Lebanon’s challenge to reassert state control over Hezbollah passes through its ability to establish a credible state capable of effectively and durably protecting its territory and population, while navigating international and regional confrontation, without risking domestic destabilization.
Introduction: A State under Pressure from Three Directions
Lebanon’s security impasse is usually simplistically framed as a question around the future of Hezbollah’s weapons and the Lebanese state’s ability to impose its monopoly over force. Yet this framing captures only part of the problem. The Lebanese state faces a three-level sovereignty dilemma: (1) Israeli occupation and ongoing attacks that continue to threaten its territory and population; (2) Iran’s regional strategy that is still giving Hezbollah a role extending beyond (and often conflicting with) Lebanon’s national interests; and (3) domestic political divisions, structural institutional weaknesses and limited security capabilities that constrain the state’s credibility and ability to respond. The result is a country without real agency over its own fate: Lebanon is hostage to actors that keep shaping its future according to their interests.
Latest developments in fall 2026 are bringing these contradictions into more focus. Israeli military activity continues despite diplomatic efforts to advance negotiations and stabilize the (daily violated) ceasefire. The potential return of military confrontation between Washington and Tehran raises concerns around the risk of Lebanon becoming again involved in the regional conflict. Domestically, the structural inability of the government to credibly deal with Hezbollah’s weapons – but also beyond, with any viable and fair socioeconomic reform – constitutes another impasse. Meanwhile, the approaching end of UNIFIL’s mandate at year’s end is raising further questions about security arrangements in the South.
The central question, therefore, is how Lebanon can build meaningful strategic autonomy without becoming an instrument of regional confrontation or being subjected to internal conflict.
1. The International Dimension: Between American Pressure and European Support
International involvement presents Lebanon with both an opportunity and a constraint. The United States remains central to diplomatic efforts concerning negotiations with Israel, the future of Hezbollah’s military capabilities, and the strengthening of Lebanese security institutions and beyond. In this respect, the United States continues to be the major long-term supporter of the Lebanese Army. Yet American policy also places Beirut under pressure to demonstrate tangible progress in limiting Hezbollah’s independent military role.
The recent Dahr al-Baydar affair illustrates this tension: On 5 October, security forces stopped a vehicle carrying approximately 800 kilograms of explosives, reportedly including TNT and C-4, and detained two individuals. After Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah acknowledged that the seized explosives belonged to the party and claimed they were intended for operations against Israeli forces, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged President Joseph Aoun not to return them and insisted on accountability. The intervention reinforced the government’s position and previous actions – such as banning the group’s military activities in March 2026 – but also exposed the political sensitivity of decisions concerning weapons that Hezbollah regards as part of its resistance to Israeli military activity.
The broader US-Iran confrontation compounds this dilemma. If Lebanon becomes an additional front in that confrontation again, as it was in March, the state could face pressure from Washington to contain Iranian influence, or simply lose its credibility, while simultaneously confronting the human and economic consequences of Hezbollah’s involvement.
Europe offers a potentially complementary approach. On 12 October, the Council of the European Union established the European Union Support Mission in Lebanon, with an initial three-year mandate to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF), including border and maritime security, intelligence, counter-smuggling and port security. However, the mission is not an immediate substitute for UNIFIL. Its deployment remains subject to operational planning and political and security conditions, particularly regarding activity south of the Litani River.
However, American and European support alone will not be sufficient to build a strong army capable of deterring external aggression and enabling Lebanon to reclaim agency over decisions of war and peace. In any case, building such a deterrent military capability is not their objective.
2. The Regional Dimension: Israeli Occupation and Iranian Influence
Israeli strikes, demolitions, occupation and other forms of military activity in southern Lebanon continued throughout the past months despite the ceasefire, sustaining fears of renewed escalation, further displacement and civilian casualties. The recent strike in Kfar Rumman, which killed twelve people, including two infants, illustrates the human consequences of the continuing violence. Israeli military pressure also complicates diplomatic efforts: the Lebanese government is expected to demonstrate that it can control armed activity from its territory while its own population continues to face Israeli occupation and aggression.
