Russia has long sought to expand its influence in the Middle East, systematically leveraging political, economic, and military means to establish itself as a key player in the region. Despite its small size and profound internal challenges, Lebanon represents a strategic focal point in Russian policy. Its geographic location on the eastern Mediterranean coast, proximity to Syria, and tense relations with Israel provide Russia with opportunities to act as a mediator and broaden its regional influence.
Russia’s interest in Lebanon can be traced back to the Cold War when the Soviet Union supported leftist and communist movements in the country as a counterbalance to Western influence. Many refugees fleeing Lebanon’s civil war also found shelter in Eastern Bloc countries, including Czechoslovakia. However, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia shifted its focus to consolidating its interests in strategically more critical areas, such as Syria and Iran. Lebanon re-emerged in Russian foreign policy over the past two decades, primarily in connection with its growing involvement in the Syrian conflict. Moscow maintains good relations with almost all political factions in Lebanon, from Hezbollah to Sunni and Christian parties, as well as the Lebanese government. This broad diplomatic reach allows Russia to exercise its traditional role as a mediator while safeguarding its strategic interests in the region.
Russia’s diplomacy in Lebanon has particularly been marked by its efforts to stabilize the region through multilateral initiatives. Moscow positions itself as a neutral actor capable of engaging with both the West and regional powers like Iran, Hezbollah, and Sunni and Christian factions. Russia regularly hosts diplomatic meetings with Lebanese leaders and offers its mediation in resolving conflicts, including disputes between Israel and Hezbollah. However, Russia’s position in Lebanon has been complicated by its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This event reverberated within Lebanese politics, particularly among the divided Christian factions. While one segment of the Christian population staged large demonstrations in support of Ukraine during the first half of 2022, others rallied behind Russia, viewing its actions as a struggle against Western imperialism. The “East versus West” divide is especially evident in the two main political blocs led by the Lebanese Forces (pro-Western) and the Free Patriotic Movement (pro-Eastern).
Russia and the Free Patriotic Movement: Pragmatic Partnership
The relationship between Russia and the Lebanese political party Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), led by Gebran Bassil, is an example of pragmatic cooperation driven by mutual interests and the need to navigate Lebanon’s complex political landscape. As one of the country’s most prominent Christian political parties, the FPM is a key player in Lebanese politics and a long-time ally of Hezbollah. This alliance provides Russia with unique access to critical political and strategic issues in Lebanon. The FPM, as a political entity advocating for the autonomous role of Lebanese Christians and the preservation of Lebanese sovereignty, has been an attractive partner for Moscow. Their partnership deepened after Russia’s intervention in the Syrian war in 2015 when Moscow sought political allies to legitimize its presence in the region. Under Gebran Bassil, the FPM has historically opposed Western influence, particularly U.S. policies in Lebanon. This anti-imperialist stance aligns with Russia’s foreign policy, which portrays itself as an alternative to Western hegemony. Moscow, in turn, values its relationship with the FPM as a means of strengthening its influence in Lebanese politics and maintaining access to Christian communities in the Middle East—a key aspect of Russia’s ideological narrative.
Gebran Bassil, son-in-law of former President Michel Aoun and leader of the FPM, is a prominent figure in Lebanese politics and a staunch advocate for closer ties with Russia. His political career, rooted in nationalist and secular principles, has provided Russia with an opportunity to deepen its ties with Lebanon’s Christian community. Bassil has repeatedly met with Russian officials and emphasized the need for stronger cooperation between Lebanon and Russia. A significant moment in this relationship was Bassil’s meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, during which they discussed topics such as energy cooperation, Syrian refugees, and strengthening Lebanese neutrality. Bassil’s support for Russian policies in the region has cemented his role as one of Moscow’s principal allies in Lebanese politics.
One of the cornerstones of cooperation between Russia and the FPM is the energy sector. Russian companies such as Rosneft and Novatek have shown interest in developing Lebanon’s offshore gas and oil reserves in the Mediterranean Sea. These firms are already involved in exploratory and testing activities. As a former energy minister, Bassil played a key role in establishing these ties. Energy cooperation not only enhances Russia’s presence in the region but also provides the FPM with political and economic advantages within Lebanon’s political system. In addition to energy, Russia focuses on supporting Lebanese infrastructure and providing humanitarian aid. While Russian investments in Lebanon are not as extensive as those of China, Moscow uses these projects as a way to bolster its soft power.
Russia’s Role, Limitations, and Outlook in Lebanon
Russia sees the FPM not only as a conduit to Lebanon’s Christian community but also as a tool for influencing Lebanese politics on a broader regional scale. As the FPM is part of a political bloc that includes Hezbollah, this relationship allows Russia to indirectly engage with Lebanon’s Shia community and its political decision-making processes. This gives Moscow an edge in negotiations with other regional players, including Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. However, the relationship with Hezbollah is a contentious aspect of Bassil’s domestic political activity. Many Lebanese view Hezbollah as a destabilizing force, and criticism of the FPM’s ties to the group has impacted public perceptions of Russia as well. Moscow must navigate this delicate balance, supporting Hezbollah and the FPM on the one hand while preserving broader diplomatic relations on the other.
Gebran Bassil himself poses challenges for Russia. In 2020, the U.S. imposed sanctions on him for alleged corruption, weakening his international position and highlighting the differences between Russian and Western policies toward Lebanon. Nevertheless, Moscow chose to back Bassil, opposing the sanctions and demonstrating its commitment to continued cooperation with the FPM. Despite the growing Russian presence in Lebanon, Moscow faces significant limitations. First, Lebanon remains heavily dependent on the West for financial aid, military support, and diplomatic protection. Russia’s influence is thus largely confined to the military and energy sectors, which is insufficient to effect a fundamental shift in Lebanon’s orientation. Second, Lebanon’s internal political fragmentation complicates Russian efforts to establish a unified approach. Moscow must continuously balance between various factions, making long-term strategic planning difficult.
Nevertheless, Russia is likely to continue expanding its influence in Lebanon. The success of this effort will depend on Moscow’s ability to adapt to a changing environment. The critical question remains whether Russia can maintain a balance between its support for Hezbollah and its ties to other Lebanese actors to offset their connections to the West. Russia’s strategy in Lebanon exemplifies its pragmatic approach, combining proximity through its military bases on the Syrian coast, economic interests, and diplomatic flexibility. Despite the challenges, Moscow’s growing influence in the country demonstrates that Lebanon remains a vital part of its broader Middle Eastern agenda.
