Since Pakistan gained independence, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been characterized by both opportunities for cooperation and persistent sources of tension. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Islamabad developed close ties with various Afghan Islamist factions. In the late 1990s, Pakistan became one of the few countries to recognize the first Taliban government, doing so in 1997, and provided substantial political and material support to the movement. Following the Taliban’s fall in 2001, numerous members and senior figures sought refuge in Pakistan. Pakistan subsequently played a crucial role in the Taliban’s survival as a movement and, indirectly, in the conditions that facilitated its return to power in August 2021.
Bilateral Political Expectations
When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, the development was openly welcomed by many in Pakistan. Since then, however, relations between Islamabad and the Taliban authorities have grown increasingly complicated, shifting from expectations of close cooperation toward confrontation and mutual distrust.
Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Islamabad expected the new authorities in Kabul to accommodate Pakistan’s core security interests and anticipated the emergence of a friendly government on its western border. The Taliban, for its part, expected Pakistan to play an important role in helping the new government overcome its diplomatic isolation and achieve international recognition.
Contrary to Kabul’s expectations, Islamabad chose not to formally recognize the Taliban government. In subsequent years, Pakistan has continued to call on the Taliban to establish a more inclusive government, combat international terrorism, respect human rights, and restore women’s and girls’ access to education. In October 2025, Pakistan even expressed hope that Afghanistan would eventually be governed by a genuinely representative government.
At the same time, Islamabad has expanded its engagement with other Afghan political actors. Contacts with former officials, ethnic and political groups, and figures opposed to Taliban rule can also be understood as a means of exerting pressure on Kabul and signaling that Pakistan retains alternative channels of influence within Afghanistan.
The Taliban strongly opposes Pakistani efforts to promote a more inclusive political system. Islamabad’s expanding contacts with anti-Taliban figures, opposition movements, and ethnic political groups—particularly the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan—are therefore viewed by Kabul as a significant political and security concern. Since Pakistan’s February 2024 election and the subsequent formation of a coalition government under Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Islamabad has maintained its policy of non-recognition while increasingly seeking to use political, diplomatic, economic, and security instruments to influence Taliban behavior.
Although the Taliban has repeatedly stated that it seeks constructive relations with Pakistan in both the economic and diplomatic spheres, bilateral relations have become increasingly transactional and multidimensional. Islamabad has sought to influence Kabul through measures including periodic border closures, tighter visa restrictions, continued withholding of formal recognition, and the reinforcement of border security.
Geopolitics and the Durand Line
The Durand Line remains one of the most persistent historical disputes in Afghanistan–Pakistan relations. Some Taliban officials continue to refer to the border as an “imaginary” line, reflecting Afghanistan’s longstanding refusal to unequivocally recognize the approximately 2,600-kilometer frontier as a settled international border.
The dispute is closely intertwined with the Pashtun question. Pashtuns constitute roughly 40 percent of Afghanistan’s population and remain central to the country’s political landscape, while accounting for approximately 15 percent of Pakistan’s population. Some Pashtun nationalist currents have historically advocated greater political unity among Pashtuns on both sides of the border, including variants of the concept of a “Greater Pashtunistan.” Islamabad therefore remains highly sensitive to any revival of Afghan territorial claims or Pashtun nationalist demands challenging the existing border.
Following the breakdown of bilateral talks in November 2025, Afghanistan and Pakistan entered a period of recurring and increasingly overt military confrontation. The human cost has been substantial, with at least 372 Afghan civilians reportedly killed during the first quarter of 2026 alone.
Border tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban authorities have persisted despite the temporary ceasefire arrangements reached in 2026, with intermittent clashes and airstrikes continuing throughout the year. More recently, Taliban and Pakistani forces have again confronted each other in border areas, creating a recurring cycle of military escalation, mutual accusations, demands, and temporary ceasefires.
The February airstrikes marked the deadliest confrontation between the two sides since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 and represented a significant escalation toward open war. Afghan forces responded with an unprecedented level of military action. Against this backdrop, Kabul has reportedly sought to strengthen its military capabilities through additional arms and equipment imports, while also exploring potential military cooperation with Russia as part of its efforts to bolster its position vis-à-vis Pakistan.
The 2026 confrontations have consequently altered the character of the bilateral security relationship. Military operations have expanded beyond localized border incidents to include strikes deeper inside both countries’ territories. At the same time, the Taliban has demonstrated increasingly sophisticated retaliatory capabilities, contributing to a relative narrowing—although by no means elimination—of the substantial military asymmetry between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has continued conducting attacks against what it identifies as militant sanctuaries. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has reiterated that Afghan territory must not be used as a base for activities targeting Pakistan. Islamabad continues to demand that the Taliban authorities prevent armed groups from operating from Afghan territory and take concrete action against organizations conducting or facilitating attacks against Pakistan.
India’s Role
Pakistan is also concerned that its increasingly strained relationship with the Taliban could create opportunities for India to expand its influence in Afghanistan at Islamabad’s expense. It therefore seeks to limit New Delhi’s strategic footprint in the country.
