military forces, implicitly questioning the pact’s military capacity to confront Iran.
How Would this Pact Function in an Actual Conflict Scenario?
Neither Ankara nor Islamabad evinces interest in confronting Tehran, and Pakistan’s traditionally cautious approach toward Iran demonstrates the considerable difficulty of such a decision.
Despite the intense rivalries between Türkiye and Iran, Ankara perceives no advantage in a full-scale direct military confrontation with Tehran. Iran represents not only a key neighbor for Türkiye but also an influential factor in regional security and economic equations. Consequently, Türkiye prefers to maintain a cautious and maneuverable role within the competitive space between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States, rather than becoming a direct belligerent party. Similarly, Pakistan, given its economic constraints and internal security challenges, would likely refrain from entering into a direct war with Iran, given the prohibitive costs involved.
In the event of an Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia, the Turkish and Pakistani response would fall not at the extremes of complete indifference or direct military engagement, but rather along a spectrum between these poles. Options such as political support, intelligence sharing, defense and logistical cooperation, heightened military readiness, and crisis containment measures appear far more likely than full-spectrum participation in a comprehensive war against Iran. From this perspective, the primary strength of the Mecca coalition should be assessed not in its members’ capacity to launch a joint war, but rather in their potential to enhance collective deterrence and crisis management.
Nonetheless, this agreement retains the capacity to alter the regional balance of power in favor of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan. Even without evolving into a formal anti-Iranian alliance, greater coordination among three major Sunni powers—each possessing distinct military, economic, and geopolitical assets—renders Iran’s strategic environment more complex.
The agreement’s principal significance lies less in what these three states intend to undertake today and more in the capabilities they might potentially marshal together during a future crisis.
The Mecca Pact signals, in its first instance, the end of an era of pure dependency by regional states upon extra-regional allies. Now that Iran is embroiled in direct conflict with Israel and the United States, with its repercussions extending across the Persian Gulf, Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad have reached the conviction that traditional security umbrellas are no longer sufficient and must be supplanted by a network of intra-regional cooperation. However, this network remains in its nascent stages and, to mature into a durable coalition, requires: 1) clarification regarding operational mechanisms, command structures, and cost-sharing; 2) separation of cooperation domains from areas of disagreement, lest political disputes paralyze military collaboration; 3) intelligent management of responses from other powers (India, China, Russia, and the United States) and reassurance that this pact does not constitute a ‘closed coalition’ directed against any specific party.
Ultimately, Iran’s perspective on the Mecca Agreement embodies a dual strategy: on one hand, it employs the pact as an instrument to articulate opposition to the existing order and to solicit regional participation in a novel security framework; on the other, it evinces profound skepticism and apprehension regarding its confrontational dimensions and implications for the regional balance of power.
