Following Israel’s incursion into Iranian territory in June 2025 and U.S. involvement in the conflict, a ceasefire was finally established after 12 days of war.
The current ceasefire is more of a temporary suspension of hostilities than a lasting peace. As long as the root causes of tension—such as Iran’s nuclear program, its military presence in the region, and the Palestinian conflict—remain unresolved, the risk of renewed conflict persists at any moment.
Therefore, this ceasefire must be considered fragile, as it is incapable of guaranteeing lasting peace in the region. The fragility stems from differing assessments of the damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear program. Preliminary reports from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency indicate that attacks on Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan caused significant damage but did not completely destroy the facilities.
After direct attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, U.S. President Donald Trump quickly declared victory. His administration claimed the world is now much safer because the bombing operation has destroyed Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons. Trump announced that Iran would no longer pursue its nuclear program. However, he stated that if Iran seeks to resume enrichment activities, the U.S. will attack again. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also stated after the U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities that Iran’s nuclear program had not been completely destroyed and explicitly warned that if Iran attempts to revive its nuclear program, Israel will attack again.
In this regard, Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), noted that the excavated pits provide little information about what remains beneath the concrete layers. He stated that the three Iranian nuclear sites had been significantly damaged in terms of uranium conversion and enrichment capabilities, but some sections remained intact. He added that if Iran wishes, it can resume these activities. A complete assessment would only be possible if Iran granted access to international inspectors. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi commented on the extent of damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities, saying, “No one has precise information about what exactly has happened at Fordow so far. As far as I know, the damage is very extensive and very serious. However, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran is assessing the situation, and the results will be reported to the government.”
While the extent of damage to Iran’s nuclear program remains unclear, the non-proliferation regime, which had been maintained transparently for years, has now collapsed. What is currently important for the U.S. is to reach an agreement with Iran after these attacks to ensure Iran will not pursue enrichment activities and to have IAEA inspectors or a trusted entity present in Iran. In this regard, Trump said he does not believe Iran is currently seeking to revive its nuclear program but demanded that Iran allow international inspections, including by the IAEA or an approved entity.
This very point shows that the Trump administration also knows Iran’s nuclear program cannot be eliminated solely through military strikes and that Tehran may resort to covert nuclear activities. This speculation is reinforced by Iran’s suspension of cooperation with the IAEA, making any future cooperation contingent on approval from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Consequently, a group of IAEA inspectors has also left Iran.
Meanwhile, the status of approximately 408.6 kg of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium remains unclear. According to some reports, Iran had had sufficient time to transfer enriched uranium, advanced centrifuges, and other sensitive technologies to currently unknown locations. This comes as Trump claims that Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium was also destroyed in the U.S. attack on the Fordow nuclear site.
Despite this, Iran has left the status of this enriched uranium ambiguous, pending a report from Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization on the damage to its nuclear facilities. This is while, a few days before Israel’s attack on Iran, Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, had stated that the 60 percent enriched uranium was securely stored and could not be easily damaged.
On the other hand, while U.S. and Israeli interests regarding Iran largely overlap, the U.S. is unwilling to fully play by Israel’s rules. That is, the U.S. has cooperated with Israel only to the extent its interests dictated, and is currently trying to control Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy and forcing Iran into a kind of political surrender.
Accordingly, immediately after the attacks, Donald Trump called Benjamin Netanyahu and told him not to expect further military action from the U.S. Thus, the stability of the ceasefire between Iran and Israel depends on assessments by Israeli intelligence agencies regarding the extent of damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities. Trump had announced that Israel would provide an assessment of the damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities. If the assessment concludes that the facilities have been severely damaged and Iran cannot revive its nuclear program for many years, the ceasefire may hold. On the other hand, although Israel has shown it acts independently of the U.S., if it realizes it will not have U.S. support in the event of a new attack, it may also consider U.S. diplomacy with Iran.
The ceasefire also appears to depend on pressure from Gulf Cooperation Council members on the U.S. to restrain Israel. These countries are deeply concerned about Israel’s ambitions. Despite viewing Iran as their primary threat for years, Arab Gulf states now face an Israel that is pursuing significant regional instability through wars with Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, aiming to establish its own hegemonic order. In this context, during the Gaza war and in response to the rejection of Trump’s Gaza plan, Israeli Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asked Saudi Arabia to allocate part of its territory for the establishment of a Palestinian state. This was not merely a pressure tactic but also revealed Israel’s intentions toward the Arab region. In this regard, Saudi Arabia has resumed efforts to initiate diplomacy between Iran and the U.S. following the Iran-Israel ceasefire. During a secret visit by Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman to the U.S. and his meeting with President Donald Trump, Iran was among the topics discussed. After meeting with Trump, Khalid bin Salman called Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces.
