Uyghurs from the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) have become one of the most important factors shaping relations between China and the new, post-Assad Syria. The victory of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the incorporation of foreign fighters into the army have given the Syrian security landscape a dimension that directly affects Beijing’s interests. This article examines how Syria could use the TIP as a tool of pressure, and how China perceives the organisation as a threat requiring a response despite the absence of any prior strategic engagement. It analyzes how the Uyghur question is forcing China to revise its approach to Syria.
Uyghurs in Syria
The Uyghurs are a Turkic-speaking ethnic group originating in the Xinjiang region, indigenous to a territory that was conquered by China in the eighteenth century. Faced with growing Chinese domination, especially after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, they sought to preserve their own cultural identity, in which, alongside language, Islam became a key instrument of resistance. Intensifying Sinicisation, systemic repression, religious restrictions, forced assimilation, and deliberate changes to the ethnic structure (through the settlement of Han Chinese in Xinjiang) pushed the most radical segments of the Uyghur community to Pakistan and Afghanistan, where they linked up with local jihadist structures. It was there that the core of the Turkistan Islamic Party took shape, a formation that later used the Syrian conflict as a new arena of combat, propaganda, and recruitment.
Uyghurs from the TIP appeared in Syria as a result of the intersection of Chinese security policy, the jihadist hinterland in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the Turkish transfer corridor that, after 2012, became the main artery of international jihadist activities. Pushed out of Pakistan’s Waziristan by the local security services operating under Chinese pressure, supported by networks linked to al-Qaeda and passing through Turkey, they built in north-western Syria one of the most disciplined and determined foreign contingents fighting against Bashar al-Assad.
The TIP used the Syrian battlefield for what neither Xinjiang nor the Afghan–Pakistani borderlands could provide: global visibility, recruitment, a flow of funds, and participation in key offensives from Idlib and Jisr al-Shughur, through the al-Ghab plain, to the battle for Aleppo. For China, this became a strategic problem. A group that Beijing had for years portrayed as the core of Uyghur terrorism gained combat experience and space to build its narrative. For local groups, above all for Jabhat al-Nusra (later renamed Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and eventually HTS), the TIP was a useful military partner, loyal and ideologically compatible, while retaining its own agenda and structures. Crucially, already in 2020, Muhammad al-Jolani (today known as Ahmad al-Shara) signalled that anti-Chinese jihad was not his war and that the alliance with the TIP was purely Syrian in character. That earlier pragmatism became the foundation of the logic that today’s post-Assad Syria is trying to use in relations with Beijing. In this configuration, the TIP is a security problem for China, while for the new authorities in Damascus, it becomes a bargaining chip. It is precisely at this intersection, between China’s drive to stabilise Xinjiang and Syria’s need to secure recognition, partners, and sponsors for reconstruction, that the mutual discourse between post-Assad Syria and China is beginning to converge.
China and the Syrian Conflict up to the Overthrow of Bashar al-Assad
Chinese policy towards Syria in 2011–2024 was characterised by restraint and declarative support. From the outset, Beijing opposed attempts to isolate Bashar al-Assad internationally. It used its veto power in the UN Security Council, blocking successive resolutions condemning the regime or opening the way to tougher sanctions and a possible military intervention. Yet in practice, this was the extent of its engagement. China did not undertake military action or serious economic initiatives in support of Damascus, even though the Syrian conflict quickly turned into one of the key arenas of regional rivalry, where all the principal regional players were present – Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Israel – as well as global actors –the US and Russia.
In military terms, such restraint fits within the broader logic of Chinese policy since 1979, which has sought to avoid armed operations beyond its own territory and to favour economic instruments. In the Syrian case, however, what stands out is that even economic tools – loans, infrastructure investments, or even a token presence in reconstruction – remained unused. Even when al-Assad, after Syria’s readmission to the Arab League (which took place in May 2023), completed the process of normalising relations with Arab states, Beijing did not try to create any real economic format or pan-Arab mechanism that would help circumvent Western sanctions and even symbolically assist in lifting the devastated Syrian economy. Only in 2022 was Syria invited to join the Belt and Road Initiative, but this did not translate into concrete steps or a list of potential projects that would actually change the situation in the country.
From a geographical and geo-economic perspective, the explanation is simple. Syria lies far from China and is not a key link in securing energy supplies. In Beijing’s Middle Eastern hierarchy of priorities, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE rank higher as oil suppliers and partners in larger infrastructure projects. Yet if we look at Syria through the lens of security, the picture is less straightforward. The TIP’s activity, which had been building its position in Syria since 2012, was quickly identified by China as a real threat. Beijing’s response was the appointment of a special envoy for Syria, visits by military delegations to Damascus, and declarations about the need to eliminate Uyghur fighters in Syria. In other words, Beijing recognised the problem but did not translate this diagnosis into a broader strategy towards the Syrian state.
