Russia’s Support for Iran: More Rhetorics Than Weapons

Russia, Iran’s comprehensive strategic partner since 2025, may well provide some degree of military assistance to the Islamic Republic. However, defending against American strikes requires more than intelligence sharing or limited military-technical cooperation, even when paired with rhetorical support from the Kremlin. 

Although Moscow and Tehran are not formal allies, the two nations are believed to have a common geopolitical advisory – the United States. Still, unlike Russia, which seems to aim to improve relations with Washington at almost any cost, the Islamic Republic – or at least its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-led structures – has so far demonstrated no willingness to end the conflict with the US under President Donald Trump’s conditions.

Fully aware of this, the US military continues to carry out periodic airstrikes against Iran, pressuring it to reach a deal with the Trump administration. At the same time, some American officials reportedly worry that Tehran might be receiving military aid from Russia. Asked about alleged Russian support for Iran, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned “everyone” against backing the Islamic Republic. Although he did not explicitly demand that Moscow end its military cooperation with Tehran, Ukrainian media portrayed his remarks as a clear warning to the Kremlin. But is the White House really that alarmed by Russia-Iran ties?

Historically, Russia has used its relations with Iran as a counterweight to Western influence and as a source of leverage in its dealings with the United States and Israel. After the UN arms embargo on Iran expired in October 2020, Tehran reportedly sought several Russian weapons systems, including Su-35s, Yak-130s, T-90s, S-400s, and Bastion coastal missiles. Given that the US and Israeli air forces manage to relatively easily establish air superiority and full control over Iranian skies during the “hot phase” of the war, it is clear that Iran never received advanced air defense systems from Russia. 

According to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, nothing that anyone is providing Iran “is in any way impeding our ability to act as necessary to protect the United States.” The US F-15E rescue operation on April 4 reinforced that assessment. US Black Hawk helicopters and C-130 transport planes flew over a remote mountainous area of Iran to rescue the pilot of a downed F-15E. The fact that they could operate at low altitude without being shot down suggests that Iran lacked even basic man-portable air-defense systems.

Russia was thus very selective in its military assistance to the Islamic Republic. Reports, however, suggest that Moscow is now helping its Iranian partners to develop a supersonic anti-ship missile. Russian specialists have reportedly been brought in to help Tehran develop a new weapon capable of threatening US aircraft carriers and other ships in the Middle East. Could this be one of the reasons why CIA Director John Ratcliffe recently visited Moscow to meet with his Russian counterparts, who described the meeting as “nothing special”?

Besides allegedly assisting Iran develop advanced missiles, Russia is also believed to have shared satellite imagery with Iran to help it target US facilities in the region, according to a Ukrainian intelligence assessment. Additionally, Russia is said to have secretly established a new strategic supply route to Iran through the Caspian Sea. 

This logistics corridor, sometimes referred to as the “Caspian Express,” resembles the way Russia supplied its forces in Syria during the civil war. At the time, the Russian military presence in the Middle Eastern country was heavily dependent on Turkey, as Russian naval vessels had to pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits to deliver supplies. It remains to be seen how Moscow and Tehran plan to use the Caspian Sea, given the serious threat posed by Ukrainian drones to both Russian and Iranian ships. Ukraine’s recent strike on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea was likely intended as a warning. Thus, even if Russia and Iran intend to use the world’s largest lake for military trade, doing so may be easier said than done – unless they ensure “security guarantees” from Kyiv.

Meanwhile, the two strategic partners are expected to continue using the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-kilometer network of road, rail and shipping routes designed to move freight between India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia and Europe, to expand their economic ties. In parallel, Moscow will undoubtedly continue supporting the Islamic Republic, although not necessarily in the way Iran would want.

“Russia is standing in full solidarity with the people of Iran. We admire your courage and resilience in your fight for your national interests,” Russian President Vladimir Putin told his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian, in Bishkek on September 1, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit.

But “admiring” Iran and expressing “full solidarity” with its people does not automatically mean that the Kremlin is arming the Iranian military. In March, following reports that Russia was providing intelligence support to Iran, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov firmly denied the claims.

If his remarks that Moscow “cannot accept the accusations that it’s helping Iran with intelligence” are true, they call into question the very nature of the partnership between Russia and the Islamic Republic. At the very beginning of the war in Ukraine, Iran provided Russia with key components and technology for Shahed-type attack drones and helped Moscow establish production facilities in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, with the capacity to produce up to 6,000 units per year. As a result, Russia now manufactures modernized Geran drones, a Russian version of the Iranian Shahed, which cause severe damage to Ukrainian infrastructure on a daily basis.

Therefore, whatever military aid Russia provided to Iran, if any, is not nearly as significant as what Tehran provided to Moscow in 2022. Even Donald Trump openly stressed that Putin could have made things “much more difficult” for the US in Iran had he not remained, as the American leader put it, “very neutral.” The Kremlin seems to have focused on offering rhetorical backing to Iran, although even that has been measured and limited.

According to Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Russia will continue to maintain and develop “friendly and partnership relations” with Iran. But what the Islamic Republic needs is weapons, particularly aircraft and air-defense systems. Without them, its infrastructure will remain an easy target for the US Air Force. Even if there is the political will in Moscow to provide such weapons to Iran – which is rather questionable – Russia, bogged down in Ukraine, does not seem to be in a position to provide meaningful assistance to its strategic partner.

Thus, for the foreseeable future, Tehran will have to settle for verbal support from Russia and its SCO partners, who condemn attacks on Iran without even mentioning who carried them out, in order to avoid jeopardizing their relations with the United States. For the Islamic Republic, such diplomatic backing offers little protection against American air power.

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