The unspeakable tragedy unfolding in the streets of Iran just recently left the world aghast. Many wonder how a system claiming divine legitimacy can turn on its own people. In the wake of the mayhem, the system’s fundamentals lost their moorings to many Iranians. Change in Iran seems inevitable.
When overturning the monarchy, Iran’s 1979 revolution ushered in a wave of re-traditionalization, discarding anything deemed remotely “Western”. Out went the separation of temporal and spiritual power, branded as alien to Islam, to be replaced by the Velayat-e Faqih, the Guidance of the Jurisprudent, bestowing supreme authority on the “Rahbar” (leader of the revolution) and the clergy. With it ended tolerance of anything judged incompatible with the Khomeini-minted official version of Shia Twelver Islam. The government claimed divine dispensation with no checks and balances, monopolizing Iran’s unique civilization. Grounded in Zoroastrianism and later colored by Manichaeism and Mithraism, Iran’s rich civilization was syncretic and tolerant throughout. Khomeini didn’t like it and wanted to obliterate any tradition he thought incompatible with Shiism, even Nowruz, the Iranian New Year (he thankfully failed, due to societal pushback).
Spearheaded by the radicalism emblematic of the Islamic Revolution, Khomeinism sent shockwaves across the entire Islamic world. Tehran spared no effort to spread its message globally. Not to be seen lagging, the Sunni world reacted by pushing its own version of combative radicalism, Wahhabism. With 9/11, the competition of the two stepped out of the confines of Islam and threatened to submerge the entire world into what was meant to become a religious war between Islam and the Other. Thus, Iran’s Islamic Revolution was the catalyst of the ensuing mayhem, with Afghanistan, Iraq, and the War on Terror in tow.
Its missionary zeal notwithstanding, the dismal performance of the Iranian theocracy at home soon belied the shining image it tried to project abroad. Facts on the ground gave the lie to Khomeinism’s supposedly world-redeeming properties. Economic mismanagement, foreign adventurism and resulting international isolation as the regime suffered punishing sanctions, bankrupted a country rich in resources.
Increasingly disillusioned, people turned away from the heavily regulated religious society the regime advocated. Khomeinism hollowed out and with it eroded erstwhile respect for the clergy, increasingly seen as monopolizing power and ruling by repression. The alliance between the clergy and the fearsome IRGC provoked growing resentment. As the economy atrophied with resources funneled into sustaining proxies abroad, four mass uprisings of disgruntled Iranians followed in succession, quelled with exceeding violence. All this suggests that the theocratic regime is neither sustainable nor does it lend itself easily to be reformed. Iran needs an exit strategy.
Not surprisingly, the crisis of the clerical regime provoked the ire of the people against the clergy and its institutions. Unthinkable before, people vented their frustration at the clerics, with physical attacks multiplying (typically, knocking off clerics’ turbans), and even more tellingly, some 300 mosques falling victim to arson in the wake of the latest mass protests.
All indications are that should the regime fold, reckoning will not spare the religious establishment. Not that Iran would become a Soviet Russia. Religion is deeply rooted in the Iranian culture and psyche, part and parcel of Iranian identity. But people would not want to reel under the thumb of the clergy any longer. They refuse a system that abused religion as its fig leaf for repression and pillaging the nation’s riches, two accusations leveled against the regime by protesters.
As war looms, the fate of the system may be hanging in the balance. A compromise may be illusory, as US and regime positions are far apart. Cornered, the ruling class may ultimately yield to pressure from within and without. To go down fighting and dragging the entire nation along into the precipice may be a price too high.
With common sense suggesting that the Islamic Republic be transformed by consensus instead of war or civil strife, pondering an exit strategy may be on the regime elite’s cards. Iran’s clerical leaders may decide in favor of the quietism advocated by Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani of Iraq, e.g., a purely spiritual role for the clergy rather than a political one. Al-Sistani has long been viewed as a face of moderation and rationality in Shia Islam, but Tehran downplayed his messages.
That was a mistake: a peaceful transition in Iran could restore a secular state without pushing out or alienating the Shiite clerical class. This would do justice to those who see Shiite Islam as an indelible mark of Iranian identity. Arriving there would call for a new approach from the clerical class in the first place. Should they advocate for peaceful change and an end to murderous repression, they may buy themselves a ticket into a future where they would live along, but not lord over, the millions of ordinary Iranians, religious or not.