From the perspective of the Syrian conflict, we can see the classic mechanism of a dysfunctional (failed) state. In a situation where the state is economically and militarily shattered, armed non-state groups (including the TIP) can challenge the state’s monopoly on coercion and violence and, in effect, take control of fragments of territory. The weakness of al-Assad’s army created favourable conditions for Uyghur jihadists to entrench themselves in north-western Syria. China’s veto in the UN Security Council strengthened al-Assad’s political position. Still, it did not increase his real capabilities on the battlefield and could not prevent the disintegration of the Syrian economy. It is difficult to determine to what extent greater Chinese economic or military involvement would have actually changed the course of events. This remains in the realm of hypothesis. What is a fact, however, is that with relatively modest financial outlays, China could have attempted to strengthen the Syrian armed forces’ capacity to suppress foreign jihadist groups and instead limited itself to diplomatic gestures.
This lack of deeper presence had another dimension. When the weight of the conflict shifted from internal actors to external states, Syria became one of the arenas on which the new regional balance of power crystallised. Iran, Turkey, Israel, the Gulf states, Russia, and the US used the Syrian conflict to pursue their own strategies. China remained on the margins, sending the signal that it did not see Syria as a space in which it needed to actively shape the security order. At the same time, the TIP, as an organisation openly hostile towards Beijing and calling for the continuation of the struggle in China after the “Syrian stage” has been “accomplished,” survived, strengthened itself, and gained combat experience. Chinese non-engagement therefore neither neutralised the threat nor lowered the level of jihadist antagonism. Instead, it turned the Uyghur thread into one of the elements China had to confront not as an actor shaping the rules of the game, but as a side reacting to realities imposed by the situation in Syria.
As a result, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, China found itself in a specific situation. Formally, it had defended his regime for years in the Security Council, but it had not built any real leverage over developments in Syria. The transformation of the Syrian order took place without its participation, and the TIP, regarded by Beijing as one of the main threats in the context of Xinjiang, was incorporated into the new arrangements in north-western Syria (the details are discussed in the following sections). It is against this background that we should read today’s attempts to build relations between China and post-Assad Syria. Beijing enters this configuration as an actor that, for years, minimised its engagement but failed to avoid the consequences of the TIP’s presence in the Syrian theatre of conflict.
Post-Assad Syria and China – Economy Versus Security
Relations between China and post-Assad Syria rest on two completely different logics of interest. For Beijing, Syria is above all a space of internal security threats linked to the TIP’s activity and the risk of exporting (or returning) jihad to Xinjiang. For Damascus, China is a potential source of funding for reconstruction, economic stabilisation, and symbolic recognition on the international stage. At first glance, the change of power in Syria has not altered the interests of the two states vis-à-vis each other. The key shift, however, is that for the new authorities in Damascus, the TIP is no longer, as it is for China, a mortal threat but a useful ally.
From China’s perspective, the first months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad are the moment when the Syrian theatre ceases to be a peripheral Middle Eastern conflict and becomes directly significant for national security. The TIP, incorporated into the structures of the new Syrian army and maintaining a force of several thousand fighters, constitutes a serious problem for Beijing. More importantly, Uyghur fighters have gained extensive combat experience, and their victory in Syria has given them the motivation to take further action. Hence, the Chinese warning signals, such as statements by China’s representative to the UN, Fu Cong, who drew attention to the presence of foreign jihadists on Syrian territory and urgently called on the new Syrian authorities to address this problem. China also abstained in the UN Security Council vote on lifting sanctions on Syria, while all other states, including the US and Russia, voted in favour. These were not symbolic diplomatic gestures but a sign of concern.
On the Syrian side, the calculus is simpler. Al-Shara does not expect a military umbrella or security support from China. His goal is purely economic and political – to attract funds, projects, and investors, and to show Syrian society and regional partners that the new Syria is capable of engaging with all key global actors. In the logic of the new authorities, every reconstruction project, every signal of recognition, every visit by a delegation is an argument in the internal struggle to maintain consolidation and legitimacy. For al-Shara, China is one of three great powers with which he must maintain at least correct relations. Besides China, this applies to the US and Russia, which, although they spent years fighting HTS militarily, have become partners for President al-Shara at the negotiating table.
Post-Assad Syria has a permanent interest in China, expressed already during al-Assad’s rule. It expects investment and Chinese participation in the country’s reconstruction. China, for its part, in the face of its years-long passivity towards Syria and the fact that an organisation it treats as a mortal threat has found its way into state structures, should be considering a re-evaluation of its Middle Eastern strategy, which until now has been based solely on economic expansion and the construction of alliances with oil giants. Syria has become problematic for China, highlighting that the Middle East is not only a commercially attractive region but also a source of security threats. For Syria, however, this is an opportunity, because President al-Shara can offer Beijing the one thing China truly expects (and which al-Assad was unable to deliver) – Syrian control over the TIP. Control is understood in broad terms, ranging from neutralising the most radical factions to ensuring that no operations targeting Chinese interests emanate from Syrian territory. Beijing’s doubts, however, concern the Syrian president’s actual capacity to control fighters who for years were allied with HTS. In the logic of Chinese policy, the question is not whether al-Shara is willing but whether he is able to do this.
