The security guarantees provided by the United States have proven ineffective regarding Qatar. Further inaction and lack of a clear plan raise doubts about the security that the American administration extends to the Gulf and beyond.
The ongoing situation in the Middle East has become even more complex, and the parties involved seem to have differing objectives and no clear goals. There is also a complete lack of vision concerning the post-war situation, an element that is of critical importance. The U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has recently referred to President Trump’s words that he “prefers a diplomatic solution to war in Iran”, yet it remains challenging to foresee a realistic timeline and actions to be implemented. Unquestionably, the Israel-US-Iran conflict has reshaped the regional order to a new level, although so far, without a clearly defined structure or a regional hegemon. The most affected are the citizens of all countries involved and targeted by attacks, and the regional economies that, despite their strong international standing, have been temporarily weakened.
Taking into consideration the ongoing conflict, one should see how the U.S. foreign policy towards the Gulf states is being shaped today. Qatar, a gas superpower and key mediator, has become one of the Americans’ key allies and plays a significant role in security and intra-regional negotiations. The year 2025 was notable in terms of lucrative contracts signed between the Gulf states and the U.S.; however, it was also an unfortunate year for Doha, which faced separate attacks from Israel and Iran. In September, President Trump signed an executive order that guarantees “the security and territorial integrity of the State of Qatar against external attack.” A closer look at the current situation shows that this action fails to materialize in practice, raising doubts about the security that the Americans extend to their strategic partner and the rest of the countries in the region.
New U.S. National Strategies and the Gulf
In late 2025 and early 2026, the White House published two core documents exemplifying the American strategy at the domestic, regional, and international levels: the U.S. National Security Strategy and the U.S. National Defense Strategy.
In the first document, the current U.S. administration outlined how important it considers to “prevent an adversarial power from dominating the Middle East, its oil and gas supplies, and the chokepoints through which they pass while avoiding the ‘forever wars’ that bogged us down [the U.S.] in that region at great cost.” Currently, this region is perceived primarily through the prism of investments in strategic sectors, which are not only related to hydrocarbons but also to artificial intelligence (AI), nuclear energy, and defense technologies. The U.S. authorities also underline their interest in expanding the Abraham Accords.
When discussing the latter strategy, Washington appears to distance itself from taking responsibility for the region, particularly regarding conflicts. The U.S. emphasizes the burden-sharing approach. As reported in the document, “the Department of War will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies.” The American administration places importance on strengthening Israel’s security, cooperation with the Arab Gulf states, and enhancing regional integration within the Abraham Accords. In the U.S. discourse, the vision of “a peaceful and prosperous Middle East” predominates.
US-Qatar Relations over the Years
In 1992, Qatar and the U.S. authorities signed a “Defense Cooperation Agreement” which was very similar to those signed with some of the Gulf states. Four years later, al-Udeid, the American military air base, was established and is today the largest military facility in the Middle East, with approximately 10,000 troops stationed there. It is also a headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Although the text of the agreement remains classified, Congressional Research Service analysis points to the prepositioning of U.S. military equipment and the conduct of military training as forms of reported cooperation included in the pact.
Guido Steinberg sheds light on the subject of U.S.-Qatar relations. He states that during Donald Trump’s first term in office, bilateral relations with Qatar were initially strained due to the diplomatic blockade imposed on Doha in 2017 and reported backing from the U.S. President. Over time, they began to improve, and the Qatari side expressed interest in purchasing fighter jets from the U.S. and Europe, as well as in modernizing the al-Udeid military base. The next step to enhance U.S.-Qatar ties was the establishment of a Strategic Dialogue in early 2018. Both parties highlighted the importance of regional security; therefore, bolstering cooperation in fields such as defense, counterterrorism, combatting extremism, bilateral trade, and investment became a priority for them.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the U.S., Italy, and the United Kingdom were the top suppliers of arms to Qatar in 2021-2025. Doha was also ranked 4th in terms of the share of global arms imports, following Ukraine, India, and Saudi Arabia.
In 2022, President Joe Biden designated Qatar as a “major non-NATO ally,” and it offered prospects for further military cooperation. The U.S. Department of War outlines activities such as hosting U.S. war reserve stockpiles of materiel, bidding on contracts to maintain, repair, or overhaul U.S. military equipment, and being eligible to enter into agreements with the United States for training.
In May 2025, Donald Trump embarked on an official trip to the Gulf, visiting Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. During his visit to Doha, several agreements were concluded, the most significant of which was Qatar Airways’ order for 210 Boeing 787 Dreamliners and Boeing 777X aircraft. Other crucial deals encompass the energy sector, artificial intelligence, and military equipment, with a total amount of $243,5 billion. Doha and Washington also aim to increase bilateral trade to $ 1.2 trillion.
The same year, Qatar faced attacks from Iran and Israel on the al-Udeid military air base and Hamas members in the capital. However, Donald Trump’s reaction remained rather neutral, expressing that “perhaps Iran can now proceed to Peace and Harmony in the Region, and I will enthusiastically encourage Israel to do the same”. When asked about the Israeli attacks in Qatar, he was “not thrilled about it.”
The U.S. President later promised he would not allow another attack on Qatari territory. On September 29, Donald Trump signed an executive order that assures the authorities in Doha that in case of an armed attack, “the United States shall take all lawful and appropriate measures — including diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military — to defend the interests of the United States and of the State of Qatar and to restore peace and stability.” In an interview for the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Mona Yacoubian, senior adviser and director of the Middle East Program at the CSIS, stressed that the U.S. views Qatar’s security as closely linked to its national security interests. Security, defense, and economy were also the main themes of discussion during the 7th United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue in Washington, D.C., in December 2025. This is so far the only state in the Gulf that has received such guarantees from the U.S.
In January 2026, Qatar and the UAE joined Pax Silica, an American initiative that aims to enhance the security of global supply chains, specifically in AI and semiconductors. The declaration was also signed by Israel, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia, Greece, India, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Taiwan, as the main global semiconductor manufacturer, is a non-signatory participant. Most of the states, including the East Asian partners, play a key role in developing and implementing the cutting-edge technologies on a global scale. The presence of two Gulf states in the initiative highlights their strategic importance and potential in advanced technologies.
U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf in Practice
Before the war, the executive order, which provides Qatar with additional security guarantees, contributed to maintaining the strategic partnership with Doha and attempted to prevent the trust from falling due to the airstrikes and the lack of specific actions to defend the state. Today, Qatar, among other Middle Eastern states, is still facing missile and drone attacks that damage the critical infrastructure, and it demonstrates that the security guarantees are of little relevance in the current war. Also, the United States sought to strengthen its position in the Middle East and maintain the balance of power with its regional strategic partners and allies; thus, depicting itself as the prominent and indispensable power in the region. By offering security guarantees, the U.S. administration emphasized Qatar’s key role as a mediator engaging in talks not only with most regional states but also with non-state actors. Retaliatory attacks launched by Iran put Qatar at risk of losses and undermining its prominent role. At the same time, the U.S. has exposed its regional partners to damage, too.
What is outlined in the U.S. defense and security strategies about peace and stability in the Middle East does not translate into practical implementation. Although investments constitute a key point of reference in the Gulf states’ relations with the United States, the likelihood of their realization diminishes in the event of continued attacks, thereby weakening their position regionally and on the international stage. Diplomacy is indeed important in ending the war, but it should address the prerequisites for all parties involved and provide a clear vision for the regional order, with the aim of achieving peace.