The upgrading of diplomatic ties with India on October 9, 2025, a series of high-level official visits, and the unprecedented expansion of India–Taliban relations reflect what has been described as a “fully pragmatic policy of mutual engagement,” as well as the Taliban’s growing willingness to accommodate Indian strategic interests.
Afghanistan’s renewed engagement with India has further intensified Pakistan’s concerns. Islamabad has long accused New Delhi of interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs and supporting militant and separatist groups. Against this backdrop, Pakistan fears that deteriorating relations with the Taliban could allow India to exploit Pakistan’s domestic vulnerabilities, including by strengthening ties with separatist and other anti-state actors. Following the Pakistani strikes in late June, India was the only country to publicly condemn the attacks.
Within this broader geopolitical competition, Islamabad has also accused the Taliban authorities of creating an environment that facilitates alleged Indian support for Baloch militant groups.
Disputes over Terrorism
Several issues shape Islamabad’s approach to the Taliban, including concerns over Afghanistan once again becoming a hub for transnational terrorism, the activities of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS-K, the absence of an inclusive government, and the broader security and migration concerns of Afghanistan’s neighbors.
At the UN Security Council, Pakistan has identified the TTP, the Balochistan Liberation Army’s Majeed Brigade, ISIS, and al-Qaeda as groups operating from Afghan territory.
The TTP has portrayed itself as a “branch of the Islamic Emirate.” From Islamabad’s perspective, the organization represents a major threat to Pakistan’s internal security. Estimates cited by some sources put its strength at up to 50,000 fighters and suggest that approximately 70 percent of its membership is Afghan.
The Taliban authorities have taken steps to exert greater control over some jihadist organizations. Pakistan, however, claims that the Afghan Taliban continues to provide various forms of support to the TTP, which Islamabad regards as a direct threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Taliban has consistently denied these allegations, maintaining that the TTP is an internal Pakistani issue.
Islamabad is also concerned about the TTP’s attempts to broaden its appeal beyond its traditional constituency and its alleged support for separatist causes associated with “Free Balochistan,” “Free Pashtunistan,” and “Free Sindh.” Aspirations involving greater control over Pakistan’s tribal and border regions similarly run directly counter to Islamabad’s security and geopolitical interests.
Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has publicly called on the Afghan authorities to choose between maintaining ties with the TTP and maintaining constructive relations with Pakistan.
The Taliban’s ability and willingness to confront militant organizations nevertheless remain contested. While Islamabad argues that Kabul has failed to take sufficiently robust action against groups threatening Pakistan, the Taliban has at times accused Pakistan of facilitating the movement of ISIS-K militants into Afghanistan or seeking to use the organization as an instrument of pressure against the Afghan authorities.
The terrorist-designation issue further complicates the relationship. The Taliban authorities seek to avoid being treated by Pakistan as a terrorist organization, while Islamabad distinguishes between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP, formally treating the latter as a separate terrorist organization.
The deterioration of the security environment has further widened the gap between the two sides. In addition to more than 1,000 TTP attacks reportedly launched from Afghan sanctuaries in 2025, militant operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have become increasingly sophisticated, while reported coordination between the TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has also increased. As a result, the gap between Islamabad’s expectations and the Afghan Taliban’s actual performance has continued to widen, with Pakistan increasingly demanding concrete, verifiable measures against militant groups operating from Afghan territory.
Failure of Talks
Although several political and societal actors in Pakistan—including Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), civil society organizations, tribal leaders, clerics, and business representatives—largely favor dialogue and engagement with the Taliban, the federal government and Pakistan’s security establishment have generally pursued a more cautious and confrontational approach.
Within the Taliban itself, attitudes toward the TTP are not uniform. Some factions reportedly regard the organization as a strategic asset that can be used to exert pressure on Pakistan. Others, however, see the TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army as an increasingly unsustainable burden for Afghanistan.
Several rounds of internationally mediated talks—including meetings in Doha, Istanbul, Riyadh, and Urumqi—have so far failed to produce a comprehensive agreement. The ceasefire established under the Urumqi framework in April 2026 remains, in practice, an informal understanding and falls far short of a normalization of bilateral relations.
The willingness to negotiate has not disappeared entirely, but diplomatic assurances have repeatedly failed to translate into measurable action on the ground. With parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan reportedly slipping beyond effective Pakistani government control, Islamabad increasingly links any meaningful normalization of relations with the Taliban to a demonstrable reduction—and ultimately cessation—of militant attacks originating from Afghan territory.
Economic and Social Challenges
Instability in Afghanistan and along the shared border has generated significant socioeconomic and security challenges for Pakistan, including refugee movements, arms and narcotics trafficking, and transnational organized crime across the long and porous frontier.
In 2025, approximately 930,000 Afghans were repatriated from Pakistan. As Islamabad continues its large-scale deportation and repatriation campaign, the Taliban authorities have repeatedly called on Pakistan to reduce the pace and scale of expulsions and to ensure more orderly treatment of Afghan nationals.