Mistrust of this capability is today one of the main constraints on bilateral relations. China knows that the TIP is becoming part of the new system, not a leftover from revolutionary fervour. It also knows that excessive pressure on Damascus could trigger destabilisation (the TIP refusing to obey al-Shara). At the same time, too little pressure could strengthen an actor Beijing sees as an existential threat. Al-Shara, for his part, plays hardball, suggesting that Syria is not in a position to beg for Chinese support and that it has other sources of legitimacy. This, too, seems to be part of a deliberate strategy. The more adept Syria appears to be in conducting a multi-vector foreign policy, the greater the value of the TIP as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis China.
Syrian Pragmatism, Chinese Fears: TIP as a Test of al-Shara’s Real Capabilities
At the end of February 2025 (two months after al-Assad’s overthrow), Ahmad al-Shara received the Chinese ambassador, Shi Hongwei, in Damascus, signalling readiness for political opening and declaring that Syria would not allow any activities initiated from its territory that could threaten China’s interests. More important, however, was the November visit of Syrian foreign minister Assad Hasan al-Shibani to Beijing, during which both sides made significant declarations. Syria recognised the PRC as the sole representative of China (in line with the One China principle) while Beijing recognised the government in Damascus as the sole representative of the Syrian people and confirmed that the Golan Heights are an integral part of Syria. From Damascus’s perspective, this was a step towards expanding international legitimacy and a prelude to economic talks. For Beijing, it was an introduction to discussions about the TIP.
The key problem is not the bilateral relationship itself but the fact that the TIP, estimated at anywhere from several hundred to as many as 3,000 fighters, has become an integral part of Syria’s state military apparatus. The 84th Division, established by the Syrian authorities and headed by Uyghur Abdulaziz Dawood Khudaberdy. His promotion to the rank of brigadier general indicates that the TIP is not only tolerated but also actively promoted within the new armed forces. This creates a dual dynamic of pressure. For Syria, integrating the TIP is a tool of control, through which fighters on the state payroll are more dependent on the state leadership and at the same time less inclined to defect to al-Qaeda or ISIS, while simultaneously strengthening the army on fronts where mountain or urban experience is crucial. For China, it means something opposite – the legitimisation and institutionalisation of the most dangerous Uyghur armed organisation, which Emir Abdul Haq al-Turkistani still leads from Afghanistan, retaining at least partial control over the Syrian TIP faction.
China’s fears are further reinforced by structural regional factors. The latest analyses of jihadist groups originating from Central Asia indicate that HTS’s victory in Syria has become a model of local jihad and a source of inspiration that worries not only China but also the post-Soviet states of Central Asia. The TIP is therefore not only an internal Syrian issue or a Chinese problem. The outcome of the Syrian conflict has given it a transregional dimension. This shows that East and Central Asia are becoming further areas beyond the Middle East, Europe, and Africa that have been affected by the international jihadist movement, including those operating within the Syrian conflict.
Within this configuration, Syrian-Chinese relations are deeply pragmatic and transactional, which is in itself typical of international relations. Nevertheless, despite Syria’s catastrophic situation, Ahmad al-Shara is still able, as in relations with other states, to apply a security leverage vis-à-vis China. Aware that the issue of Uyghurs from the TIP in Syria is urgent for Beijing, the Syrian president may be tempted to engage in a game aimed at securing Chinese economic involvement in Syria. The question, however, is whether Beijing will be able to regard Damascus as a partner capable of delivering on such sensitive commitments. The current dialogue between the two states is therefore a test of Syria’s control over Uyghur fighters and a test of China’s readiness to cooperate with authorities that have generated the strongest existing structure of Uyghur jihad and separatism.
Conclusion
In Syrian–Chinese relations, the issue today is not declarations about reconstruction but a test of real capabilities. Syria must prove that it can subordinate the TIP and keep its fighters within the bounds of state discipline, while China must show that it is ready to engage in a country that has not previously been among its priorities, but in light of Uyghur jihad and separatism, is beginning to affect its security in a direct manner. This is not a classic expansion project or an economic venture for Beijing, but above all, a defensive issue. For the Chinese authorities, the risks emanating from Syria are becoming too serious to continue ignoring. For al-Shara, this is both an opportunity and a burden. On the one hand, it is the possibility of securing one of the key great powers whose investments can genuinely enhance its international position. On the other hand, it is necessary to prove that he is able to keep the TIP under control and prevent actions that could harm China’s interests. As long as both sides do not provide binding answers to these two key questions, their dialogue will remain largely courteous yet burdened with uncertainty and mutual suspicion.