The regional context makes this task more difficult. Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah forms part of a wider network of regional partnerships and armed actors. This month’s Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and the subsequent Iranian role provide a striking example of this issue, demonstrating how regional escalation can potentially affect Lebanese territory again. If Iran pushes Hezbollah to enter the confrontation with Israel and the United States, Lebanon will again become a battlefield in a conflict over which its government has limited influence.
Yet a policy focused only on Hezbollah’s military role would leave the other half of the security problem unresolved. The Lebanese government cannot credibly ask its population to rely exclusively on state institutions if those institutions lack the capabilities or political backing to protect them against Israeli attacks.
3. The Domestic Dimension: Reasserting Sovereignty and the Risk of Internal Confrontation
The Dahr al-Baydar explosives case is the perfect and most recent and dangerous illustration of the difficulty of translating the state-monopoly principle into practice. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam pledged a thorough investigation, while the president faced pressure not to reverse the seizure. A separate Army interception of approximately 200 kilograms of explosives near al-Qasr, in Hermel, reinforced concerns about illicit weapons movements across the Syrian border. But both Hezbollah and its constituency have been resisting these measures. As previously stated, Hezbollah MP Fadlallah asked for the release of the arrested and the restitution of the explosives, while sporadic protests erupted to condemn them. How can the government impose a monopoly over weapons while managing internal stability? The government has been juggling restrictive, firm measures with a step-by-step negotiation approach, but it has not yet shown any tangible results.
The reported obstruction of an ISF raid near Beirut, followed by Hezbollah’s accusation that police had breached local security coordination procedures, raised a related question: can state agencies operate according to judicial authority across the country, or must they negotiate access with actors exercising de facto local control? Such incidents challenge the implementation of the state’s monopoly over the use of force and provide a further indication of the fragility of this process.
The medium-term answer to this domestic dilemma may lie in Hezbollah’s own constituency. If public attitudes increasingly undermine the group’s legitimacy, it may be compelled to adapt its strategy. A recent (cross-sectional) Statistics Lebanon survey of 800 adult Lebanese Shia found that 66.4 percent supported transferring Hezbollah’s weapons to state control in some form, while 71.1 percent believed decisions on war and peace should belong exclusively to the state. The findings do not establish consensus on how disarmament should proceed, but they challenge the assumption that Hezbollah’s constituency uniformly rejects stronger state authority.
Conclusion: From Contested Authority to Credible Sovereignty
Lebanon cannot escape its dilemma through a single diplomatic agreement, security operation, or declaration of state monopoly over weapons. It needs a diversified international strategy combining American diplomatic leverage, European capacity-building, continued UN engagement and Arab support, while avoiding dependence on any single actor’s strategic priorities. The EU and US support offers an opportunity to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF), but assistance must translate into sustainable operational capabilities.
However, international support cannot deliver sustainable sovereignty while Lebanon’s territorial security remains contested by Israeli occupation and aggression. Along with Hezbollah’s disarmament, the state must provide a credible strategy to end Israeli violations and occupation. This requires sustained international pressure, effective arrangements for Lebanese deployment and territorial control, and mechanisms for monitoring and de-escalation. Negotiations must serve as instruments of sovereignty, not substitutes for it. The objective is to ensure that Lebanon can protect its territory and population without remaining exposed to Israeli military action or strategic calculations driven by the wider confrontation between Iran, Israel and the United States.
Domestically, restoring state authority cannot be reduced to disarmament. The state must demonstrate that its institutions can protect the population, enforce judicial decisions and provide public services reliably and without discrimination. This also requires pursuing a negotiated process that avoids internal confrontation. Ultimately, Lebanon’s sovereignty will become sustainable only when the state is both capable and legitimate enough to serve as a credible alternative to autonomous military power. This requires structural socioeconomic and banking reforms capable of restoring public finances and securing viable, predictable funding for national defense and security institutions. The objective is not merely to transfer weapons to state control on paper, but to make national defense a public responsibility and ensure that the state can protect its people while retaining control over decisions of war and peace. However, the government has yet to demonstrate tangible progress towards this path.