Water security represents another potential source of bilateral friction. The Kabul River system, which originates in Afghanistan’s Hindu Kush and flows into Pakistan, is strategically important to both countries. Islamabad is particularly concerned about the possibility of Afghanistan developing infrastructure that could reduce downstream flows, potentially with Indian assistance. Against this backdrop, Afghan plans to construct a dam on the Kunar River have generated concern in Pakistan, with some estimates suggesting that such projects could significantly affect downstream water availability. Islamabad therefore has a strong interest in preventing Afghan water-development policies from substantially reducing Pakistan’s share of transboundary water resources.
At the same time, considerable scope for economic cooperation remains. Pakistan seeks to preserve its economic interests and commercial presence in Afghanistan, while both countries stand to benefit from greater regional connectivity. Potential areas of cooperation include the TAPI gas pipeline, the proposed Mazar-e-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway, the CASA-1000 electricity transmission project, and improved trade and transit corridors connecting Pakistan with Central Asia through Afghanistan.
Kabul has previously announced significant trade agreements with Pakistan and efforts to strengthen bilateral banking relations. Their implementation, however, continues to face obstacles ranging from international sanctions and weaknesses in Afghanistan’s banking system to Islamabad’s attempts to impose trade restrictions on Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, India’s expanding economic engagement with Taliban-governed Afghanistan has introduced another strategic dimension. During 2025 and 2026, New Delhi increasingly emphasized market access, capacity building, connectivity, trade facilitation, and the restoration of air freight corridors—a development interpreted by some observers as a significant strategic shift in India’s approach toward the Taliban.
Trade between India and Afghanistan exceeded $1.5 billion during the previous fiscal year. By contrast, Afghanistan–Pakistan bilateral trade declined to approximately $1.77 billion in 2025, while Pakistani exports to Afghanistan reportedly fell sharply during the first half of fiscal year 2026. These trends have reinforced Pakistani concerns that its traditional economic influence in Afghanistan is gradually eroding as Kabul diversifies its regional partnerships.
Strengthening economic, commercial, transport, and energy connectivity with neighboring countries has become an important component of the Taliban’s foreign policy. Kabul has, in particular, expressed interest in Afghanistan joining the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), although Islamabad continues to have reservations regarding the terms and implications of Afghan participation.
Similarly, despite the signing of a trilateral framework in July 2025, implementation of the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (UAP) railway project will require substantially greater political, financial, and technical coordination among the participating states.
Vision
The Taliban’s most important diplomatic and political demand remains Pakistan’s formal recognition of its government. At the same time, the Taliban’s approach to foreign militant groups operating in Afghanistan will be a critical factor in determining both its prospects for broader international legitimacy and the future trajectory of Pakistan’s security environment.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has increasingly sought to convince Western and regional governments that the security challenges emanating from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan represent a shared threat rather than a purely bilateral concern. Islamabad continues to advocate a political solution to Afghanistan’s broader challenges, while demanding concrete action from Kabul against the TTP, respect for the rights of women and minorities, measures to curb arms and narcotics trafficking, and the establishment of a more inclusive system of government.
Of these issues, the TTP remains the most significant obstacle to an improvement in bilateral relations. Islamabad is therefore likely to continue using the prospect of formal diplomatic recognition, alongside economic and political pressure, as leverage to encourage greater cooperation from Kabul.
Against the backdrop of recurring border clashes, a substantial improvement in bilateral relations appears unlikely in the short term. The deterioration of the security environment has also complicated Pakistan’s efforts to promote economic stability, attract international investment, expand regional connectivity, and maintain a stable relationship with Afghanistan consistent with its broader national security objectives.
Under these circumstances, Islamabad may undertake a broader reassessment of its Afghanistan policy. Security relations between the two countries appear to be moving beyond a series of temporary crises toward what could be described as a “chronic structural conflict”—one that is unlikely either to escalate into sustained full-scale war or to give way to a durable peace settlement.
The most plausible scenario is therefore the emergence of a prolonged gray zone characterized by persistent tension. Full-scale war would remain unlikely, but border clashes, limited cross-border strikes, occasional attacks deeper inside each other’s territory, and recurring political and security crises could become enduring features of the bilateral relationship.
Pakistan could also seek to influence the structure and internal balance of Taliban rule. Despite some reported coordination with anti-Taliban forces, however, direct Pakistani support for regime change in Afghanistan or sustained backing for an armed opposition would require considerable time, resources, and political investment, while carrying substantial risks.
A potentially less disruptive alternative would involve Islamabad attempting to encourage internal reforms or changes in the Taliban’s leadership structure in the hope of producing a government more responsive to Pakistan’s security concerns. At the opposite end of the spectrum, a rapid normalization of Taliban–Pakistan relations remains possible but comparatively unlikely in the short term, as it would require substantial progress on the fundamental security disputes dividing Kabul and Islamabad—above all, the TTP issue.