Diplomacy Amid Distrust
While speculation about renewed Iran-U.S. negotiations persists, Israel’s attack on Iran and the subsequent U.S. strikes on three nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan have deepened Tehran’s distrust of the Trump administration.
Israel’s attack occurred just two days before the sixth round of Iran-U.S. talks was scheduled to begin, and reports indicate that in their last conversation before the attack, Netanyahu had informed Trump about the planned strike on Iran. Thus, announcing the timing of the sixth round was merely a deceptive operation to normalize the situation for Israel’s surprise attack.
During the war, the foreign ministers of Britain, France, Germany, and the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, metwith Araghchi and agreed to meet again within a week. European officials were encouraged to meet with Iran’s foreign minister because Trump had given a two-week window for diplomacy on June 19.
However, the Trump administration attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities just days after this announcement. In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Britain and the EU, “Last week, we were negotiating with the U.S. when Israel destroyed diplomacy. This week, we talked with Europe, and the U.S. destroyed diplomacy. What conclusion do you draw?” As a result of this distrust, Iran now demands serious guarantees from the U.S. that it will not attack Iran during new negotiations. Araghchi stated that Tehran wants the U.S. to guarantee it will not launch military strikes against Iran during negotiations before Iran reengages diplomatically with Washington.
On the other hand, it must be noted that the attacks by Israel and the U.S. on Iranian soil, including its nuclear facilities, set a dangerous precedent: a country that had opened its facilities to inspectors and remained within the framework of negotiations was met with military strikes. If countries conclude that adherence to the NPT and allowing inspections do not protect them from attack or coercion, they may conclude that developing nuclear deterrence is the only reliable means of guaranteeing their security. In fact, this marks the first time two nuclear-armed states have militarily attacked a non-nuclear NPT member. One might argue that this demonstrates that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been merely a political tool for the U.S. and Israel.
The scale of military aggression by nuclear-armed Israel and the U.S. against the civilian nuclear facilities of an NPT member country is unprecedented in history. These attacks began exactly one day after Iran was condemned at the IAEA Board of Governors following the agency’s report. In other words, the report by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi helped create the mental groundwork for military strikes on nuclear facilities.
In this regard, Esmail Baghaei, spokesman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, stated, “From today, no developing country that is an NPT member can take comfort in the Treaty’s promises, because NPT membership not only fails to prevent attacks but becomes a pretext for more precise identification and targeting.” Additionally, Iran’s Supreme National Security Councilannounced that Iran will henceforth suspend all its additional protocol commitments, and if hostile behavior continues, withdrawal from the NPT will be a serious option on the table.
Ali Shamkhani, former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, had earlier tweeted, “Attacking an NPT member with purely peaceful facilities marks the beginning of a new era of nuclear chaos. If the NPT cannot protect its members, it is itself meaningless.” In this context, Iran’s parliament approved a bill on Wednesday, July 4, suspending the country’s cooperation with the IAEA. Iran’s suspension of cooperation with the IAEA comes while it has not withdrawn from the NPT, and IAEA inspections are now contingent on approval from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. This has led to speculation that, under this new approach, Iran is moving toward ‘nuclear ambiguity,’ with some comparing Iran’s current strategy to Israel’s policy of ‘nuclear ambiguity.’
It should be noted that Israel’s nuclear ambiguity strategy, also known as ‘Amimut’ or ‘deliberate ambiguity,’ means Israel neither confirms nor denies having nuclear weapons. This policy serves as a deterrent, aiming to prevent potential attacks on Israel while avoiding international sanctions and pressure over its nuclear arsenal. In contrast, Iran’s suspension of cooperation with the IAEA is aimed at rejecting the agency’s failure to support Iran’s nuclear cooperation program, not at pursuing nuclear weapons.
The U.S. still has an opportunity to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and beyond. To do so, it must focus on diplomacy and confront the deep distrust it has created. However, as Abbas Araghchi has emphasized that the doors to diplomacy will never be closed, Tehran has clearly accepted that a negotiated solution to this crisis is the best possible option for the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Reaching an agreement is essential, but to achieve this, U.S. diplomacy must return to a more realistic approach in negotiations. Washington must abandon its maximalist demand of ‘zero enrichment.’ Arms control experts have noted that insisting on Iran having no enrichment capability is both unnecessary for non-proliferation and unrealistic. The JCPOA previously proved that a limited enrichment program with strict monitoring can effectively block Iran’s pathways to a bomb. The U.S. must show willingness to accept such an agreement in exchange for security guarantees and sanctions relief.
Until a comprehensive agreement is reached between Tehran and Washington, Iran will not hesitate to rebuild its nuclear capabilities—a message signaling continued tension and the potential for a new cycle of conflict in the Middle East. Thus, maintaining the ceasefire is crucial for U.S. regional stability. The U.S. does not want Netanyahu’s adventurism with Iran to continue. It is unwilling to risk reigniting a war that could plunge the region into a deeper crisis.
